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ABSTRACT
Political Corruption In Sub-Sahara Africa:
A Comparative Assessment Of Kenya,
Nigeria, And Zaire/Congo
by
Kennedy Geoffrey Ondieki
Dr. Mehran Tamadonfar, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Legally, politically, academically, and culturally, 
political corruption eludes clear, precise, and 
comprehensive definition. It is a universal phenomenon 
that afflicts every political system. It means different 
things to different people. It manifests itself in a 
variety of ways in both developed and developing countries. 
It is considered morally, economically, politically, and 
socially devastating. This thesis addresses the dynamics of 
political corruption in sub-Saharan Africa and explores some 
central and perplexing questions. How is it that one of the 
most serious problems in sub-Saharan Africa receives such 
limited attention despite its magnitude, pervasiveness, and 
consequences? Is political corruption a cultural 
characteristic of the African continent? What do the
iii
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peoples of Africa think about political corruption?
What are their historical, cultural, and contemporary 
explanations for corruption, i.e., its definitions, causes, 
effects, and remedies? Indeed, we cannot understand 
political corruption in sub-Saharan Africa outside the 
framework of the legacy of colonialism, neo-colonialism, the 
"Big Men", tribalism and nepotism, underdevelopment, and 
frustrated economies. These factors are discussed in 
detail. Three country case studies— Kenya, Nigeria, and 
Zaire/Congo—  are discussed to demonstrate how corruption 
can frustrate, impede, and paralyze all developmental 
efforts, administrative performance, economic growth, and 
social and political integration in Africa. Finally, some 
critical remedies are suggested to eradicate political 
corruption in sub-Saharan Africa.
I V
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INTRODUCTION
Corruption is an ancient phenomenon and a universal
malady that afflicts all societies and polities in one form
or another. It is endemic and pervasive in politics, and
hardly any is government totally immune from corruption. It
is particularly rampant in post-independent Africa, and it
has reached alarming proportions. It has permeated every
sector of government and society as a whole; it has become
part and parcel of the African lifestyle. Since it has
grown in such gigantic proportions and affects all spheres
of life— political, social, economic, and cultural— it is a
dilemma that urgently demands the continent's serious
attention.^ According to Ronald E. Wraith and Edgar
Simpkins, corruption in Africa,
flourishes as luxuriantly as the bush and weeds which
it so much resembles, taking the goodness from the soil
and suffocating the growth of plants which have been 
carefully and expensively bred and tended.‘
Political corruption in politics and leadership is a 
common practice in contemporary African political systems. 
Scholars and commentators argue that through the fabric of 
political life runs the scarlet thread of bribery and 
corruption. Andreski Stanislav, in particular, states that
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"venality pervades through and through the fabric of African 
states"', and like an ogre it refuses to let go of African 
communities, assert Kivutha Kibwana et al.*
In recent years, the notoriously affected countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa— Nigeria, Congo/Zaire, Ghana, Sierra 
Leone, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Kenya, Malawi, 
and Zambia— have had numerous episodes of governmental and 
individual misdeeds reported in both the local and 
international press. These reports heavily indict the 
African elite, top government officials, presidents (the 
"Big Men"), civil servants, businessmen, and even the public 
with the perpetration of such corrupt activities as 
embezzlement, fraud, kickbacks, theft, misappropriation of 
funds, bribery and extortion, report padding, tribalism, and
nepotism.5
Interestingly enough, even African leaders, the elite, 
officials in top government institutions/echelons, and 
intellectuals acknowledge the existence of such high levels 
of government corruption. To control or alleviate this 
problem— the illegal practices and immoral activities— many 
African states have, in conjunction with their judicial 
systems, formed special anti-corruption squads and created 
committees for national inquiries to these activities and 
bring the wrongdoers to justice. Unfortunately, these anti­
corruption institutions are all too impotent because, all
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too often, these agencies are under the thumb of the "Strong
Men" and thus are controlled by those most heavily involved
in the corrupt activities.*
The sad fact is that political corruption keeps raging
on unabated, eating the very fabric of African societies—
from "top political levels to the family unit".’ Its impact
is far-reaching resulting in underdevelopment, political
unrest, economic decline, unemployment, social malaise,
crime and violence, and other human miseries.
The most perplexing questions posed are: (1) How is it
that one of the most serious problems in Africa remains an
understudied phenomenon, despite its magnitude,
pervasiveness, and consequences? (2) Why is it that for
decades political corruption in Africa received such limited
attention from researchers? and (3) What has been done
recently to correct this crisis? The answers to these
questions are hard to pin down. Perhaps Wraith and
Simpkins's succinct explanation tackles this dilemma when
they eloquently write that:
It is frustrating to try to write, one's phrases 
wrapped in a cocoon of ambiguity, about something which 
everybody knows, which no one dares openly acknowledge, 
which may lead to serious trouble if one is in the 
least incautious.®
Indeed, the above statement extrapolates in a nutshell 
two reasons why scholars are disinterested in African 
corruption. First, the shortcomings and risks that are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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involved in undertaking such a sensitive and delicate issue 
outweigh the benefits. Second, political corruption is 
widely accepted as a "necessary fact of life" in most of 
African nations. In fact, bribery and venality are viewed 
as essential ingredients that turn the wheels of government 
and facilitate business transactions. Therefore, these 
facts of life or biases have contributed to thwarting local 
and international researchers from studying this problem 
and, thus, possibly provide remedies.*
Theoretically speaking, when the concept of corruption 
is placed under social science's macroscopic lens, it 
indeed, proves broad and complicated, because it involves 
various interpretations and meanings. Therefore, the answer 
to the question why corruption has been understudied in 
Africa and why many scholars for decades have been 
discouraged from undertaking this phenomenon runs the gamut 
from the risks involved to lack of information and 
accessibility of sources, from lack of consensus among 
scholars on the precise definition of corruption to lack of 
scientific methods relevant to studying this subject on a 
universal or cross-cultural basis.
However, because of the severe impact of political 
corruption in sub-Saharan Africa, numerous scholars, 
especially those who are brave enough, as well as those who 
place primacy on the substance over method, have in recent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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years ventured to study this subject regardless of the
consequences, opting to understand the phenomenon and
provide remedies.
The question that arises is: Why has Africa become the
"poster boy" for the study of political corruption? Simply
put, why are scholars and students of corruption paying
special attention to contemporary Africa? First and
foremost, there is a general consensus among scholars that
corruption is a global problem whose effects are far-
reaching. According to Syed Hussein Alatas,
The problem with corruption is trans-systemic; that is, 
it inheres in all social systems— feudalism, 
capitalism, communism, and socialism. It affects all 
classes of society; all state organizations, monarchies 
and republics; all situations in war and peace; all age 
groups; both sexes; and all times, ancient, medieval, 
and modern.
Indeed, on a continent where corruption has "passed the 
alarming and entered the fatal stage"̂ ;̂ where the problem 
has transcended individuals and entered the state system; 
where the practice is so endemic, pervasive, and viewed as a 
fact of life; and where the whole society keeps nipping like 
termites at its very scarce natural resources to the extent 
of turning the whole continent into a basket case, clearly 
studying the manifestations and ramifications of this 
disease is, indeed, a step forward toward finding the cure.
Similarly, sub-Saharan Africa is appealing to scholars 
and students of political corruption for various reasons.
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James Gibbs Jr., contends that for decades the primary 
interest of scholars and academicians focused mainly on the 
peoples and cultures of Africa. Perusing social science 
studies and the rich and varied literature on the peoples of 
Africa as presented by anthropologists and sociologists, one 
is convinced that African corruption was either 
insignificant or uninteresting to most scholars. However, 
with the end of the cold war, Africa moved to center stage, 
not purely because it is the "home" of human misery, but 
also because it is underdeveloped.^*
Furthermore, most scholars generally agree that the 
prevalence of political corruption in the newly independent 
nations of Africa seriously hinders economic growth and 
political development.^® Therefore, scholars and students 
of corruption have not only been lured towards Africa 
because of its supposedly open and democratic political 
systems that have made it possible and conducive to study 
political corruption in contemporary Africa but also because 
it is significant to understand its nature and effects.
Additionally, it is argued that, for sub-Saharan 
Africa,
The past thirty years have been disastrous. The region 
has been beset by famine, drought, civil war, disease, 
population explosion, shortage of food, environmental 
degradation, a fall in production and exports, massive 
governmental indebtedness, and political corruption. 
Worse yet, Africa now faces severe competition from 
Eastern European countries for scarce international
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aid. Therefore, without finding a cure for corruption, 
future economic decline, political unrest, poverty, 
human suffering, and cries for self-determination are 
inevitable.
Other factors why social scientists are now interested in 
studying corruption in sub-Saharan Africa include: First,
Africa stands highly vulnerable to government corruption 
compared to other developing countries^® due to political 
and economic instability, ineffective government 
institutions, particularly, the judicial system; due to lack 
of democratic tradition, political pluralism, and skilled 
manpower.
Second, Africa still remains terra incognita, to many 
scholars and researchers. In fact, some of Africa's 
"primitive" regions are to-date understudied and hence 
undiscovered. Most of these areas are found in the rural 
areas where the majority of people reside. Indeed, for 
decades, scholars and researchers have concentrate their 
energies in studying African predicaments in the urban 
centers especially capital cities, but with recent discovery 
of rural regions, researchers have began to incorporated 
rural and urban areas to understand Africa's problems.
Third, Africa provides lively, fresh, and juicy 
episodes of both petty and grand-scale corruption. These 
episodes run the gamut from buying a cup of coffee, lunch, 
drinks, to giving bribes in monetary currency to acquire
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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jobs or driver's licenses, to offering large kickbacks, or 
"percentages" to acquire business licenses or begin a 
factory at certain areas or locations in urban centers. 
Therefore, these factors have played a key role into 
attracting scholars, academicians, and students of political 
corruption to probe the ramifications of this phenomenon 
with the hope of understanding it, mitagating its impacts, 
and setting a precedent on how to study government or 
bureaucratic corruption.
In spite of the endeavors to study corruption in sub- 
Saharan Africa, social scientists still face some disturbing 
questions: How does one study corruption where it is said
be so prevalent? Where does one draw a line between a gift 
and a bribe where the two phrases are often used 
synonymously? How does one tell corrupt acts from normal 
acts where laws are often unclear or mute? Which criteria 
are relevant and applicable to studying corruption? With 
these factors in mind, a thorough theoretical, conceptual, 
and methodological framework are of utmost importance to 
understanding this phenomenon.
THESIS OBJECTIVES
This thesis analyzes what Africans think about 
political corruption. It examines the nature of corruption, 
its causes, effects, and remedies. It assesses and compares
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
corruption in three African countries— Kenya, Nigeria, and 
the former Zaire. The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. 
One is to shed some light to undertanding political 
corruption from an African perspective. Two is to show 
that, if this problem rages on unabated, it can become a 
deadly disease. Additionally, it is my contention that 
political corruption may not rank high in the minds of the 
African peoples who daily live with such problems as 
poverty, disease, civil war, hunger, tribalism, and 
illiteracy; nonetheless, it is a dilemma that requires the 
continent's special attention. Attempts to alleviate "these 
problems can only be hampered when citizens lack confidence 
in their governments and are distrustful of their officials, 
a situation not likely to change so long as corruption 
remains at its present level".This is the overriding 
message I hope to convey in this thesis.
The findings of this research confirm that corruption 
is indeed the number one problem and the major obstacle to 
Africa's economic growth, political development and 
integration, and political leadership. Therefore, it is my 
contention that political corruption has ruined Nigeria, the 
former Zaire, Kenya, and many other countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. It also my assertion that, if this trend continues 
at its current rate and if sub-Saharan Africa falls short of 
sunshine remedies before the end of this century, the whole
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of the African continent will be one big political and 
economic basket-case.
The introduction part provides a set of dimensions on 
the study of corruption; offers a general overview of 
corruption and a theoretical framework and addresses some 
key questions and delineates the primary objectives of this 
thesis.
Chapter One provides the major conceptual, and 
methodological framework necessary for the study of 
political corruption. To provide a broad and comprehensive 
analysis of corruption; explores both the Western and non- 
Western (indigenous) explanations; discusses various 
definitions of political corruption based on legality, 
public interest, public opinion, market-oriented and 
philosophical views; provides differences between corruption 
and political corruption, corruption and bribery, bribery 
and gift-giving, corruption and tribalism/nepotism, and 
political corruption and culture; and offers descriptive, 
prescriptive, and analytic indigenous explanations of 
corruption as understood by Africans. The fact that, the 
concept of political corruption precludes a universal 
definition and a continental consensus a detailed 
comparative analysis of this phenomenon is oftentimes 
unachievable and/or myopic. Therefore, I intend to provide
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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a precise "working" (all-African) definition to simplify the 
task of operationalizing this concept.
Chapter Two traces the genesis of political corruption 
commencing from the Biblical standpoint; Ancient and Roman 
medieval Rome; modern Europe and North American 
perspectives; to Middle-Eastern and African purview. This 
chapter intends to show that corruption is as old as mankind 
and their governments.
Chapter Three delineates the genesis and development of 
political corruption and discusses its causes from both 
external and internal perspectives. Additionally, two 
schools of thought (international and national) and the 
dependency theory are analyzed in endeavoring to search for 
the underlying reasons for corruption. Therefore, the 
causes of corruption in sub-Saharan African states are drawn 
from a variety of factors— the legacy of colonialism and 
neo-colonialism, tribalism and nepotism, the centralization 
of state structures, the "Big Man" syndrome, lack of state 
accountability and transparency, and simply due to personal 
avarice and greed and, of course, other physical realities.
Chapter Four examines the nuts and bolts of Africa's 
paternalistic and neo-tribal models of leadership that 
contribute to corruption. Indeed, in almost every African 
society, paternalism, clientalism, and tribalism still
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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remain the defining features of politics and leadership.
Due to lack of a sense of national identity that transcends 
tribalism or ethnicity, current political leaders play the 
"tribal card" to rule and/or remain in power. Also it shows 
that even among some charismatic leaders— Kwame Nkrumah, 
Patrice Lumumba, Jomo Kenyatta, and Nelson Madikizela 
Mandela leadership styles and the cult of personality 
were/are replicas of tribal forms of leadership.
Chapter Five discusses the economic, social and 
political impacts of political corruption and ascertains 
that corruption is indeed the major impediment to 
development and the primary cause for sub-Saharan Africa's 
economic decline, political instability, and its many other 
manmade miseries.
Chapter Six provides three country case studies from 
three different regions in sub-Saharan Africa. The first 
one is Kenya, once Africa's shining star and according to 
many people a country that was destined to succeed in East 
Africa. Second is Nigeria, once Africa's economic 
powerhouse blessed with oil and a leading star in West 
Africa. Last is the former Zaire, a country that was 
blessed with natural resources including diamonds.
Copper, and Iron ore that became a kleptocratic state in the 
midst of Central Africa. This chapter shows that, although 
these countries are far away from each other and have
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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different forms of government, one thing they share in 
common is high-scale political corruption.
Chapter Seven offers some feasible theoretical and 
practical remedies appropriate for eradicating or reducing 
political corruption in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa. 
Additionally, it provides some conclusions and findings.
One of this conclusions is that, without sunshine mechanisms 
and measures or "a magic bullet" to control political 
corruption before the end of this century, sub-Saharan 
Africa is going to be nothing but a big basket-case.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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CHAPTER 1
POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A CONCEPTUAL AND
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
"Truth is whatever promotes your government. If 
something is not favorable to your country, then it 
isn't true and you should not publish falsehoods".
— Quoted in David Lamb, The Africans
Research on political corruption and its causes and 
consequences has been lamentably insular. Studies on 
systemic corruption, for instance, have been limited to a 
handful of developed countries, specifically Great Britain 
and the United States. The major reason for this cultural 
bias has been attributed to the chronic shortage of 
information and/or access to the major primary sources and 
historical data. For decades social scientists, 
academicians, and especially students of political 
corruption have been faced with severe obstacles in 
undertaking this phenomenon.^
These problems are a result of either the non-existence 
of adequate information and/or government redtape— data 
hidden by parties concerned. Consequently, any attempt to 
understand the nature of political corruption, its causes 
and its impacts, remains provincial at best and, at worst, 
subjective and filled with unproven theories.-
In the absence of primary sources against which to
16
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test and evaluate specific patterns or attributes of 
corruption pertinent to drawing some objective and concrete 
generalizations, efforts to study and understand corruption 
are often "guided by intuition and political expediency".^ 
Here, a cultural analogy may be appropriate: "One man's 
terrorist is to another a liberator" or as John Peters and 
Susan Welch state, "what may be corrupt to one citizen, 
scholar, or public official is just politics to another,or 
indiscretion to a third".“ Put simply, what some observers 
may call corruption may be just a normal practice.
THE MAJOR OBSTACLES TO THE STUDY OF CORRUPTION 
The question is: Why is it so difficult for social
scientists to study political corruption in Third World 
nations, specifically contemporary African governments? 
Robert Klitgaard probably sums it up best when he states 
that :
Researchers find it increasingly complex and 
frustrating to empirically study government corruption 
because the parties involved have every reason to keep 
data hidden and governments are reluctant to allow 
foreigners and even their own citizens to work on such 
a sensitive question. Consequently, academic debates 
over the toxic and tonic properties of corruption tend 
to rely too much upon anecdotes, hypothetical cases, 
and speculative linkages between corruption and the 
future social outcomes.^
Obviously sources and accessibility are the prime 
obstacles that scholars face. It is Rory Miller's
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contention that oftentimes the documentation on this subject 
has been sparse in official publications and records. 
Research in local archives which might uncover the lower 
level of politics, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and other 
government institutions has commenced only in recent years. 
Consequently, much of the available evidence on corruption 
comes from the archives of foreign governments, journalists, 
scholars, businessmen, and travelers who at some point are 
forced to compromise with the endemic corruption which they 
encounter in Third World countries, particularly those in 
Africa.°
Obviously, relying heavily on Western scholars and 
sources introduces yet another bias in the study. However, 
with the present state of knowledge, these scholars probably 
offer one of the most fruitful ways of developing an 
analysis of the structure and dynamics of political 
corruption in post-independent Africa.^
Pertaining to corrupt government elites in Africa, and 
especially those in power, Kole Omotoso claims that they get 
away with their corruption unpublished.® Furthermore, those 
who get prosecuted walk free or receive minor punishment.
The primary reason why African researchers are discouraged 
from unearthing and publishing government corruption is 
xenophobia or fear of government repression. Many who brave 
to openly talk or write about systemic corruption often pay
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
with their lives. Recent examples of Nigerian poet and 
anti-corruption crusader Ken Saro Wiwa's public guillotining 
and former Kenya Minister for Foreign Affairs Robert Ouko's 
ghastly assassination serve as backdrops.
Other difficulties and dilemmas lie in the 
circumstantial nature of much of the evidence. For example, 
Africa did not have a radical press of the kind that exposed 
"Old Corruption" in early 19th century Britain. Similarly, 
many episodes of alleged corruption at the higher levels of 
government and key records are often missing, hidden, or 
ignored by scholars.®
There is also the difficulty of drawing a line through 
the hazy area that lies between outright bribes and 
extortion on the one hand, and the relationship of 
clientalism, kinship, and tribal ties that characterize 
African political life on the other. Therefore, as long 
as researchers and students of corruption encounter a major 
problem of differentiating a bribe from a gift, or a corrupt 
activity from normal lifestyle, any attempt to grasp this 
phenomenon may blurred or deterred entirely.
In contrast, pertaining to sub-Saharan Africa, Kivutha 
Kibwana et al., contend that most social scientists were 
particularly disinterested in undertaking the study of 
political corruption because of the way African political 
systems were structured. They assert that "...prior to
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1990, most African countries were either under military rule 
or single party governments and/or lacked adequate 
information or access to primary data on both foreign and 
local researchers".^^ As a result, most of the information 
found about corruption in Africa relied heavily on a media 
that only occasionally exposed government scandal and often 
lacked authenticity, objectivity, and scientificity.
Another global factor that contributes to the 
complexity of studying political corruption includes lack of 
consensus among social scientists on the definition of 
corruption, lack of the approach and method on how to study 
corruption, and lack of relevance and applicability of some 
explanations. Specifically, due to lack of a germane cross- 
cultural paradigm necessary to study this phenomenon, the 
end result has been heated debates and disagreements among 
social scientists that dominated the literature of political 
corruption. 1-
THE WESTERN AND NON-WESTERN EXPLANATIONS OF CORRUPTION 
This problem is largely attributed to the scholars' 
political, economic, and social environments. Depending on 
the cultural orientation and background of a particular 
researcher (Western or non-Western) , it is highly likely 
that he or she will define and explain corruption based on
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his or her purview— culture and understanding. For example, 
what an American may see as a bribe may be a gift to an 
African. Similarly, what one scholar may see as behavior 
that constitutes corruption to another may be a normal and 
acceptable activity. Additionally, the interpretation or 
cultural connotation that one's research may attach to the 
concept of corruption may not necessarily be relevant or 
applicable to another. Indeed, where one looks depends up 
on where one stands.
Peter DeLeon argues that what is seen as corruption is 
"decidedly dependent on societal and cultural norms''.̂ ®
Given the fact that sub-Saharan Africa comprises many 
diverse societies and cultures being cautious and sensitive 
to how we define or explain corruption is critical. DeLeon 
states that "What transpires in a Latin America, Middle 
East, or Asian nation as legitimate, excusable, or at least 
accepted business exchanges would be felonies in the United 
States".In the same vein, one can also argue that the 
practice of gift-giving may be interpreted by western 
observers as bribery and corruption while Africans may 
embrace and treat this practice as a normal way of life.
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AFRICANS' JUSTIFICATION OF CORRUPTION 
Measured by the modern standards or yardsticks, the 
system of government (chiefdoms) in pre-colonial Africa was 
deeply and pervasively corrupt just as it was during 
colonial and post-colonial eras. The question is, how do 
Africans today justify the endemic and pervasive existence 
of corruption? Indeed, what westerners may call moral 
corruption, average Africans may choose to call a parallel 
economy— it is not underground, it is a necessity. Ben 
Tahar Jelloun states that "they don't condone it, nor do 
they wish to live with it, but they don't confuse 
compensation with theft". He also notes that Africans read 
or hear daily of the developed world's systemic scandals and 
large-scale corruption, but they see corruption in their 
countries as small-scale— on an individual level. In 
developed nations it is no longer compensation for the 
people, it is misappropriation of large sums of monies, 
embezzlement, fraud, and organized crimes. Similarly, they 
see no correlation between their entirely small-scale and 
underdeveloped way of freeing up a file to save time and 
create jobs, and the numbered Swiss bank accounts Europeans 
and American politicians and businessmen open to stash 
payoffs for the compromises they make with parliament or 
congress, industrial, and even Mafia figures.^®
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Furthermore, they are miserable and underpaid 
bureaucrats engaged in daily struggle so that their 
children, family, and relatives can have a normal lifestyle, 
education, and a decent life without sadness and poverty.
In fact, most civil servants or bureaucrats do not see 
themselves as greedy and selfish but rather they just want 
to have their fair share. Therefore, it is perceived as 
entirely legitimate to cut corners and to help one's 
relatives and tribesmen survive. Thus, the issue of 
morality and ethics are non-existent.^ This, then, is how 
Africans justify corruption— a way of survival.
In sum, due to the lack of information, access to 
available data, a universal approach or traveling method 
relevant to studying political corruption on a cross- 
cultural basis, and the absence of concrete empirical data 
or evidence necessary to evaluate and test certain or 
specific variables and patterns of political corruption, 
attempts to draw comprehensive generalizations or 
explanations to this concept may be blurred and/or difficult 
to accomplish. Additionally, due to the lack of adequate 
scientific method to study this subject, the possibility of 
relying on anecdotes, hearsay, subjective, and biased 
explanations are most likely. Therefore, our lack of 
understanding of political corruption is brought by 
cultural, conceptual, and methodological frameworks.
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In contrast, Charles A. Schwartz claims that although
the study of political corruption has advanced in recent
years in terms of its approach and method, there is yet,
however, a gigantic lack of understanding on this subject on
both the elite and non-elite levels. For instance, scholars
still disagree a great deal about the applicability of some
definitions and explanations regarding the concept of
corruption. Nonetheless, Schwartz contends that today
researchers use various paradigms to investigate this
phenomenon and arrive at some general consensus and
universal generalizations. He particularly states that
social scientists have two major tasks and objectives
to change the nature of inquiry from an inquisition of 
immoral individuals to an investigation of actual 
workings of corruption in the society...to apply system 
analysis to these workings with an eye to gaining new 
insights into the process of modernization and 
political development.1®
For his part, Robert Tignor also admits that most of the 
literature on political corruption seeks to define the 
concept, its causes, its impacts, and its remedies 
regardless of the method— quantitative or qualitative.^® 
Arguing from these scholars, especially that of Syed Hussein 
Alatas, it is critical for researchers and students of 
corruption to study this subject as a "universal phenomenon" 
in order to clearly see how different factors or patterns of 
corruption when put together form a "composite whole".The
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implication from these arguments is that if we increase our 
array, height and width, patterns and discourses of 
corruption, accommodate other cultures and their 
explanations, use holistic approaches, and apply multi­
methodology methods such as content analysis, field work, 
interviews, surveys, experiments, historical comparative 
analysis, western and non-western viewpoints to the study of 
political corruption, we are highly likely to reach a 
universal consensus and understanding that would enable us 
to make comprehensive, accurate, objective, valid, reliable, 
and applicable generalizations of this phenomenon.
DATA COLLECTION 
In researching and analyzing this thesis, I used 
several approaches and methods to probe and arrive at some 
conclusions. These are: content analysis, field research,
personal interviews, and participant observation. Where 
possible, I conducted my project by traveling to some parts 
of sub-Saharan Africa— Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi, and 
South Africa. Oftentimes, the interviews were face-to-face 
and the population involved journalists, lawyers, 
businessmen, college professors, students, civil servants, 
bus and taxi drivers, and the general public. The 
interviews were informal in that I followed no prepared 
schedule of questions. Instead I adopted my questions to
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the interviews accordingly. In most cases, I benefitted and 
garnered more information during my conversations with the 
government workers and general public during their leisure 
time and social activities especially while watching soccer.
Nigeria and the former Zaire, I was unable to travel to 
conduct one-on-one research. Instead, I interviewed 
scholars and students studying and residing in the United 
States. I also relied heavily on content analysis, i.e., 
current materials such as textbooks, magazines, newspapers 
and journal articles.
To establish the nature of political corruption, its 
historical genesis, the forms in which it manifests itself 
in practice, its perceived causes and explanations, its 
political and socio-economic consequences, and its remedies, 
I sought data and relied heavily upon different scholarly 
and journalistic literatures, both Western and non-Western.
I also made use of the international and national schools of 
thought and relied on several methods, i.e., content 
analysis, field study— participant observation and 
interviews. Most significant, I took note of what people 
said constituted political corruption, its causes, effects, 
and remedies to shed some light in understanding this 
subject.
Although corruption is widely observable in Africa, it 
is still regarded as a sensitive and delicate subject, a
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topic that people are not accustomed to speaking about 
publicly without looking over their shoulders. A majority 
of Africans still prefer a "silence is golden" stance or a 
"don't ask, don't tell" mentality since, discussing 
corruption, one does so at his or her peril.
Even though corruption is an unlawful, criminal 
activity, it is nevertheless generally accepted as a normal 
way of life in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Still, 
discussing it openly can be incriminating. Thus, the major 
predicament I encountered researching this topic in Africa 
was a lack of straight talkers, especially among the African 
elites, top government officials, civil servants, and the 
public at large. There was a general hesitation to respond 
to most of my questions because of fear of government 
repression or the risk of being prosecuted. Worse still, 
the existing information on corruption or reports on 
national inquiries on government corruption were hardly 
accessible.
Therefore, due to the above dilemmas, I relied 
predominately upon current materials— magazines, newspapers 
(local and international), reports from United Nations 
agencies, non-governmental agencies, and some of their 
workers. While researching this project in Africa, 
sometimes I was forced to engage in bribery or the "African 
handshake" to access some information concerning government
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documents, or for that matter to get some people, 
especially, the civil servants and the public to talk. The 
bribes ranged from cash to "nyama chôma" (a leg of roasted 
goat meat) to beer and cigarettes. After encountering all 
these problems and setbacks in collecting data, I realized 
that one approach or method was quite inadequate to gather 
information in sub-Saharan Africa. I also found out that 
some of my prepared questionnaires were oftentimes 
ineffective and/or ignored by the respondents. The cardinal 
reason was, even within Africa, the concept of corruption 
means many things to different people. Thus I chose to use 
various methods in this study. Additionally, due to the 
need for a cultural explanation of political corruption, it 
seemed particularly important to undertake this phenomenon 
with as many approaches and explanations as possible to 
grasp what Africans think about political corruption and its 
cultural explanations. Besides, with such a remarkable 
topic, this is, of such broad magnitude, and of a variety of 
facets and caveats, it would be unrealistic to limit 
ourselves to only a single method and explanation.
Therefore, I chose to use various methods in undertaking the 
study political corruption. Because it adds rigor, breadth, 
and depth to our understanding.
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DEFINING POLITICAL CORRUPTION
"A concept that is boundless cannot 
be rationally defined".
— Franz Neuman, Behemoth. (1943:75)
The explicit significance of the above quotations is: 
it is extremely difficult to define the concept of 
corruption because it means different things to different 
people throughout the globe. Even though, the meaning of 
this phenomenon has many ramifications, it nonetheless, 
easily detected because its impacts are far-reaching and 
damaging.
In his preface, Robert Williams articulates that:
If you let people know that you are interested in 
controlling corruption in developing countries, you may 
find some surprising and skeptical reactions. 'Yes they 
may tell you that we have heard that corruption is a 
big problem in Third World governments. But who is to 
say a given act is actually corrupt? Maybe it is 
corrupt in your culture, but not theirs. And might not 
corruption play a useful role in developing societies? 
Doesn't it grease the wheels of commerce, build 
political coalitions, and help organizations overcome 
red tape? Besides what can you do or anyone else do 
about corruption? Like sin, it's everywhere.̂
These rhetorical questions together, however, spawn 
definitional debate among social scientists and often 
dominate the literature of political corruption.
Legally, academically, politically, and culturally, 
corruption eludes clear definition.^ Corruption, like 
obscenity or democracy may mean different things to 
different people, depending on their individual.
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ideological, methodological, and cultural or contextual 
viewpoints.^ According to Ernest Harsch, the term 
corruption "conjures up certain images but when closely 
examined it involves a wide spectrum of practices, of 
varying forms and significancies".“ In the same vein,
Robert Williams claims that corruption "resists easy 
measurement and simple interpretation".® Therefore, under no 
circumstances could corruption be studied in isolation of 
politics and power, political institutions and economic 
resources, and class and society.
Generally speaking, defining corruption either from a
Western or non-Western context can be very difficult or a
"tedious and dispiriting task".® Any significant attempts to
search for a comprehensive and all-embracing explanation is
oftentimes myopic. Perhaps Robin Theobald's explanation
captures this dilemma when he graphically writes that:
Corruption like many other forms of behavior when 
placed under the scrutiny of social science lens proves 
to be an elusive and complex phenomenon: in fact the 
more one examines it the more difficult it becomes to 
separate corruption from other forms of social 
exchange. The task of definition is not made easier by 
the fact that corruption by its very nature, is 
inseparable from questions of public morality and 
morality in general. This has sometimes excited a 
tendency to condemn which has impeded objective 
analysis. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that 
some writers, whilst dealing with the phenomenon in 
some detail, have deliberately avoided it.’
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This means that the deeper researchers probe this 
phenomenon, the more confusing and complicated it gets. 
Furthermore, it is highly likely that researchers may 
overlook or ignore the essential components of corruption.
Under these conditions, many scholars and students of 
corruption may argue that attempting an all-embracing 
definition of the concept of political corruption is indeed 
impossible, if not unrealistic. Unfortunately, those who do 
attempt to provide a precise universal definition 
oftentimes limit their focus and approach to certain 
patterns of corrupt behavior to arrive at a consensus. 
However, scholars who venture into this narrow purview fail 
to acknowledge that the concept of corruption is so broad 
and ambiguous and that it "assumes many different forms, 
levels, magnitudes, and frequencies"® and is, therefore, 
difficult to pin down.
If this assertion is true— that corruption manifests 
itself in many sizes and shapes, the questions are: Would
such an ambiguous concept as corruption be understood in the 
absence of a universal definition? Would it be practical to 
clearly define corruption without falling into conceptual 
problems? The answers to these questions are emphatically 
"no". Given the manifestations and ramifications of 
corruption, any endeavor to search for a cross-cultural 
definition would indeed lead to conceptual traps and also
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invoke some serious ethnocentric labels. Furthermore, it 
would be unprecedented and insensitive for researchers to 
use a Western notion to explain, analyze, and measure 
corruption in Third World countries, specifically in Sub- 
Saharan Africa. However, it would also be absolutely 
impossible to study, operationalize, analyze, and understand 
political corruption without some general consensus on what 
constitutes corruption.
This chapter addresses five major questions: (1) What
is corruption? (2) What is the difference between corruption 
and political corruption? (3) What type of behavior 
constitutes corruption? (4) How do Africans view/think about 
corruption? and (5) What kinds of behavior do they regard as 
corrupt? But, before discussing what peoples of Africa 
understand about corruption, it is important foremost to 
explore the different definitions of corruption based on 
legal and moral grounds, on public interest and public 
opinion viewpoints, and on economic and classical 
philosophy.
It is John G. Peters and Susan Welch's contention that 
no matter what aspect of behavior or political system is 
examined, the study of systemic or government corruption is 
still hampered by the lack of an adequate definition. For 
example, what may be "corrupt" to one person or government 
official, may just be "normal behavior" to another.®
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Equally significant, the cliche "one man's meat is another 
man's poison" or "one man's terrorist is to another a 
liberator" may be worn-out, but together they nonetheless 
illustrate how notoriously difficult it gets to define the 
concept of corruption or to separate corrupt from non­
corrupt behavior in a diversified world.
According to Arnold J. Heidenheimer, any analysis of 
political corruption must confront the thorny issue of 
defining what is meant by the term.̂ ° Elaine R. Johansen 
asserts that there has been a tremendous attempt to 
catalogue and delineate the identifying characteristics of 
political corruption, but to date no generally agreed upon 
definition has been achieved."- In contrast, however, Walter 
Little and Eduardo Posada-Carbo contend that for all the 
moral indignation corruption generates, political corruption 
should be distinguished from crimes such as theft, burglary, 
and embezzlement. They maintain that while several forms of 
corruption may well involve criminality, a definition that 
is too "narrowly based on legal codes sacrifices 
consideration of corruption's more subtle and nebulous 
aspects".
For example, often political corruption is 
characterized by dual and contradictory elements. When 
engaging in bribes and backhanders, political officials and 
businesses may be fulfilling their legitimate functions.
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The bribe may be a byproduct of the fulfillment of an 
official process, such as in the case of business licenses.
In other cases, such as the use of "sweeteners" (tax 
incentives) by governments to attract investments in a given 
region or industry, the distinction between such 
inducements, which are claimed to be legitimate, and 
bribery, which is seen as corrupt, is sometimes hazy. Such 
overlaps have led some analysts to distinguish between 
black, white, and gray forms of corruption based on how 
public opinion perceives t h e m . I t  is evident, for example, 
that members of the United States congress in Washington 
D.C. compete in a "rat-race" for pork-barrel projects for 
their states/constituencies and lobby Congress to offer tax 
incentives to businessmen investing in rundown inner-cities 
and crime ridden neighborhoods. The question is: Does this
behavior constitute corruption? Put simply, under what 
category of corrupt behavior would this practice of 
logrolling fall?
Heidenheimer identifies three types of corruption—
Black, Gray, and White. He labels an action
'Black corruption' which a majority consensus of both 
elite and mass opinion would condemn and would want see 
punished on grounds of principle. 'Grey corruption' 
indicates that some element, usually elites, may want 
to see the action punished, others not and majority may 
well be ambiguous. 'White corruption' signifies that 
the majority of both elite and mass opinion probably 
would not vigorously support an attempt to punish a 
form of corruption that they regard tolerable."
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It is quite likely that the behavior/actions of the U.S. 
legislators who put their states' interests above those of 
the country would fall under the category of grey 
corruption.
LEGAL, PUBLIC INTEREST, PUBLIC OPINION,
ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
What is corruption? According to Ernest Harsch, 
corruption includes all practices or behavior that society 
identifies, labels, or condemns as being corrupt. These 
practices may include such activities as "outright theft, 
embezzlement of funds or other appropriations of state 
property, nepotism and the granting of favors to personal 
acquaintances, and the abuse of public authority and 
positions to exact payment and privileges"." Even with clear 
and succinct behaviors and practices, evidently, explaining 
corruption still remains notoriously complex.
Numerous observers define corruption in different ways 
based on legality, public interest, public opinion, market- 
oriented principles, and philosophical viewpoints.
According to Stephen Ellis, corruption is "the use of 
official position or authority for purposes of personal 
advantages"." George Benson defines it as the "illegitimate 
use of public power for private gain"." H. A. Brasz, on the
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other hand, asserts that corruption is the "arbitrary use of 
power". For his part, Stanislav Andreski writes that 
corruption "designates the practice of using the power of 
office for making private gains in breach of laws and 
regulations nominally in force".
M. McMullan states that "a public official is corrupt if 
he accepts money or money's worth for doing something that 
he is under a duty to do anyway or one that he is under a 
duty not to do, or to exercise a legitimate discretion for 
improper reasons".^® Joseph S. Nye defines corruption as 
"behavior which deviates from the formal duties of public 
role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding 
(personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status 
gains: or violates rules against the exercise of certain 
types of private-regarding influence"."^ In the same vein,
D.H. Bayley argues that corruption, while tied to the act of 
bribery in a general term, covers the "misuse of authority 
as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need 
not be monetary".For example, Richard Nixon's Watergate 
scandal and Ronald Reagan's Iran-Contra Affairs serve as 
backdrops to illustrate how United States presidents misused 
their executive authority, not purely to enrich themselves, 
but largely for other purposes— re-election in the case of 
Nixon and power and popularity for Reagan. In short, one 
can argue that those individuals who orchestrated the
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Watergate and Iran-Contra scandals, including of course the 
two presidents, may not have benefitted financially, but the 
desire to see the Republican Party win election and stay in 
power or control the government's course of action was 
worthwhile.
Definitions of corruption based on the public interest
perspective are significant because they essentially broaden
the range of behavior considered corrupt. For instance,
when a public officeholder accepts illegal rewards to give
favors to donors, he or she threatens and damages the public
interest and violates the public trust. According to
Arnold A. Rogow and H. D. Lasswell,
A corrupt act violates responsibility towards at least 
one system of public or civic order and is, in fact, 
incompatible with (destructive of) any such system. A 
system of public or civic order exalts common interest 
over special interest; violations of common interest 
for special advantage are corrupt.^®
Equally important is the definition of corruption based 
on public opinion that suggests that a political behavior is 
corrupt when the weight of public opinion determines it so."
However, Peters and Welch assert that the conception of 
political corruption harbors similar limitations like public 
interest. Whose opinion carries much weight? Is it that of 
the elites, the rich and powerful, or the masses— the poor 
and powerless? Indeed, the elites' opinions are often key 
in almost all developed and developing countries. But one
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cannot underestimate the power of the masses. As St. Paul 
once said in his poem, DESIDERATA, the masses and "even the 
dull and ignorant; they too have their story".’®
Nonetheless, Peters and Welch contend studies show that when 
it comes to certain issues, public sentiment can be either 
ambiguous or divided among the public and even among the 
political elites in their assessment of appropriate
standards of public conduct. Whatever the case may be,
opinions of the elites often take precedent.
The market-oriented definition of corruption, on the
other, hand seeks to extrapolate corruption based purely on
economic theory. Economist Susan Rose-Ackerman defines
corruption "as an allocative mechanism for scarce
resources"." In the same vein, Nathaniel Leff states that
"corruption is an extra-legal institution used by
individuals or groups to gain influence over the actions of
the bureaucracy. As such, the existence of corruption per se
indicates only that these groups participate in the
decision-making process to a greater extent than would
otherwise be the case".-®
For his part, Jacob van Klaveren asserts:
Thus, we will conceive of corruption in terms of a 
civil servant who regards his public office as a 
business, the income of which he will, in the extreme 
case, seek to maximize^ The office then becomes a 
maximizing unit. The size of his income does not depend 
on an ethical evaluation of his usefulness for the 
common good but precisely upon the market situation and
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his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on 
the public demand curve.■'
Also, Robert Tilman agrees that:
Corruption... involves a shift from a mandatory pricing 
model to a free-marJcet model. The centralized 
allocative mechanism, which is the ideal of modern 
bureaucracy, may break down in the face of serious 
disequilibrium between supply and demand. Clients may 
decide that it is worthwhile to risk the known
sanctions and pay the higher costs in order to be
assured of receiving the desired benefits. When this 
happens, bureaucracy ceases to be patterned after the 
mandatory market and takes on the characteristics of 
the free market.^
Clearly, the economic approach or framework to corruption is
pertinent because it assists us in assessing the economic
impact of corruption in any given political system.
Finally, there is also the classical philosophical
explanation of "corruption of the body politic" as is
understood by Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Thucydides, Thomas
Hobbes, and Niccolo Machiavelli. These theorists, in
particular, Niccolo Machiavelli, define corruption as:
The moral incapacity of citizens to make reasonably 
disinterested commitments to actions, symbols and 
institutions which benefit the substantive common 
welfare. This extensive demise of loyalty to the 
commonwealth comes from the interaction of human nature 
with systematic inequality of wealth, power and status. 
The corruption of the polity results in certain 
identifiable patterns of political conflicts and 
competition. The central feature of these patterns is 
the emergence of quasi-governmental factions and an 
increasingly polarized class system. The politics of 
the factions leads to an undermining of the efficacy of 
the basic political structures of the society and the 
emergence of systematic corruption in all aspects of 
political life.31
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In essence, these political theorists assert that 
corruption involves all the evils of a society and 
especially behavior that is immoral— injustice and 
inequality, placing private interest over public interest, 
and lack of virtue and justice that results in the moral 
disorder of societies and the decay of political s y s t e m s . 3-
Therefore, according to the definitions presented above 
by different scholars, academicians, and theorists, it is 
safe to say that all illegitimate or unethical uses of 
government offices and public resources, misuse/abuse of 
power for private or selfish motives— economic, social, 
political, cultural, and ideological— at the expense of the 
public, can be regarded as corrupt behavior or practices. 
Indeed, no matter how one looks at corruption, its 
characteristics or features are the same in both developed 
and developing nations. The only difference is how it is 
practiced, how it is viewed, and what effects it has on a 
society.
Padhy Krushna Singh argues that in developed nations, 
specifically the United States, the possession of wealth was 
for decades a common road for political power and influence. 
In contrast, in developing countries, especially 
contemporary Africa the reverse is true, i.e., politics has 
become the sure path to wealth.^* The misuse of public
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offices for personal enrichment has become the norm, not the 
exception, in post-independence Africa.
It is clearly argued that most African elites seek 
political offices not necessarily because they want to serve 
the public, but purely because of the economic and personal 
factors. This is because political office/power more often 
than not ensure automatic access to public or scarce 
resources and provides immediate avenues to personal 
enrichment. For his part, Samuel P. Huntington contends 
that when politics or political power is used for economic 
reasons, i.e., to promote a few persons' selfish ends at the 
expense of public good, "political values and institutions"^" 
or ethics become secondary and this by itself constitutes 
political corruption.
In distinguishing corruption from political corruption, 
Peter DeLeon and Le Vine Victor state that the latter is a 
"cooperative form of unsanctioned, usually condemned policy 
influence for some type of significant personal gain, in 
which the currency could be economic, social, political, or 
ideological remuneration".V.O. Key, Jr., claims that 
political corruption is an intentional act and neglecting to 
perform one's political duties.
Singh argues that, political corruption is indeed 
deliberate and intentional because political actors choose 
to neglect to perform their political duties as is required
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of them and instead perform these duties only after 
receiving bribes and kickbacks. For example, a political 
office is misused when business licenses, work permits, 
government contracts, allocation of public projects, hiring 
government employees, or providing quotas and other favors 
that stand to benefit a few to the highest bidder while 
deliberately ignoring those who meet the necessary 
qualifications or standards. Therefore, political 
corruption can assume different shapes and dimensions, quid 
pro quo being the obvious.
Theodore J. Lowi, on the other hand, identifies two 
types of political corruption. The first is Big Corruption 
(Big C) and the second is little corruption (little C).
While the former is "corruption that contributes to the 
decomposition, dissolution, or disorientation of the 
constitution", the latter "is corruption that reflects or 
contributes to individual moral depravity". Lowi maintains 
that Big C puts the state at risk while little C is the most 
feared corruption of all, because it involves the public.
In addition, John A. Gardiner identifies three 
categories of political corruption. The first is non­
feasance (failing to perform a required duty at all); second 
is malfeasance (the commission of some act which is 
positively unlawful); and third is misfeasance (the improper
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performance of some act a person can properly do) 3- 
Evidently, it is argued that most political leaders, the 
elites, and top civil servants in sub-Saharan Africa are 
guilty of all three types of political corruption.
THE INDIGENOUS DEFINITIONS OF CORRUPTION
Clearly, just as the concept of political corruption
is perceived and defined in various ways among Westerners,
the same thing applies to non-Westerners, particularly among
indigenous Africans. Indeed, it is true among Africans that
behavior that usually benefits a few people "punishes" the
majority, causes havoc, leads to slicing foreign aid, civil
war, death, hunger, disease, tribalism, nepotism, genderism,
clientalism, dictatorship, unemployment, low living
standards, sin, etc. can be regarded as corrupt activities.
In 1994, Kenyan scholars conducted a study on political
corruption, entitled The Anatomy of Political Corruption:
Legal. Political and Socio-Economic Perspectives. In their
inquiry, they asked the Kenyan public "What comes
immediately in your mind when the word corruption is
mentioned?" The following is a list of responses:
Money, government officers, unfair deals, theft, 
bribery, tribalism, Kenya police, underpaid staff, use 
of position to get rich, evil, mismanagement of funds, 
bad feeling, Indians, rich get richer, denial of one's 
rights, fear, injustice, TKK (Toa Kitu Kidogo— give out 
something small), civil war, no development, annoyed, 
irresponsibility, dishonesty, helplessness.
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discrimination, oppression, no money nothing happens, 
unsatisfied human rights, rotten society, surprised, 
easy way out, damaging, unorthodox ways, unlawful ways, 
favoritism, financial experts, malpractice, 
destruction, disagreement, Kamlesh Pattni, immorality, 
fraud, deprivation, government not managing economy and 
resources, political instability, illegal, suffering, 
cheating, sinful, unfaithful, and indecency.
The above responses, although exclusively applying to
Kenya, are, however, inclusively applicable in part across
the African continent and especially within many countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa. These responses show that the public
attaches many things to the concept of corruption. In fact,
it is not uncommon to find most Africans equating corruption
to leaders like Mobutu Sese Seko, General. Sani Abacha,
Daniel arap Moi, Paul Biya, Omar Bongo, Charles Taylor,
Yoweri Museveni, and former dictators such as Marshall Idi
Amin Dada, Jean Bokasa, Babangida, or Pik Botha of South
Africa during apartheid, and even to certain tribes— Kikuyu,
Kalenjin, Zulu, Xhosa, Asmaran, Yoruba, Igbo, Gbandolite,
and even to some foreigners— the British, French,
Portuguese, Italian, Germans, Belgians (the former colonial
masters) or to the indigenous Indian populations and even
Americans. Depending on which group of people the question
about corruption is directed/addressed to, there are as many
and different response as there are peoples and tribes.
However, as Kivutha Kibwana et al assert, the response^
can be categorized in a number of ways: those that identify
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various perpetrators of corrupt activities in the form of 
institutions, departments, professions and individuals; 
those that identify specific aspects perceived as smacking 
of corruption— destruction, suffering etc.; and those that 
are a reflection of public outrage and desperation generated 
by the impact of corruption. These can be described as 
attitudinal definitions.
A WORKING DEFINITION OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
Surely, there is no clear-cut definition as to what
political corruption means, nor can one single definition
based on legality, public interest, public opinion,
economics, and philosophy pin down the concept of
corruption. But for the purpose of this study, I define
political corruption as the use of political power and
office in ways that are geared to some individual or
collective self-interest that are illegal and/or considered
corrupt, improper, or self-serving. Perhaps Syed Hussein
Alatas' inclusive and comprehensive characteristics of what
constitute corrupt acts sum it up well when he concludes
that they include,
A betrayal of trust; deception of a public body, 
private institution or society at large; deliberate 
subordination of common interests to specific 
interests; secrecy of execution except in situations 
which allow powerful individuals or those under their 
protection to dispense with it; involvement of more
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than one person or party; the presence of mutual 
obligations and benefits in pecuniary or other forms ; 
the focusing of actions on those who want definite 
decisions and those who can influence them; the attempt 
to camouflage the corrupt act by form of lawful 
justification; and the expression of a contradictory 
dual function by the committing of the act.'"‘
Alatas goes on to typologize corruption in seven
distinct types— transactive, extortive, defensive,
investive, nepotistic, autogenic, and supportive. He
writes :
The transactive type refers to the mutual arrangement 
between the donor and the recipient to the advantage of 
an activity pursued by both parties. This normally 
involves business and government, or the public and 
government. The extortive type is the kind where the 
donor is compelled to bribe in order to avoid harm 
being inflicted upon his person, his interest, or upon 
those persons or things dear to him, defensive 
corruption in the behavior of the victim of extortive 
corruption. His corruption is in self-defense.
Investive corruption involves the offer of goods or 
services without any direct link to a particular favor, 
but in anticipation of future occasions when the favor 
will be required. Nepotistic corruption, or nepotism, 
is the unjustified appointment or other forms, 
violating the norms and rules of the undertaking. 
Autogenic corruption is a form involving only the 
person himself, e.g., where a person makes fraudulent 
claims with everything properly accounted for.
Supportive corruption does not directly involve money 
or any other immediate returns, but describes corrupt 
action undertaken to protect and strengthen the 
existing corruption.*3
Perhaps Alatas' above schema offers a clear definition 
of corruption that is neither rule-bound nor tied to a 
society's prevailing moral conventions or norms,but rather 
provides the most comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon. 
In an African context, therefore, it is clear that what has
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been offered as corruption is an all-pervasive syndrome that 
resembles one or all of the forms discussed above.
Corruption is an act or omission perpetuated by an 
individual or group of individuals which goes against the 
legitimate expectations and hence the interests of society. 
Such acts or omissions are not confined to the holders of 
public office.45
Indeed, corruption takes place in all spheres of human 
endeavor— in government offices, corporate organizations, 
private institutions, and daily lives. Political corruption 
can be both small- and big-scale, primitive or 
sophisticated. In contemporary Africa, this phenomenon has 
become a way of life, a common culture, or a continent-wide 
characteristic. This disease continues to have a strong 
grip in almost every African society and eats into its very 
fabric. As Kibwana et al argue, when corruption becomes a 
cancerous disease, the whole society is encapsulated and 
then holds the social fabric in r a n s o m . 4° It is with this 
holistic context— Western and non-Western— that I define and 
discuss political corruption.
CORRUPTION AND VERSUS POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
But to distinguish further the concept of corruption 
and political corruption, it is imperative to turn to the 
differences between these two concepts. Although outwardly
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the two appear to be synonymous, corruption is more 
comprehensive, having wider and broader connotations and 
ramifications. As discussed above, corruption involves all 
misuse of public office for selfish motives at the expense 
of the general public. For example, civil servants who use 
their office power to obtain extra income from the public 
are involved in corruption.4® Corruption, therefore, is the 
perversion of power, the violation of civic order, a breach 
of trust, an illegal behavior that exalts private interests 
over public interest.4® It can be either administratively, 
socially, or judicially-oriented, or business and political 
in nature.5°
Political corruption, on the other hand, is a narrower 
term and refers mainly to the abuse of power by political 
actors seeking to promote their own ends— enrichment. It is 
an illegitimate way of using political power for securing 
pecuniary or other advantages directly or indirectly either 
for oneself or for those in whom one is interested. Put 
simply, it is a trade of public interest for private gain. 5"- 
To put this into perspective, if a political leader, a 
parliamentarian, a judge, a military general/admiral, or a 
mayor uses his or her political authority to benefit or 
enrich himself or herself or family, clan, or tribe without 
regard to others or in breach of a contract/trust, then this 
is referred to as political corruption. Unfortunately, this
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tends to be the trend in almost all sub-Saharan African 
nations. Throughout Africa political leaders or elites are 
first and foremost interested in lining their pockets at the 
expense of the public. In addition, African leaders are, 
above all, loyal to their respective constituencies and most 
of all tend to serve their tribes first before service to 
the public or country. Most of their daily undertakings and 
decision-making is influenced by special ethnic interests. 
They demand bribes or kickbacks for their duties and often 
times the highest bidder gets the government's scarce goods 
and services, including government contracts.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION VERSUS BRIBERY 
While political corruption is an inducement to commit a 
violation of duty bribery, on the other hand, is a price, 
reward, gift, or favor bestowed or promised with a view to 
pervert the judgment or corrupt the conduct especially of a 
person in a position of trust.5® Bribery whose currency is 
money, often sways and influences the judgment or decisions 
of the receiver or bribe taker— a political actor, judge, 
legislator, civil servant, voter, or witness. This kind of 
betrayal of trust is what V. 0. Key. Jr., calls a cold­
blooded commercial transaction.
John Noonan, Jr., on the other hand argues that bribes 
are ancient, universal and may arise from larger concepts of
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reciprocity or the practice of gift-giving. Under this 
condition, the definition of a bribe would very much depend 
upon cultural understanding, that is, how people of a 
particular culture view bribes, and what criterion they use 
to distinguish bribes from genuine gifts. Bribes can be 
overt or covert in nature and can be disguised as businesses 
or loans. Additionally, they can be treated as voluntary 
gifts offered in good will or "soft" tokens/monies.
Whatever the case may be, bribes are associated with the 
practice of quid pro quo (you scratch my back, and I scratch 
yours) .5®
In contrast, Daniel H. Lowenstern contends that 
equating bribes with quid pro quo is being unrealistic. He 
states that bribes take many shapes and come in different 
sizes when associated with political corruption. He defines 
bribery as "an explicit exchange of a specific benefit for a 
specific official action (or inaction)".5® He maintains that 
bribes are an exchange of "anything of value", e.g., 
campaign contribution, endorsement, agreement not to run, 
logrolling, and kickbacks. He concludes that 
"...distinguishing of bribes from non-bribes requires the 
application of more general standards distinguishing corrupt 
official conduct from proper conduct".
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In Africa, bribes are viewed as another source of 
supplementing meager government wages. Among the public, 
bribe-giving is the only sure avenue to acquire scarce 
government goods and services, i.e., business licenses, 
jobs, passports, scholarships, housing, farming equipment, 
and government contracts/projects. Wahome Mutahi states 
that, if there are bribes to be paid to get to heaven,
Kenyans will bribe St. Paul at the gate to jump the queue. 
Everywhere in Africa, without a "handshake", many things may 
be unreachable and unattainable. The implication from this 
argument is that in Africa, bribery and corruption rule the 
day and are seen as politically correct.
By no means, however, is political corruption 
synonymous with bribery. The two concepts are intimately 
linked together, but they are not inseparable. The latter 
is narrower, more direct, and less subtle.For instance, a 
person bribed is a person corrupted, but a person may be 
corrupt without taking recourse to bribery. In fact, 
political corruption can and does take place without even a 
tendency for personal gain. For example, the Watergate 
scandal— the criminal act of breaking into the Democratic 
headquarters during Richard Nixon's presidency—  was not
necessarily engineered for personal/monetary gain, but the 
need for the re-election of a Republican president for a
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second term drove the Republican "Neanderthals" (the strong 
men) into committing this crime.
Furthermore, a person having an interest in a certain 
corporation may approach a parliamentarian and lure him to 
vote on a matter that may clearly be harmful to the public 
interest but beneficial to the corporation. If the bargain 
is accomplished, then this is unmistakably a case of bribery 
and the actions involved are also political corruption.®® In 
the same vein, if a parliamentarian uses his political power 
to demand bribes prior to voting for a certain bill, he is 
clearly disregarding his public duty for the sake of 
personal reasons. Under this circumstance, that 
parliamentarian or government official is involved in both 
bribery and political corruption. The term "auto 
corruption" clearly distinguishes political corruption from 
bribery. Therefore, political corruption, in the widest 
sense of the word, includes both "bribery and auto­
corrupt ion "®"- and may be defined as an intentional 
misperformance or neglect of a recognized duty or 
unwarranted exercise of power with the motive of gaining 
some advantage more or less directly personal.®^
BRIBERY VERSUS GIFT-GIVING
The concepts of bribes and gifts are used somewhat 
separately and differently in the Western countries. But in
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non-Western nations, especially African, the two are used 
indistinguishably because, for decades, the former was 
absent in the vocabulary. Generally speaking, this is a 
true national epic in Africa that can be traced back for 
centuries. Even social scientists, especially 
anthropologists who study non-Western societies, Africa 
included, prefer not to use the term "bribe", especially in 
those "primitive" societies in which offerings to the gods 
are a common practice or where the exchange of gifts among 
people— families, clans, or tribes— is viewed as an 
obligation that symbolizes gratitude, friendship, 
generosity, and reciprocity.
Thus anthropologists refrain from applying the modern 
concept judgmentally for to do so would be ethnocentric and 
violate their sense of cultural relativism.in fact, even 
the famous anthropologist, Marcel Mauss, in his book. The 
Gift. does not use the term "bribe" but instead calls all 
exchanges "gifts".®4 Indeed, African societies strongly 
regard the practice of exchanging gifts in high esteem.
They also view the practice of giving gifts to others as an 
unspoken obligation that is continuous in time of peace or 
turmoil, in health or sickness, in wealth or in poverty.
Marjorie Shostak states that among the primitive !Kung 
San— hunters and gathers in Africa, "giving gifts is a 
fairly formal affair or practice, and people remember
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clearly who gave what to whom when".®® The ! Kung San are
undoubtedly fond of exchanging gifts because it is a
reciprocal practice that is passed on to succeeding
generations. Although the !Kung San are the only group that
practice hunting and gathering for survival, the practice of
gift-giving is nonetheless a continent-wide phenomenon that
is also practiced by almost all African societies.
The cultural importance of reciprocal giving is not
limited to Africa. Marcel Mauss reported similar practices
among cultures in Melanesia, North America, and South
America. He states that :
What they exchange is not exclusively goods and wealth, 
real and personal property, and things of economic 
value. They exchange rather courtesies, entertainment, 
ritual, military assistance, women, children, dances, 
and feasts.. . . ®®
Although these presentations and counter-presentations 
takes place under a voluntary guise, they are nonetheless 
strictly obligatory, and failure to comply often leads to 
open warfare or conflict.
In Africa, gifts are not necessarily equivalent to 
bribes. Gift-giving is a normal practice that dates back 
many years and has a strong symbolic meaning— a sign of 
respect to the elders, especially the chief; a token of 
generosity and service to others, especially those in need; 
and a gesture of friendship, "I come not for war, but for 
peace". However, this practice began to be abused, misused.
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and exploited with the introduction of monetary currencies 
that replaced the long tradition of barter trade. Also, 
because it is easy to demand bribes in terms of money, it is 
difficult to detect or identify bribe-givers and bribe­
takers .
The practice of offering gifts has been misconstrued or 
misinterpreted to mean bribes. Undoubtedly, this labeling 
is a Western perception. Surely, Christopher Clapham argues 
that, whereas a Westerner may regard the practice of gift- 
giving as outright bribery, an African may see as genuine 
the exchange of gifts as a normal lifestyle and a 
continuation of traditional practice.®^ He maintains that 
corruption makes no sense because there is no clear 
distinction between gifts and bribery. Where do gifts end 
and bribes (corruption) start? Pertaining to political 
leaders, he writes, "There is no embezzlement because the 
ruler's personal income is the same as the government 
revenue, no nepotism because there is no criterion for 
appointment to office apart from the ruler's favor".®®
It is Tahar Ben Jelloun's assertion that most African 
leaders and civil servants take part in corruption, not 
because they think it is illegal, but what Westerners may 
define as corruption or bribery, Africans view as only a 
subtle way of recouping what is theirs. Others think that 
without "cutting corners" (accepting bribes), it is
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extremely hard to be better off if one is honest. 
Additionally, some argue that "saints or heroes" are never 
rewarded, but "flexible" officers are those who see their 
opportunities and take them and create the need to be sought 
after by the public for "connections" (favors)
Contrary to Clapham and Jelloun, there is a general 
consensus among indigenous African societies that excessive 
demand for "gifts" (bribes), especially for free government 
services, constitutes corruption. Additionally, excessive 
practice of extortion by government officials for baksheesh 
or dash or kitu kidogo (something small) or "speed money" 
for state goods and services and other favors is seen as 
daylight bribery and corruption, although some accept them 
in the guise of gifts— a sign of gratitude.
In Africa, being overly selfish, greedy, tribalistic, 
nepotistic, or for that matter giving favors to friends, 
relatives, and tribesmen in terms of government contracts, 
jobs, promotions, loans, and business licenses purely on an 
ascriptive basis rather than on merit, i.e., those with 
qualifications, education, experience, skills or expertise, 
is definitely considered as Magendo. illicit, and corruption 
Indeed, this practice is quite common in almost all African 
countries.
Similarly, the practice of using public office and/or 
economic or social status to influence decision-making in
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parliament or other institutions of decision-making for the 
sake of creating opportunities for one's constituency, i.e., 
region or province, and to implement strategies that would 
generate/bring better living conditions, infrastructure, 
schools, hospitals, sanitation systems, and housing or for 
that matter the economic, social, and political development 
at the expense of others is regarded as illegal behavior 
that constitutes corruption.
Furthermore, blatant imbalance in the distribution of 
offices, privileges, goods, and services among tribal 
groupings is seen as corruption.The fact that the ruling 
tribe often times takes all, controls all, and has all 
explains why there is high-scale corruption to win favors 
from those tribes in power or to penetrate roadblocks to 
resources and power. In short, corruption in Africa 
includes all kinds of practices, legal or illegal, that 
stand to benefit only a few individuals, clans, or tribes 
who are strategically, economically, and politically 
positioned within government institutions and agencies, 
especially within the parastatals— government owned and/or 
subsidized agencies— Kenya Airways (KQ), Kenya Railways 
Corporation (KTC), Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA), 
and Kenya Power and Light Corporation (KPLC) to name a few.
But in Africa, like other Third World regions, where 
people are used to the practice of looking for "connections"
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(middlemen or go-betweens) for scarce goods and services and 
favors, it would be foolishness to do otherwise; where it is 
normal conduct to do business behind dirty corridors 
covertly or clandestinely, it would be foolish to do 
otherwise; where government officers can get rich and be 
poverty free, "taxing" patients, clients, or the public is 
the only way out; where the public is willing to grease the 
palm of officers to jump queues or acquire a favor, it would 
be unreasonable to not follow suit or it would be suicidal 
to do otherwise.
Throughout Africa, due to the severe problems of 
poverty, hunger, drought, famine, population explosion, and 
scarcity of natural resources (in many areas), being 
"flexible" or "adapting" to a given situation is an 
essential key to survival. The public for their part looks 
for someone to intervene in order to pick up a document from 
a government office. In this sense, some officers tend to 
think that it is reasonable to be "paid" below the tables or 
be bribed for rendering their duties and services to the 
public. Others also justify these illicit activities as a 
way of contributing to a climate of "national solidarity.""'̂  
According to Jelloun, "corruption is a supplementary tax in 
disguise. Everyone goes along with it.... ""'3 Indeed, Jelloun 
asserts that "Poverty is not always a good adviser. It 
pushes people to break the law, steal, swindle, and lie"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
It is true among Africans that if it does not "rain" 
people will fight and starve because the bluer the sky, the 
emptier the pockets."'® This implies that when it rains, the 
farmer's crops germinate, he is paid, and may require 
farming equipment, fertilizer, or a loan from the 
government. But before acquiring his needs, he will "pay" 
(bribe) government officers for their services and in the 
end everyone is happy.
A senior government officer advising a junior has this 
to say:
The cost of living is going up. There is nothing we can 
do about it. You have to adapt. Everyone knows that 
most salaries are symbolic. The state knows it, just as 
it knows that people have ways to compensate for what 
they lack. It closes its eyes. It has to, otherwise 
there would be a revolution. Citizens participate in 
whatever ways that are available to them to fill the 
gap. It's normal practice. It's a national consensus, a 
balancing mechanism. The whole trick is to do it 
discreetly, even elegantly if possible.^®
In the African idiom, corruption is also equated with
being "fat", implying that "fat" people extract from the
"thin" people to maintain their rotund stomachs. Indeed, in
walking through the corridors and government offices, one
can quickly detect and discern the "fat cats" by their well-
nourished bellies, while the bone-thin masses queue in the
hallways of government offices waiting indefinitely to be
provided with government goods and services— birth
certificates, licenses, passports, farming equipment.
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identification cards, permits, employment benefits, water,
electricity, housing, loans, social security, medical
treatment, and registration of businesses to name a few.
The fact of the matter is that, only those who are able to
grease the palms of the government officials and the civil
servants expect to receive these services.
Perhaps the story of a fat and a thin man that is often
repeated throughout Africa during hunger, famine, and
starvation is worth mentioning:
'You should be ashamed of yourself', said the fat man 
to the thin man. 'If a foreigner saw you before he saw 
anyone else he would think there was a famine here'.
'And if he saw you next', replied the thin man, he 
would know the reason for famine'.^®
In sum, according to Africans, corruption is, therefore, 
"eating" too much from one's office or job; it is skimming 
and "taxing" or extorting too much from the poor public; it 
is skimming from government institutions and foreign aid 
assistance; it is being too greedy and too "fat"; it is an 
act of demanding money behind dirty corridors, bars, and 
streets; it is the refusal to accept traditional gifts— a 
goat, beads, a basket full of corn flour, a hand-made rug or 
other things that are valuable, but without monetary value; 
it is also refusing to accept small bribes for a roasted leg 
of goat meat, a couple of beers and brandies holding out for 
more as some usually do. Worse still, government officers
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are regarded as corrupt if they fail to deliver the promised 
services or favors after receiving bribes.
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CHAPTER 2
POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HISTORICAL SURVEY
"Old and corrupted nations cannot be governed
On the same principles with those [young nations]
Which are simple and virtuous".
— Napoleon I (1769-1821)
"In corrupt Governments the Place is given for 
the sake of the Man; in good ones the Man is 
chosen for the sake of the Place".
— George Savile (1633-1695)
"Corruption is like the garbage.
It has to be removed daily".
— Ignacio Pichardo Paraza,
Controller-General of Mexico (1987)
For decades, the existence of government corruption 
has been regarded as a "normal" practice in almost all 
political systems and societies.^ As Samuel Huntington 
asserts, corruption is highly likely to be found in all 
bureaucratic institutions in all periods of political 
development, although the degree and magnitude varies 
significantly among societies. Corruption is "obviously 
more common in some societies than others and more common in 
some time in the evolution of a society than at other 
times".2
Obviously, there is prima facie evidence that attests to 
the fact that corruption was at one time or another 
widespread in the Western world in ancient, medieval, and
68
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modem periods. For instance, corruption was more common in 
Great Britain in the 18th century than in the 17th and 20th 
centuries. The practice was also more common in the United 
States in the 19th century than in the 18th and 20th 
centuries. Basically, during the Industrial Revolution, 
higher patterns of corrupt behavior were reported in Western 
industrialized nations, especially Great Britain and the 
United States.^
Historically, corruption was a normal practice in 
Oriental and Occidental societies during ancient and 
medieval periods.* Furthermore, in many Asian, Middle 
Eastern, and African countries, corruption was a common 
practice. Debates that suggest that during early periods of 
history mankind was pure and incorrupt is a travesty, much 
like sweeping dirt under the rug. To assert that 
precolonial African societies were completely untainted by 
corrupt behavior would be simply untrue.
CORRUPTION IN THE OLD TESTAMENT 
For example, in ancient Egyptian, Babylonian and Hebrew 
societies judges received bribes while performing their 
required public duties.^ Conversely, from the Biblical point 
of view, one finds out that Eli's sons used their priesthood 
powers to demand or extort sacrifices from the people— much 
more than was required.® Similarly, in the Old Testament,
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the prophet Amos denounced the rule of King Jeroboam II for 
receiving bribes.' In the same vein, the book of Exodus 
condemned bribery and other social injustices: "Beware of 
accepting bribes; it blinds even the prudent, and destroys 
the judgment even of just men".® Prophet Isaiah of the Old 
Testament described the man who will be saved from the 
horror of destruction as one who refuses ill-gotten gains 
and bribes.® The list is endless.
Clearly, one can argue that there is no place in the 
world that has not experienced some form of corrupt behavior 
that can easily be interpreted to mean corruption. Not even 
Greece, the land of the philosopher kings, was totally free 
from this scourge.
CORRUPTION IN GREECE AND ROME 
Although corruption and bribery had a rather slow 
growth in ancient Greece, by early 6th century B.C. 
corruption had become a common feature in the political life 
of the Greeks. The growth of corruption in Greece during 
this century was attributed to an increase in economic 
activity and to political apathy. However, as windows of 
opportunity arose, political participation, bribery, and 
corruption steadily increased as Greeks struggled to capture 
public offices.^®
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According to Aristotle, it was at this time that
organized bribing of judges and public officials commenced."
Because corruption was linked to political change and
democracy or revolution, it attracted considerable attention
among the Greeks. Even though corruption became the means
for political advancement, it was nonetheless condemned and
rejected by many Greek philosophers such as Aristotle and
Plato. In his book The Laws. Plato stated that:
The servants of the nation are to render their services 
without any taking of presents.... To form your judgment 
and then abide by it is no easy task, and 'tis a man's 
surest course to give loyal obedience to the law which 
commands, 'Do no service for a present
Therefore, Plato extols just and virtuous persons
(philosopher kings) while condemning sycophants and corrupt
tyrants. Clearly, there were all forms of corrupt practice
in the history of Greece.
In the ancient Roman Empire, on the other hand, low-
scale corrupt practices were also prevalent in the public
sector. Public servants often received bribes for providing
services to citizens. Later, bribery and corruption were
commonly practiced on a grand-scale during elections for
public positions in the legislature and judiciary.^ As Syed
Hussein Alatas states, the intensity and variety of
corruption was probably greater in Rome than Greece simply
because of the possession of an Empire. During the first
three decades of the second century B.C. Rome underwent a
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series of economic, political, social, and agricultural 
changes. These changes led to a rapid increase of wealth, 
especially among the state and military echelons.^* 
Additionally, the growth in industry, commerce, and 
urbanization in ancient Rome gradually gave way to modern 
Rome and a rich class of people and new groups of wealthy 
capitalists who slowly rose to ascendancy.^" As Romans rose 
with the spoils of their victories throughout Europe, 
corruption and bribery became new adventures although not 
"entirely open and shameless".
As Carl J. Friedrich points out, in Rome the presence 
and prevalence of wide-scale corruption seemed to have a 
"consequence of an unwieldly electoral system which derived 
from history". Clearly, as the Roman Empire expanded its 
territories through conquest, electoral competition and 
corruption increased. During this period, corruption in 
Rome was a result of people seeking public office for bread 
and butter, or better still "the loaves and fishes of high 
offices".
As a matter of fact, bribery in the electoral system did 
not decline in ancient Rome or during the era of the 
emperor, but it continued to increase throughout the Roman 
Republic. During this time, corruption was, however, 
condemned by some members of the republican government and 
by persons such as Cicero who were interested in reforming
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the degenerate republic by attempting to unearth and bring 
extreme cases of corruption to trial."
However, these attempts were often unsuccessful because 
the Roman republic as a whole had became so polluted with 
immoral practices that corrupt behavior became a norm.
During medieval times, corruption manifested itself in Rome 
in the form of bribery and extortion by local and state 
officials who perverted justice. For instance, those who 
served kings and barons became the instruments for 
collecting illegal money.Efforts to regulate trade and 
commerce based upon the rule of law and principles 
unfortunately led to well-developed mechanisms for 
smuggling, which resulted in official corruption.^"
The moral decay/disintegration of the body politic in 
Greece and Rome were the consequences of corruption, 
injustice, inequality, and egoistic forces. The prevalence 
of these societal ills forced political philosophers such as 
Thucydides, Aristotle, Plato, and Machiavelli to condemn 
them. These theorists opted to create ideal polities that 
were just and ruled by virtuous persons for the sake of the 
commonweal.
Niccolo Machiavelli, opted to provide a recipe to The 
Prince as to how to reform both man and public institutions 
to enhance civic culture and restore political order. After 
deeply and extensively studying the concept of corruption in
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Italy's political and social life, Machiavelli concluded 
that corruption was a disease that destroyed the prosperity 
of Italy's body politic."* In essence, the social and 
political decay, public immorality, and political disorder 
were phenomena that most political theorists such as 
Aristotle, Plato, Thomas Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and 
Niccolo Machiavelli constantly confronted in their writings 
and thus suggested that, virtue, justice, and the public 
good ought to be the ultimate teleos of all polities.^
Indeed, "standing on the shoulders of giants" of these 
philosophers, one can successfully construct a "theoretical 
account of the decay of a political order"^® in today's 
developed and developing countries and benefit from their 
uniform understanding of politics, corruption, and how to 
prevent it. Although these theorists differ on many 
occasions on certain concepts, they generally agree that any 
polity that portrays characteristics of moral decay, 
injustice, extensive inequality in wealth, power, and 
status, abuse of public office for personal reasons, 
betrayal of public trust, and the lack of civic culture and 
virtue is by and large a corrupt state.
In sum, although political life today tries to operate 
upon relatively high moral principles, bribery and 
corruption in electoral processes, mudslinging, and other 
abuses are nonetheless common and evident in many societies.
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Unmistakably, two centuries ago Great Britain was a "sink 
hole" of corruption in all spheres of its political 
structure— civil service, police, judiciary and legislative, 
both within the monarchic and parliamentary systems."^ In the 
same vein, ethnic corruption and political machines and 
patronage were devastating to the United States in the 19th 
century in major cities, particularly New York and Chicago.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN AMERICA
Perhaps the best example is that of George Washington
Plunkitt of Tammany Hall, who coined the phrase "honest
graft". In his famous passage, Plunkitt said:
There's honest graft, and I'm an example of how it
works. I might sum up the whole thing by sayin': I seen
my opportunities and I took 'em'. Just let me explain 
by example. My party's in power in the city and it's 
goin' to undertake a lot of public improvements. Well, 
I'm tipped off, say, that they are going to lay out a 
new park at a certain place. I see my opportunity and I
take it. I go to that place and I buy up all the land I
can in the neighborhood. Then the board of this or that 
makes its plan public and there is a rush to get that 
land which nobody cared particular for before. Ain't it 
perfectly honest to charge a good profit and make a 
profit on my investment and foresight? Of course it is. 
Well, that's honest graft.
No doubt, "corruption in high offices is not unique"®® in 
the American political structure. According to Martin 
Gross, it is rife "from the smallest communities to the West 
Wing of the White House, whichever party occupies it".®̂  One 
of the most celebrated episodes of corruption in high office
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
involved a vice president of the United State, Spiro T.
Agnew. Former Governor of Maryland, he was elected on the 
Richard Nixon ticket in 1968 and again in 1972. As a county 
executive in Baltimore, he received up to one thousand 
dollars a week on kickbacks from contractors, architects, 
and engineers. He continued this practice as governor and 
finally as the U.S. Vice President. It began when Agnew
received a friendly payment/donation of $50,000 to secure a
government contract for the donors. At first he denied the
charge but during the federal grand jury, he pleaded nolo
contendere (no contest) to the charge of evading income tax 
on the tainted money. In October 1973 he resigned as vice 
president just before the Watergate break-in.®®
Another heinously corrupt scandal was that of Housing and 
Urban Development HUD in the 1980s which showed that the 
agency was riddled with influence peddling and special deals 
that cost the taxpayers millions of dollars. The House 
investigative committee reported that "HUD was enveloped by 
influence peddling, favoritism, abuse, greed, fraud, 
embezzlement, and theft. In many housing programs, objective 
criteria gave way to political preference and cronyism, and 
favoritism supplanted fairness". The committee concluded 
that the "rehabilitation program which was intended for the 
poor, became a cash cow which was milked by former HUD
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
77
officials and the politically well-connected".®® Luckily, 
most of the officials involved in this scandal were 
prosecuted and sentenced.
In Chicago, during the era of political machines, 
election fraud was also reported throughout the state 
whereby dead men and women were voting on local and state 
levels. During this period, there were reports that local, 
state, and national officials were accepting bribes and 
kickbacks and/or taking part in government fraud and 
embezzlement. According to Gross, the practice was from the 
bottom up. In fact, local officials would take bribes for 
such simple favors as zoning changes, assessments, and city 
contracts. At the top levels, crooked politicians or 
legislators took part in lining their pockets first before 
those of their constituents. For most of these politicians 
the motto is "once bought they remain bought" or as one U.S. 
Congressman calls them "bastards who stay bought".®*
In New York, the tradition of graft was established in 
the 19th century with Tammany Hall— the crooked Democratic 
machine. It continued almost unabated well into the 1930s 
and 1980s. It is Gross's assertion that, "Corruption in New 
York flourished in the post war years, with new twists in 
the old scenario". ®® For example, in the 1980s, Donald 
Mannes, the Democratic boss in Queens County was implicated 
in an extortion-bribery scheme in the city's Parking
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Violation Bureau (PVB) where millions of dollars were 
missing. Before he could be charged, he resigned and later 
committed suicide. The deputy director of the PVB, Geoffrey 
G. Lindenauer, admitted to extorting up to $140,000 in 
bribes from contractors and sharing it with other officials, 
including Donald Mannes. Fortunately, Lindenauer was 
prosecuted and sentenced with others for bribery and fixing 
parking tickets in New York.®® The list is endless. Recent 
cases of political corruption involve Whitewater, that 
implicates the President of the United States Bill Clinton, 
and the 1996 dirty money or illegal campaign contribution 
funds that implicate both Democratic and Republican parties 
and their leaders.
In conclusion, it is important to acknowledge that 
sophisticated corruption is still a big problem in the U.S. 
"Lest it be presumed that the United States is an oasis of 
moral purity in a desert of worldwide corruption".®®' Nathan 
Miller reminds us that "...from Jamestown to Watergate, 
corruption runs through our history like a scarlet thread. 
Although we self-righteously congratulate ourselves on our 
high moral standards, the grafting politicians, corrupt 
tycoons, and crooked labor barons are prominent fixtures in 
American folklore".®*
Perhaps Robert Klitgaard sums it up best when he 
eloquently states that:
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Corruption is not the province of one particular 
culture or region. Not many years ago, corruption 
flourished in countries we now call 'developed*— and, 
indeed, there is evidence that some forms of corrupt 
behavior are today on the rise in most economically and 
politically 'advanced' nations.®®
Evidence of scandals and fraud have been extensively 
reported in Great Britain, Italy, France, Japan, and the 
United States. In America, episodes such as Watergate, 
Iran-Contra, Whitewater, and illegal campaign funds top the 
list of endless government political scandals.
Nevertheless, Klitgaard claims that "the situation is 
particularly worrisome in 'developing' nations"*® because 
they are most vulnerable to government/bureaucratic 
corruption.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Political corruption is also a pervasive feature in the 
Middle East. David M. Miller and Clark D. Moore state that, 
for centuries, the Ottoman Empire's misrule enhanced the 
habits of corruption in the Islamic World.*® Consequently, 
the payment of bribes (baksheesh) in the Arabic and Turkish­
speaking countries and roshveh in Iran are deeply embedded 
in the social and cultural fabric of these countries, 
asserts Fernand Braudel.*® From Iraq to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
to Jordan, the prevalence of political payments in the 
Middle East is derived from the historical presence of the
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all-powerful states. Manfred Halpern claims that, 
typically, governments have been the major source and owners 
of capital, i.e., land, natural resources (particularly 
oil), the primary dispensers of contracts, and the arbiters 
of the rules of trade and investment. State ownership of, 
and control over, much of the means of production have been 
an essential part of Middle Eastern economics.*®
Unlike Europe or the United States, the Middle East did 
not produce a politically and economically influential 
bourgeoisie or middle class that could act as a 
countervailing power to the state and its rulers.**
French philosopher, Fernand Braudel states that, 
paradoxically, the political payment was an accepted method 
by which the tyranny of the ruler and venality of his 
officials were curbed.*® Halpern concludes that, because 
today the Middle East is the world's foremost oil-producing 
region, it is not uncommon to find government 
inefficiencies, mismanagement, and tolerance of corruption 
and bribery for those who must deal with Middle Eastern 
political leaders, bureaucrats, and civil servants. Indeed, 
corruption is prevalent not only among government employees 
but also among the businessmen who have to bribe royal 
family members for contracts or other concessions to do 
business.*® Therefore, from Jordan to Iran, Palestine to 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia to Kuwait, and Iraq to Israel, the
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practice of giving gifts or bribes to acquire favors is a 
common norm. But like anywhere else in developing nations, 
gifts today carry a negative connotation— bribery and 
corruption.
Perhaps the worst affected region in Africa is sub- 
Saharan Africa. The fact is that corruption is a problem 
that Africans face daily can neither be "blithely ignored or 
treated as a minor social malaise".*^ But before discussing 
the problem of corruption in Africa, it is important to 
trace the genesis of political corruption from pre-colonial 
and colonial to post-colonial Africa.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Then our people lived peacefully, under the democratic 
rule of their kings....Then the country was ours, in 
our name and right....All men were free and equal and 
this was the foundation of government. The council 
[of elders] was completely democratic that all members 
of the tribe could participate in its deliberations. 
Chiefs and subjects, warriors and medicine men, all 
took part and endeavored to influence its decisions.
— Nelson Mandela, 1984.
In pre-colonial Africa, the organizational structure of 
the indigenous political system was generally based on 
kinship and ancestry. The survival of the tribe was the 
primary objective of the African people. Each ethnic group 
had its own system of government that was ruled by custom 
and tradition. Written constitutions were non-existent.*®
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Many groupings that existed as separate political 
entities were ruled by kings or chiefs. Ethnic groups that 
were under the rule of chiefs were referred to as chiefdoms 
and were generally independent and autonomous. For example, 
the Asante and Zande of West Africa and the Zulu of South 
Africa fall under this category. Those tribes or 
ethnicities that did not have chiefs or kings, on the other 
hand, were referred to as stateless tribes and were easy 
prey for conquerors who assimilated conquered areas into 
empires. This was evident among the Mandika, Fulani, Hausa, 
and the Islamic empires in West Africa in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. Generally, in all African tribes, political 
organizations began at lineage or village levels and 
expanded into the tribes, chiefdoms, kingdoms, and state 
settings. *®
Robert Williams observes that lineage was the most 
powerful and effective means for unity and stability in 
early Africa.®® Each lineage had its head elected according 
to its own rules. The Fante of Ghana used wealth as the 
criterion while other lineages in West, Central, East, and 
Southern African communities used personality cult and 
characteristics such as age, maturity, relations to 
ancestors, social status— many wives and children—  
generosity, and oratory.®® The leaders were usually male 
elders. Because of the system of patriarchy that is
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predominant and manifested in almost all African societies, 
males usually were chosen as chiefs or elders. Also there 
is a general consensus among Africans that wisdom comes with 
age and experience.®® Therefore, the elderly are major 
assets in Africa, and usually occupy the highest positions 
of tribal leadership.
In early African systems, kings or chiefs were not 
necessarily paid for performing their duties; however, they 
occasionally received gifts and dues from their subjects 
because they were supposed to live well above common 
tribesmen in order to enhance their status and the stature 
of the tribe. The traditional practice of offering gifts to 
chiefs has been misinterpreted and misconstrued by scholars 
to provide a cultural explanation for the pervasive 
incidence of bribery and corruption in contemporary Africa.®® 
The truth of the matter is that the offering or the exchange 
of gifts among Africans is a traditional practice that dates 
back for centuries and serves a variety of purposes.
For instance, in Sierra Leone when a plaintiff called 
upon the chief for legal action/function, he offered dash 
usually in terms of water, food, or drinks. Among the Shona 
of Zimbabwe, before a dispute was solved, the plaintiff and 
defendant offered a small token or fee to the chief and his 
"judges" that was later shared among the chief and his 
chosen elders/adversaries. In addition, the guilty party
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paid full cost of the case to the victor, who in turn shared 
his compensation with the chief as a sign of gratitude for a 
fair hearing. The same practice was present among the 
Asante of Ghana, the Luo, Luhya, and Gusii of Kenya, and the 
Baganda of Uganda.®*
Under these conditions, a gift of dash or kitu kidogo 
that is generously given to the chief and his elders is not 
seen as bribery or corruption. Rather, the token is seen as 
some type of gratitude, respect, and appreciation for the 
service rendered. One can see it as a tax that supported 
the courts. As a matter of fact, gifts were given publicly 
and everybody was aware of who gave what to whom and for 
what purpose. In contrast, today's bribes are extorted 
clandestinely by civil servants before they can perform 
services for the public which they are paid to render in the 
first case.
In fact, in traditional Africa, there was evidence that 
suggests that native Africans were intolerant of bribes and 
corruption. For example, in Ghana during the 6th and 8th 
centuries A.D., there was a popular or mass revolution 
against corrupt leaders, specifically the members of the 
dynasty that routinely accepted bribes. The rebels 
systematically massacred and even extracted fetuses from the
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wombs of the royal family in order to completely wipe out 
corruption.®®
Does this mean that pre-colonial Africa was pure and 
pristine or immune to corruption? To the contrary. Indeed, 
for the kings/chiefs to live luxuriously, and they did, 
mandatory annual taxes and dues were required of subjects. 
Oftentimes, the chief's chosen tax collectors accepted 
bribes or diverted the dues meant for the chief into their 
pockets. Also, they used the chief's office to extort 
bribes or favors from the people in terms of drink, sex, 
food, and money. Thus, bribery and corruption were not 
unknown phenomena in pre-colonial Africa.
Indeed, large-scale corruption manifested itself in 
Africa during the colonial period; the introduction of 
political systems, parliaments, urbanization, new currency, 
white collar jobs, and schools contributed to competition 
and bribery and corruption. As Robert Williams asserts, 
upon colonization African corruption began to become more 
entrenched, especially in those countries where a feudal way 
of life had already set the climate for corruption or a 
gift-giving system of authority.®® Therefore, it is 
imperative to recognize and appreciate that the unethical 
behavior in post-independent Africa has a history outside of 
and within Africa. This is not, however, to justify the 
continued existence of corruption in Africa, but to argue
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that large-scale corruption in modern day Africa has its 
roots with the European colonialists as well as within the 
Africans themselves.
The truth of the matter is, in East Africa and some 
countries in Central and West Africa where Great Britain had 
her colonies, the British used indirect rule, divide and 
conquer, and Western influences such as religion, education, 
English, sophisticated weapons, etc., to conquer and 
dominate indigenous Africa. As for the issues of 
kings/chiefs, the colonialists bribed them with clothes, 
guns, and other Western items to relinquish or share their 
power, sell their subjects as slaves, and allocate land to 
the colonists. Similarly, the artificial partitioning of 
Africa by the European powers in the late 1800s was by all 
means morally corrupt because native Africans were never 
consulted during the scramble for lands and territories in 
their countries. Instead, they were dislocated and 
disoriented from their lands and forced to live together in 
squatters while their fertile lands were grabbed and used 
for cash crops— coffee, tea, cotton, and sugarcane 
plantations, forced to adopt western lifestyles— systems of 
government, constitutions, forms of education, religion, and 
language. One can make a strong case that, the natives were 
stripped off their culture, dignity, and lifestyle by the
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European colonialists. Indeed, this in itself is corruption 
at its very best.
As the African saying goes, when the white men or 
missionaries came to Africa they told Africans to close 
their eyes for prayer. While they were praying, the white 
men's eyes were open. It was during this time the whites 
were able to grab the most fertile lands, usually at 
gunpoint. When the Africans opened their eyes and realized 
that the white men's motives were lands, raw materials, and 
cheap labor and not Christianity or "civilization", they 
began rebelling to recapture their lands and lifestyles, but 
it was too late because the colonialist's influence and 
control had spread like wild fire. The natives were told 
not to close their eyes for prayer this time, but to sing 
the Christian hymn— "trust and believe, for there is no 
other way, but to trust and believe". The literal 
implication from this hymn was that the white men had taken 
over Africa and the natives were better off if they trusted 
and believed. Therefore, the fact that Africans see 
governments as the enemy or the tool of oppression is no 
surprise. According to many Africans, a good government is 
one that allows avenues for personal enrichment.
In sum, the African nations that won their independence 
from the European colonial powers are for the most part 
uneasy confederations of tribes that are traditional
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enemies. The primary loyalty of their citizens is not the 
state, but the tribe and its chiefs. The political 
objective of the dominant tribe is to capture the country's 
economic power base, which is the government, and once it 
has been seized, to hold onto it. Political corruption is 
probably the most destructive moral disease in Africa. 
Although this malaise is found in nearly all societies, it 
appears to be especially virulent south of the Sahara with 
the exception of some Southern African countries 
particularly South Africa. As some European entrepreneurs 
with interest in Africa once stated, "they bribe a good deal 
in Uganda, some in Kenya but not at all in Tanzania and 
Zambia"®®, a tribute to the high personal integrity of Julius 
Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, former presidents of the two 
countries, respectively. Therefore, corruption cannot be 
"dismissed as 'one of those things'; it is an evil which 
challenges the very bedrock on which our juridical 
independence stands"®® assert Neil Jacoby et al. What 
emerges from these brief examples is a sense of the 
pervasiveness of corruption that is practiced in both 
developed and developing nations. These scholars argue 
that, political/government corruption often "declines as 
society advances in its awareness and support of nationhood, 
in wealth and income, in political and legal stability, and 
in building of strong social institutions".®® However, to
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make a case that, political corruption ends at some stage 
with the social and economic development would be stretching 
too far. Indeed, in a world populated by human beings with 
their moral frailties, desires, appetites, selfishness, and 
lust for personal enrichment, to eradicate political 
corruption from the face of the earth is perhaps a utopian 
concept.®^ As Jacoby et al., conclude, "socio-economic 
development does tend to curb practices that civilized men 
and women agree are morally wrong and economically 
inefficient".
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
REFERENCES
1. Braibaint Ralph, "Reflections on Bureaucratie 
Corruption", Public Administration.(Winter^ London, 1962), 
p. 357.
2. Samuel P. Huntington, "Modernization and Corruption", in 
Arnold J. Heidenheimer (éd.). Political Corruption: Readings 
in Comparative Analysis. (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 
1978), p. 492.
3. Ibid.
4. Krushna Singh Padhy, Corruption In Politics. (New Delhi: 
B.R. Publishing Corporation, 1986), p. 20.
5. Syed Hussein Alatas, Corruption: Its Nature. Causes and 
Functions. (Brookfield USA: Avebury, 1990), p. 13.
6. Joseph Senturia, "Political Corruption" in R.A. Edwin 
Selingam et al (ed.) Encyclopedia Of Social Sciences. Vol.
III & IV, London, 1931), p. 448.
7. Knox R.A. The Old Testament. Vol. II, Amos 5:12 (tr.)
Burns and Oates and Washburn (London, 1949), p. 1396.
8. Ibid., Vol. I, Exodus 23:8, p. 114.
9. Ibid., Vol. II, Isaiah 33:15, p. 1114.
10. Halayya M. Emergency: A War On Corruption. (New Delhi:
S. Chand & Co. 1975), p. 6.
11. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution. XXVII, nos. 3-4 
(tr.) H- Rackhma (London: Heinemann, 1952), p. 81.
12. Plato, The Laws, (ed.) Edith Hamilton and Huntington 
Cairns (New York: Pantheon, 1961), bk. 12, sec. d.
13. Alatas, op. cit., p. 15.
14. Halayya, op. cit., p. 6.
15. Carl J. Friedrich, The Pathology of Politics. (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1901), p. 158.
16. Alatas, op. cit., p. 16.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
17. Ferrero Guglielmo, The Greatness and Decline of Rome.
Vol. I, (tr.) A.E. Zimmern (London: Heinemann, 1909), p. 42.
18. Padhy, op. cit., p. 22.
19. Halayya, op. cit., p. 6.
20. Dickinson John, Death Of A Republic: Politics and
Political Thought In Rome in Friedrich op. cit., p. 132.
21. Halayya, op. cit., p. 6.
22. Senturia, op. cit., p. 44 9.
23. Patrick J. Dobel, "The Corruption Of State" The American
Political Science Review. Vol. 72, (1978), p. 959.
24. Alfredo Bonadeo, Corruption. Conflict and Power in the 
Work and Times of Niccolo Machiavelli. (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1991), p. 1.
25. Dobel, op. cit., p. 959.
26. Ibid., pp. 959-61.
27. Paul H. Douglas, Ethics In Governments. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 13.
28. Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption. (Los Angeles : 
University of California Press, 1988), p. 10.
29. William Turner, "In Defense of Patronage", The Annal of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science
(January 1937), pp. 22-8. and William J. Riordan Plunkitt of 
Tammany Hall. (New York: 1958)
30. Martin L. Gross, The Political Racket: Deceit. Self- 
interest and Corruption in American Politics. (New York: 
Ballantine, 1996), p. 62.
31. Ibid., p. 60.
32. Ibid., pp. 61-2.
33. Ibid., pp. 63-4.
34. Elizabeth Drew, Politics And Monev: The New Road To 
Corruption. (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1983), 
p. 97.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
92
35. Gross, op. cit., pp. 70-1.
36. Ibid.
37. Nathan Miller, The Foundling Finaglers (New York: David 
Mckay, 1976), pp. 41-2.
38. Ibid.
39. Klitgaard, op. cit., p. 10.
40. Ibid.
41. David M. Miller and Clark D. Moore, in (éd.), The Middle 
East Yesterday and Today (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1970), pp. 123-4.
42. Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean 
World in Age of Philip II (New York: Harper & Row, 1973)
Vol. 2, p. 693.
4
3. Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the 
Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1963), p. 237.
44. Ibid, pp. 46-9.
45. Braudel, op. cit., p. 693.
46. Halpern, op. cit., p. 251-80.
47. Peter deLeon, Thinking About Political Corruption 
(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), p. 5.
48. George B. N. Ayittey, Africa Betrayed. (New York: St. 
martin's Press, 1992), p. 37.
49. Ibid., pp. 37-8.
50. Robert Williams, Political Corruption In Africa. 
(Brookfield: Gowers Publishing Company, 1987), p. 165.
51. Benjamin Ewuku Oguah "African and Western Philosophy: A 
Study", in (ed.), Richard A. Wright African Philosophy: An 
Introduction. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
1984).
52. Ayittey, op. cit., p. 38.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
53. George B.N. Ayittey, Indigenous African Institutions. 
(Dobbs Ferry, NY: Transactional Publishers, 1991).
54. Ibid.
55. Anita Cheikh Diop, Pre-Colonial Black Africa. (Westport, 
CT: Lawrence Hill, 1987), p. 65.
56. Williams, op. cit., pp. 35-46.
57. Kivutha Kibwana et al.. The Anatomy Of Corruption:
Legal. Political And Socio-Economic Perspectives.
(Unpublished Monograph, 1994), pp. 60-1.
58. Ibid.
59. Neil N. Jacoby et al.. Bribery And Extortion in World 
Business: A Study of Corporate Political payment Abroad (New 
York: MacMillan Publishing Company Inc., 1977), p. 43.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3
THE CAUSES OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION
"Not every black man is my brother.
Not every white man is my enemy".
— Lucky Dube
"Your pocket will decide".
— Ghanaian bribe request
"Every franc we give impoverished Africa, 
comes back to France, or is smuggled into 
Switzerland and even Japan".
— Le Monde, March 1990
An investigation into the causes of political 
corruption in African societies would provide many different 
explanations depending upon the question and time.
Generally and broadly speaking, the motives for corruption 
can be divided into two categories: the external corruption- 
-the legacy of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and dependency- 
-and the internal corruption— the "Big Men" of Africa, 
centralized states, inefficient leadership, 
maladministration of government institutions and 
parastatals, tribalism and nepotism, population explosion, 
unemployment, and other physical and man-made realities.
Indeed, massive corruption in Africa seems to grow from 
both historical and contemporary sources. In fact, on a 
continent where corruption is seen as "a way of life"̂ , it 
would seem unrealistic and somewhat biased to blame a few
94
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"bad apples" or factors. Despite extraordinary consequences 
the exposure of corruption has had in recent years, 
corruption is by no means new in political life. On the 
contrary, it has a long pedigree running throughout the 
history of both pre-colonial and colonial periods.’ In fact, 
it is not uncommon to find a large number of the African 
public who admit that corruption is a "national feature" or 
the "way things are done".̂ However, as April Gordon and 
Donald Gordon assert, corrupt practices among the 
strategically positioned politicians, bureaucrats, and the 
elites are rampant and habitual.* Therefore, one can 
strongly argue that African elites' primary purpose is to 
chase for profits and work for their own pockets at the 
expense of the public.^ Yet when the question arises as to 
why there is pervasive and habitual corruption in African 
continent-wide societies, the legacy of colonialism and neo­
colonialism are mentioned.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND COLONIALISM 
It has been suggested and strongly argued that the 
prevalence of government corruption in post-independent 
Africa was brought about by colonial rule. Indeed, Syed 
Hussein Alatas agrees when he states that, "Not only was 
there corruption in colonial administration but it was 
further increased by the indirect effect of nationalist
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agitation against the government".° For example, in Nigeria, 
Zaire, Kenya, and other British, French, Belgian, and 
Italian colonies, during the period of colonial imperialism, 
cheating, plundering, and stealing from the enemy government 
was popularly considered as patriotic. Protecting offenders 
from the police, income tax evasion (land and dog taxes), or 
hiding those individuals who were fighting for national 
liberation/independence were regarded as heroic acts. But 
after independence (which for many of these countries 
occurred in the 1960s), the habit of cheating and stealing 
from the government continued.^ As of the 1990s, the trend 
of stealing has increased and spread to the point of choking 
the whole continent.
It should be borne in mind that the main purpose of 
European imperialism in Africa was solely and purely the 
economic motive— acquire raw materials, cheap labor, and 
markets. Thus, one can argue that the partitioning of 
Africa during the late 1800s was geared towards enslaving 
and exploiting Africa's natural resources and labor power. 
The consequences were displacement, dislocation, 
disorientation, and alienation of tribal societies from 
their territories, lands, and resources. The Biafran War in 
Nigeria during the later 1960s was a result of colonial 
rule.®
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Undoubtedly, the imperialists were successful in their 
endeavors and managed to bulldoze their lifestyles and their 
economic and political regimes into the African mindset. 
While the British used indirect rule and a divide and rule 
(instigating tribal confrontations) strategy to achieve 
total collaboration and rule, the French and Belgians used 
direct and cultural means to control their colonies. In all 
instances, the colonialists held out the carrot and wielded 
the stick. In essence, classes were formed, economic 
opportunities and education established, especially in urban 
centers, and some tribes benefitted more and wielded more 
economic and political power than others. Those tribes that 
were at a disadvantage lacked economic and political power 
and access to scarce natural resources and, thus, corruption 
and bribery became tools of choice for penetrating any real 
or imaginary barriers or roadblocks to government goods and 
services.®
According to Robert Williams, the legacy of colonialism 
can be blamed for economic underdevelopment, political 
instability, tribalism, and political corruption.Because 
the Europeans strived to bring "civilization" to Africa and 
to transform its supposedly "barbaric" or "savage" ways of 
life to modern lifestyles— in terms of language, education, 
Christianity, political institutions, constitutions, 
technologies, and machineries— disregarded African tribal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
98
and customary lifestyles. Thus, as Europe attempted ro 
bring modernization, civilization, and development to 
Africa, it cast an image of "heroes doing battle with 
cannibalism, lust, and depravity— the forces of 
'darkness' and uncultured people, which was not 
necessarily the case.
Niccolo Machiavelli argues that civilization is a 
factor in corruption, especially in civic political life.
He related civilization and the difficulty in establishing a 
sound form of government in this manner:
"Doubtless.... anyone seeking to establish a republic at the 
present time would find it easier to do so amongst 
uncultured men of the mountain than amongst dwellers in 
cities where civilization is corrupt; just as a sculptor 
will more easily carve a beautiful statue from rough marble 
than from marble already spoiled by a bungling workman".^’
According to Alfred Bonadeo, the assumption from 
Machiavelli's statement underscores that corruption is more 
likely to be found among those peoples whose civilization is 
highly evolved, among the inhabitants of cities and, 
finally, it indicates that where such corruption is present 
it is vain to hope for the establishment of a republican 
government. Indeed, the same can be said of the 
eradication of corruption in Africa. Since people now know 
the new way of corruption— through the exchange of currency-
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-it would be impossible to totally clean up this act. In 
fact, Africans say "mlamba hazari halambi mara moja" (one 
who licks honey does not do it only once). When this idiom 
is applied to government officials, it literally means that 
as long as they are in charge of distributing scarce goods 
and services, the temptations to become corrupt are 
inevitable. Thus they will keep deepening their hands in 
the national honey pot and lick not only once but from time 
to time. As the saying goes, "kawaida ni kama sheria" 
(normalcy is like law). This literally means that, if 
government workers are used to being bribed for their duties 
and services, it becomes a routine or a "law" to expect 
bribes before and after these services are rendered.
In the same vein, Samuel Huntington asserts that in 
developing nations, particularly Africa, corruption is a 
"virtually inevitable phenomenon of the initial stages of 
'modernization'",^^ one likely to disappear/diminish as 
African economies and nation-states move beyond the 
infant/early phases of capitalist development, as tended to 
be the case of Western Europe's bourgeois transition.
Additionally, other scholars argue that the aspirations 
of Africa's administrative elites for the status symbols and 
lifestyles of the continent's former colonial masters are 
inclinations reinforced at the lower rungs of the 
bureaucracy by the social disorientation of rapid
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urbanization, that is, the imbalance between rural and urban 
development.-® While the rural areas, where a majority of 
African citizens live, are neglected at the expense of 
cities, there is a high rural-urban migration for government 
goods and services— jobs, social amenities, and a higher 
standard of living. This migration leads to overpopulation, 
crime, unemployment, and a lack of housing and water, thus 
necessitating corruption. In Africa money talks and 
character walks; who you know is more significant than what 
you know; the highest bidder is more important than meeting 
the qualifications or simply being in need. Thus, as scarce 
government goods and services, especially government 
contracts, projects, jobs, housing, etc., are on sale, the 
strong survive while the weak wither away.
Going back to colonialism, the international school of 
thought also agrees that the aftermath of colonialism, 
capitalism, and the exploitation of Africa by Western 
countries necessitated corruption. Indeed, with Africa's 
overweighed dependence on economic/foreign aid, political 
independence seems illusionary. In this condition, the 
notion of manifest destiny in Africa is far from real.
Roger Tangri also points out that "During the colonial 
period, African countries were made both politically and 
economically subordinate to the interests of imperial 
capital....Local economies were subordinated to externally
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defined needs.... When the colonial bureaucrats departed from 
Africa, they left behind highly distorted economies".*® To 
date, this trend continues coupled with yet another new 
fashion of colonialism— "back-door colonialism" or neo­
colonialism.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND NEO-COLONIALISM
According to Ralph J. Onwuka and Timothy M. Shaw, neo­
colonialism is the "survival of the colonial system in spite 
of the formal recognition of political independence in the 
emerging countries which become the victims of indirect and 
subtle forms of domination by political, economic, social, 
military, and technical means". These scholars maintain 
that the main "ploy of neo-colonialism is to make sure that 
the dominated countries do not have much direct horizontal 
contact among themselves, particularly, not economic 
interactions or trade".In fact, the chances of African 
countries doing business and trade on a regional or 
continental basis is slim to none.
Similarly, even after independence, many African 
countries have not completely changed their political and 
economic settings to reflect their own indigenous models. 
Most countries still use former colonial constitutions, 
laws, and economic apparatuses. For example, Africa still 
favors cash crops— coffee, cotton, and tea, etc— that are
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sold abroad (to the mother colonialists) for foreign 
currency while neglecting consumer and immediate substance 
crops, e.g., corn, sugarcane, and other agricultural goods 
that could be used for its population, thus alleviating the
problem of hunger. The fact that Africa is largely an
agriculturalist continent and lacks the skills and 
technology to tap its rich natural resources and manufacture 
and consume its own goods, it is left with only one 
solution— to rely on the Western powers to feed and solve 
her problems. Worse still, Africa is forced to dance to the 
tunes of the western International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank (WB), and other international organizations. A 
case in point is that of Kenya, which was recently cut off 
by the IMF for loan transactions amounting to $220 million 
for having a large number of civil servants, too much 
government repression, violations of human rights, and a 
high level of corruption and bribery.One can argue that 
in Nigeria and the former Zaire, government repression and
corruption are far worse than in Kenya; yet the
international organizations for decades supported the 
dictatorial leadership of Babangida and Mobutu, their 
African puppets.
E.A. Boetang also observes that "the achievement of 
political sovereignty does not automatically lead to 
economic independence. . . . It is but a rubber stamp under
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the guise of self-determination. Thus the Western nations 
still dictate and chart the course that Africans should 
follow lest they lose economic aid. This, is essence, 
destroys the self-determination and political sovereignty 
that Woodrow Wilson intended to see in Third World countries 
that were allies to the West during the First World War.
Clearly, until Africa fully realizes its full self- 
determination, until the West treats Africa as an equal
partner in the world economy, Africa will forever remain a
spectator of world politics. Therefore, the legacy of 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, and dependence have 
contributed to corruption in modern-day Africa. It is April 
and Donald Gordon's assertion that as long as Western 
nations still assign Africa the role of the "producer of
cheap raw materials" in the global economy, they continue
to prevent Africa from "achieving its economic potential"
In addition, these scholars maintain that political 
oppression, foreign exploitation, economic inequality, and 
poverty contribute to corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Undoubtedly, "colonial policies worked to handicap 
independent Africa's economic future".^®
Pertaining to neo-colonialism, African scholars, 
particularly Ben Turok, contend that it "has brought both 
hardship and social turbulence to many countries in the 
Third World",especially Africa. Turok, however, argues
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that the reasons for this dilemma are to be sought in both 
external causes and in the inherited and developing internal 
structure of neo-colonialism and imperialism. He 
particularly points an incriminating finger at the 
international market as the primary cause for Africa's 
chronic problems, including corruption. He states that "the 
deterioration in international trading conditions have 
sorely reduced export earnings for previously high-value 
commodities"^' such as gold, diamonds, iron ore, oil, etc. 
Also, the unfavorable terms of trade for most African major 
agricultural items— coffee, cotton, sugarcane, pyrethrum, 
etc.— have inevitably hit the farmers crucially and directly 
in income received and in government support.’® Turok 
concludes that the basic reason for the new conditions after 
independence in Africa is that "Whereas colonial rule was 
exercised by an external force, neo-colonial rule is a 
function of two powers— imperialism and an internal ruling 
class".
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND THE NATIONALIST SCHOOL 
The nationalist school of thought agrees that rather 
than blaming colonial rule for corruption, it is about time 
to look at what is going on in the backyards of African 
societies. These scholars include Chinua Achebe, Wole
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Sonyinka, Bankole Omotoso, Ben Turok, George Ayittey, Ngugi 
wa Thiongo, Kivutha Kibwana, and Blaine Harden, among 
others, who blame African elites— leaders, politicians, 
policy-makers, bureaucrats, businessmen, and top civil 
servants— as the causes for corruption. They point out that 
overbearing executive powers, government repression, single 
party states, big and centralized governments, inefficient 
state institutions, the underpaid civil service, tribalism 
and nepotism contribute a great deal to corruption.
Even though it is unanimously agreed upon that the 
legacy of colonialism and today's neo-colonialism or 
"international straightjacket" share some of the blame for 
corruption, these scholars strongly think that Africa's 
problems, particularly corruption, are self-inflicted 
wounds. They concur with Christopher Hitchen who writes: 
"Yes, we know that colonialism was devastating and 
disruptive. Yes, we know that political borders of Africa 
make no sense and were drawn without regard to human 
reality. Yes, no doubt the international trade decks are 
stacked against African p r o d u c t s b u t  does this 
explain why life is so much more "brutish, cruel, and short" 
in modern Africa than during the colonial era? Does this 
justify why African elites are greedy, selfish, squander 
maniacs, and corrupt maniacs? Or should this reality deter 
Africa from removing the chains of backwardness?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
106
Indeed, Africa seeks scapegoats in the West to justify 
corruption and her chronic problems— poverty, civil war, 
crime, low living standards, and unemployment. George B. 
Ayittey notes that, "True, there was colonial exploitation 
in the past, but today the real exploiters and oppressors of 
the African peasant are often the African elites".®^ No 
doubt, African megalomaniacs, corruptimians, and 
squandermanians such as late Mobutu Sese Seko, Babangida, 
Kenneth Kaunda, Hasting Kamusu Banda, Omar Bongo, Sani 
Abacha, Paul Biya, and Daniel arap Moi, to name just a few, 
keep amassing wealth and exploiting their respective 
countries with impunity by stealing economic aid, by 
treating their national treasuries as if they were their 
personal bank accounts, and by stashing their riches in 
Swiss banks.
To negate the factors of colonialism and neo­
colonialism, conservative journalist Keith B. Richburg 
contends that Africa, like some Southeast Asian countries, 
e.g., Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam, etc., were also 
under colonial rule. After independence during the 1950s 
and 1960s, Asian countries have succeeded while Africa is 
still in despair. Richburg asks:
Why has East Asia emerged as the model for economic 
success, while Africa has seen mostly poverty, hunger, 
and economies propped up by foreign aid? Why are East 
Asians now expanding their telecommunications 
capabilities when in most of Africa, it's still hard to
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make a phone call next door? Why are East Asians now 
wrestling with ways to control access to the Internet, 
while African students still must use cardboard 
drawings of computer keyboards because they don't have 
real computers in the classroom? Why are East Asian 
airlines upgrading their long-haul fleets, while 
bankrupt African carriers let planes rust on weed- 
strewn runways because they can't afford fuel and 
repair costs? Why are the leaders in Southeast Asia 
negotiating ways to ease trade barriers and create a 
free trade zone, while Africans still levy some of the 
most prohibitive tariffs on earth, even for 
interregional trade?.
To put these questions in perspective, why is it 
relatively possible to travel throughout Asia, while it is 
hard to travel within Africa? Why is it possible for Asian 
countries to do business on a regional basis while Africa 
cannot? Why are the Asian markets and borders open to 
regional and world investors, while those in Africa are not? 
Why is Asia blossoming with economic success, while Africa 
lags behind? The ugly truth is that, it is not because 
Asians are workaholics and smarter while Africans are lazy 
and dumb. The cardinal reason for Africa's underdevelopment 
resides within Africa. Richburg argues that, for decades 
Africa's failures "have been hidden behind the veils of 
excuses and apologies".
Indeed, there is no reason why Asia should succeed and 
Africa fail. Richburg notes that, both regions emerged from 
colonialism at about the same time and faced similar 
obstacles. For example, in 1957, when Ghana became
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independent from Britain, it was one of the brightest hopes 
for black Africa with a higher gross national product than 
South Korea, which was itself still recovering from a 
destructive war and more than thirty years as a Japanese 
colony. Today, South Korea is recognized as one of the 
Asian "dragons" or "tigers"— an economic powerhouse 
expanding into new markets throughout the region and the 
world at large. In contrast, Ghana meanwhile has slid 
backward. In fact, today her gross national product is 
lower than it was at independence.
Along the same line of argument, Kenya in the 1970s and 
early 1980s was regarded as East Africa's success story, a 
country in the horn of Africa that was destined to become a 
powerhouse, a country bubbling with economic growth and 
political integration, and a hub of an efficient civil 
service, of transportation and communications networks, and 
a haven for regional and international investment, a country 
with a history of political stability and tranquility. 
According to Julius Nyerere, Nairobi was the "London of 
Africa", a role model to many in sub-Saharan Africa. Today, 
Kenya has been relegated to the dustbin of history due to 
political corruption, tribalism, poverty, unemployment, 
crime, police brutality, and dictatorship. In short, all 
forms of development have stalled just as in many other 
countries in the horn of Africa.
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Nigeria was also another potential African powerhouse 
blessed with oil reserves. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
Nigeria's gross national product was the highest in Africa. 
Today, the country is ruled by marauding military tigers and 
dictators who repress and take part in high levels of 
corruption that make the lives of ordinary Nigerians a 
nightmare.
The former Zaire (The Democratic Republic of Congo) is 
one of those African nations blessed with diamonds and iron 
ore. Like Lagos, Kinshasa was at one time a bustling modern 
city. Today, Zaire is nothing but a huge hole in the middle 
of Africa. It has been raped by its former dictator,
Mobutu, and his colleagues, and today it is the eighth 
poorest country in the world.
Additionally, the reason for this peculiar atmosphere 
has to do with Africa's fear, suspicion, and oppression that 
the "Strong Men" engender among the public. Also, Africans 
still cling to their tribal loyalties and identities instead 
of a national loyalty and identity. For example, one is 
Yoruba or Hausa first and Nigerian second, Kalenjin first 
and Kenyan second, or a Zulu first and a South African 
second. Although this may seem minutely insignificant to 
some observers, where tribes are as numerous as they are in 
Africa, tribalism cannot be treated as a minor problem. It 
has as much to do with underdevelopment as colonialism.
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There is no doubt in Ayittey's mind that what breeds 
corruption and bribery in sub-Saharan Africa is purely "the 
system of pervasive state controls, regulations, 
concentration of economic and political power, the 
institution of one-party state systems which lack 
accountability, and the muzzling of the press to expose 
corruption and wrongdoing.®® The truth of the matter is 
that, these conditions are also present in East Asia and 
other developing areas, but no place/region are these 
conditions so severely instituted than is Africa.
Writing on the issue of muzzling of the press to 
express government wrongdoing, Peter Warutere notes that by 
attacking the press for exposing government and individual 
corruption and other malfeasance of the African elites and 
business, the government is being insensitive, illogical, 
cynical, and undemocratic. He, therefore, asserts that 
governments that harass the media/press are "wrestling with 
the mighty power of the pen" that feeds the public with a 
for information and solutions to their problems. He 
concludes that, "victory can only be assured if there is 
political will to suppress corruption, tribal clashes and 
the other multitudes of critical problems which the 
newspapers and magazines continue to highlight in their 
quest for a transparent and democratic republic".®’
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For their part. Wraith and Simpkins support these 
African scholars' claims when they state that, "In Africa 
corruption flourishes as luxuriantly as the bush and weeds 
which it so resembles, taking the goodness from the soil and 
suffocating the growth of plants which have been carefully 
and expensively bred and tended".®® Indeed, systemic 
corruption has simply destroyed what took many years to 
build. Wangari Mathai notes that corruption has reached 
devastating proportions, has destroyed and stalled democracy 
and economic development, and has led to "non-accountable 
and non-transparent leadership". ®®
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND THE "BIG MEN"
It is argued that those who suffocate and stall 
development in Africa are the "Big Men", or the "Strong 
Men", or the "national figures" or the "founding fathers" or 
the "god-like" presidents. According to Blaine Harden, 
"Africa's traditional dictators and tribal chieftains— the 
'Big Men'— have proven surprisingly tenacious..."^” in 
corrupting and stealing with impunity Africa's scarce 
natural resources.
In describing the "Big Men" or the African 
excellencies. Harden states that, they can be recognized 
everywhere because their pictures can be found on every wall
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and in office or business premises; their faces are on the 
local currencies; highways, schools, universities, 
hospitals, streets, avenues, shopping malls, football 
stadiums, military academies, hotels, airports, and public 
transportation services are named after them; they appear on 
the front pages of the local daily newspapers; their daily 
movements or undertakings are broadcast on radio and 
television on an hourly basis; they ban political parties 
except those of which they are members (usually the ruling 
party); they harass political opponents, rig elections, 
appoint and shuffle legislators/parliamentarians as they see 
fit; they make, modify, or amend laws without question; they 
receive the highest percentage of kickbacks and skim foreign 
aid; they treat their national treasuries as if they were 
their personal accounts, and stash their amassed wealth in 
Swiss banks and/or invest in foreign countries; and last, 
they are, tribalistic, all-powerful, brutal, tyrannical, and 
all government institutions, i.e., courts, civil service, 
universities, national hospitals, and parastatals are under 
their thumbs.With these characteristics, African leaders 
have created what is referred to as Mobutuism, Moiism, 
Abachaism, Bandaism, Biyaism, Kaundaism, Mugabeism,
Bongoism, etc.
Without a doubt, the "Strong Men" of Africa have poisoned 
their respective countries, thus retarding economic growth.
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Referring to the former Zaire's former dictator, Mobutu Sese 
Seko, Harden states that his "venality spawned a corruption 
ethic that underdeveloped Zaire....'"*® David Gould also 
stresses that in Zaire "where corruption was central in the 
entire system of government and economic activity, the 
embezzlement of state funds, tax evasion, extortion, and 
other immoral practices facilitated the consolidation of the 
economic base, one that largely arises out of the state 
bureaucracy".'*® In Zaire, as in many other countries in 
Africa, one is either rich or poor; there is no middle- 
class .
In fact, during Mobutu's reign, those individuals from 
his tribe, personal cliques, and members of parliament who 
sung the tune of Mobutu's songs or supported his tyrannical 
regime, or those who never "crossed him", benefitted 
economically and politically. Some rose to become 
millionaires and succeeded in business because they captured 
most of the government contracts, import-export licenses, 
and fat kickbacks or "percentages", as they are often 
called.'*̂  Mobutu's family and friends spent three decade 
looting Zaire and helped themselves from the earnings to the 
copper, cobalt, and diamond mines. According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States 
Treasury, Mobutu's personal fortune was worth four to five 
billion dollars during its height in the 1980s. Although
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Mobutu denied this report of his vast wealth as sheer 
allegation, it is all too well known that denial is part and 
parcel of African leadership.
Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Sani 
Abacha of Nigeria, Paul Biya of Cameroon, and El Had] Omar 
Bongo of Gabon, to name a few, are seen as "god-like 
figures", all-powerful, all-knowing, and presidents for 
life. Therefore, one can argue that, these "Big Men's" 
omnipresence and repressive leadership is detrimental to 
Africa's economic development and political integration 
because they discourage foreign investments, free elections, 
freedom of press and speech, unite among ethnicities, and 
above all plunder national resources.
The fact that they amass wealth with impunity; buy 
loyalty with hard currency using state resources; give 
favors to their families and relatives, clans, tribes, 
supporters, cliques, and friends; divide-and-rule; and stir 
tribal warfare, they in essence preside over the collapse of 
their respective countries, contribute to high-level of 
political corruption, and induce it in others. Yet they all 
blame Western nations for their countries' problems. 
Undoubtedly, therefore, one can make a strong case that the 
problems with Africa lie with the political elites/leaders 
themselves who plunder from their own national resources and
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steal from their own people and yet openly and vehemently 
they deny this fact.**
Indeed, African leaders who embodied the hopes of the 
African continent at the start of the independence period, 
at a time when Africans proudly took the run of self-rule 
and vowed to build fair and more just societies than they 
had known under colonial rule, were the ones who became the 
colonizers of their own people. Makau wa Mutua reveals that 
"Once they replaced the colonial rulers, they wanted to 
become like them...they wanted to become all-powerful and 
omnipresent....We just replaced white faces with black 
faces". *’
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND TRIBALISM/NEPOTISM 
Nepotism is another factor in political corruption. 
David Apter attributes corruption in Africa to the 
persistence of traditional values which conflict with the 
requirement for a secular way of life. Nepotism or 
favoritism is considered a grave crime in Western 
bureaucratic practices, yet in Africa, providing jobs, 
government contracts, business licenses, and promotions for 
members of one's own family, clan, and tribe is considered 
compulsory and quite normal.*® In fact, many Africans would 
agree with this analysis— the more successful a civil 
servant or politician becomes, the more he or she is
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expected to share his or her good fortunes with kinsmen.*® 
Throughout Africa, asserts W. E. Abraham, the "family 
conscience is terribly loaded with a proliferation of duties 
and obligations owed to relatives known and unknown who may 
spring up and demand attention when one is busily performing 
his official duties".®® He goes on to say that clan welfare 
takes priority over individual welfare. This is because 
African cultures emphasize clan achievement and cooperation 
more than individual self-help.C. S. Whitaker, Jr., notes 
that the "...high incidence of official corruption stems in 
large part from conflicting pressures and expectations 
regarding social and official positions, rather than from 
any singular aptitude for venality on the part of those who 
occupy them".
Generally speaking, these pressures emerge from the fact 
that Africans still believe in "yours is mine and mine is 
ours". And that it takes a village to raise a child. 
Therefore, it is the child's responsibility and obligation 
to serve his family, clan, and tribe. Neglecting or 
ignoring the needs of one's family and clan is the most 
terrible thing one can do. Generosity and assistance are 
the most appreciated human qualities and the most admired 
features in Africa. For example, when a politician or a 
member of parliament is generous, even at public expense, 
all his faults are forgiven. At the same time, African
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elites derive satisfaction as well as prestige from having 
people dependent on them.®® The simple reason why African 
politicians and top civil servants surround themselves with 
their fellow clansmen or tribesmen and/or immediate family 
members and relatives is to avoid the accusation of 
ingratitude or betrayal of family. Kwame Nkrumah once 
admitted, "I could not have chosen my government without 
regard to tribal origin...and even within the party itself, 
there was a tendency to condemn or recommend some individual 
on the basis of his tribal or family origin".®*
Other factors that contribute to corruption include the 
population explosion, the shrinking and scarcity of natural 
resources and foodstuffs, and the high demand for scarce 
goods and services— education, healthcare, housing, and 
jobs. Under these circumstances, nepotism and tribalism 
oftentimes come in handy. April A. Gordon notes that the 
"patronage relationship based on ethnicity and kinship is 
often potent to gaining access to resources (such as jobs, 
schooling, or money) .... "®®
In the same vein, James C. Scott notes that kinship ties 
and parochial loyalty to one's tribesmen often dictate who 
gets what, how, and when.®® Put simply, who you know is 
more important than what you know. He maintains that the 
traditional obligations of kin, tribe, village, or religious 
sect are so strong that they contribute to a certain amount
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of corruption. It is not uncommon to find a politician or a 
top civil servant who is at the same time an official of his 
tribal or clan organization and a civil servant. He may 
take unwarranted liberties with state funds and place his 
incompetent friends or tribesmen in office. But in the 
tribal or clan association, he is a scrupulously honest 
guardian of the ethnic interest.®^ This is definitely what 
Africans call a "good man", or a "man of the people", or a 
"true son", or a "tribal hero". Because the clan/tribe 
engages his strong loyalties, the nation does not.
Therefore, to steal from the state burdens his conscience 
little or not at all; to steal from his clan or tribe would 
seem like stealing from his own family.®®
Because governments in Africa are the sole or largest 
source of goods and services and the providers of jobs, 
status, prestige, wealth, and security, "it's the dream of 
every family and tribe to place at least one of his sons in 
the public service; the demand for Western-style education 
is, in part, a by-product of this demand for public 
office".®® Hence, the "scramble" for jobs in the civil 
service is a result of the opportunities one acquires 
working for the government, e.g., status, prestige, avenues 
to amass great wealth, and exercise of power with few 
restrictions.®® Indeed, these are things a politician or top 
civil servant does not want to "steal" from his family or
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clan/tribesmen. Publius Gamesu also states that the keen 
competition for government employment contributes to 
ethnicity and gives greater impetus to nepotism and 
tribalism.®® Because there are big bureaucracies and a rapid 
increase of civil servants with chronic lower salaries, 
corruption and bribery is to most workers a supplementary 
source of income.
Taking from Peter to pay Paul is not a new concept in 
Africa, nor is it seen as an immoral thing, but rather it is 
expected of those who are in power and in positions of 
decision-making arenas. The fact that those tribes in power 
tend to take all and control all is a normal phenomenon.
This is not to argue that all government officials or tribes 
engage in corruption for selfish or tribal reasons. There 
are, of course, a few good, decent, honest, and moral 
leaders. Nelson Mandela is a good example. Wraith and 
Simpkins write: "The ethnicity is there, but it has not yet 
been transferred from the seat of natural loyalty, which is 
the clan or tribe, to the new seat of loyalty which is the 
state".®^ Put simply, due to the weak legitimacy of the 
political systems compared to pervasive pressures and ties 
of family and/or ethnicity, many Africans oftentimes serve 
tribe first and country second.
Therefore, one can strongly argue that tribalism and 
nepotism are two evils or factors that enhance and reinforce
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political corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. Those tribes 
that are unrepresented or under-represented or "left out" of 
the government's political machine— economically and 
politically—  find that their best shot/chance often is to 
buy their way into the system. Furthermore, severe poverty 
and meager wages impel people to tolerate corruption and 
bribery in order to survive. Indeed, the majority of 
government workers in many countries cannot afford a 
balanced diet or three meals a day even if they spent all 
their salaries on food alone. Furthermore, with the signs 
of affluence that people see around them— skyscrapers, 
expensive cars, big houses, and the unequal distribution of 
wealth— it is every person's dream to live a good life with 
power, money, status, and prestige.
Under these circumstances, it is understandable that 
civil servants are inclined to demand gratuities, speed 
money or dash, or kitu kidogo before performing their 
services. Therefore, due to frustration, most government 
workers are tempted to accept bribes to supplement their 
meager incomes. In sum, the historical legacy of 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, the "Big Men", nepotism and 
tribalism in concert cause political corruption in sub- 
Saharan Africa.
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CHAPTER 4
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND LEADERSHIP IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA: TRIBALISM AND PATERNALISM
"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely."
— Lord Action
"I am your god and teacher. I am the divine way, 
the torch that lights the dark. There is no god 
but Ali Solih".
— Ali Solih, the late president of Comoros
"After me, it will be upon you, if you allow 
even monkeys to rule you".
— Daniel arap Moi, Kenya's president
"We know so little of Africa, the 800 [sic] 
and some tribes that make up Africa... I say 
it is like a different world".
— Senator Hubert Humphrey, 197 6
In this rapidly changing world, each decade/era has its 
own political horizon, its own system of values, its own 
experiences, its own political leaders, and, of course, its 
own style of political leadership.® According to John 
Cartwright, "The essence of leadership is the ability to 
persuade others to comply voluntarily with one's wishes"®. 
However, when we endeavor to determine what creates this 
ability to persuade, the cult of personality, attributes, 
traits, ideology, and other elements that leaders possess 
are hard to pin down, even though they play a significant 
role.
125
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Leadership is an elusive phenomenon that eludes precise 
definition. James MacGregor Burns asserts that, "The study 
of leadership has been largely neglected by modern social 
scientists, who for both methodological and ideological 
reasons have tended to concentrate on mass movements and 
more easily measured phenomena. No one has yet developed a 
general theory of leadership"®. Nonetheless, when we speak 
of "leadership" what comes to mind is the activity of an 
individual who draws from his people to pursue his intended 
goals. In Africa, individuals such as Kwame Nkrumah,
Patrice Lumumba, Jomo Kenyatta, and Nelson Mandela appealed 
to the masses in their endeavor to liberate their countries 
from white domination.*
But leadership not only revolves around "heroic" 
figures, but also around individuals who are capable of 
compromising out of a diversity of conflicting interests.
For example. Nelson Mandela's ability to negotiate and 
compromise with both white and black South Africans to 
achieve harmony makes him a great leader. In essence, the 
ability of a leader to act, to persuade followers, and to 
win their support with the intent of bringing his goals into 
fruition and acquire legitimacy is what entails leadership.
Leadership does involve not only voluntary compliance 
but also a special kind of power relationship between the 
leader and the led— a symbiotic relationship. Because of
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this special relationship. Burns contends that it is easier 
for "leaders to induce followers to act for certain goals 
that represent the values and the motivations— the wants and 
needs, the values and aspirations— of both the leaders and 
followers".® Therefore, leadership is the power and ability 
to obtain non-coercion and voluntary compliance from 
followers that enable both the leaders and followers to 
achieve their goals.
However this is not to argue that leaders cannot obtain 
compliance with coercion. Quite to the contrary, tyrannical 
political leaders, e.g., Adolf Hitler, Idi Amin Dada, Samuel 
Doe, Jean Bokassa, Mengistu Haile Mariam, Kenneth Kaunda, 
Kamuzu Banda, Sani Abacha, and Mobutu Sese Seko have all 
ruled with an iron hand and, supposedly, acquired 
legitimacy. This kind of leadership, coercion, is, however, 
short-lived. Cartwright argues that "some material reward 
is needed, and the resources to provide such rewards are 
most readily obtained through control of the machinery of 
the state"®.
In Africa, it is hard not to find politics and 
political leaders untainted by high levels of state 
centralization, coercion, favoritism, tribalism, and 
paternalism. The salting away of government favors, 
contracts, developmental loans, etc., by the "Big Men" to 
their tribesmen, cliques, cronies, and loyal friends is
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quite the norm. As a matter of fact, politics in Africa is 
influenced by tribal politics and tribal leadership. In 
other words, the style of political leadership in Africa is 
by and large that of the paternal and tribal model.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND TRIBALISM
When the focus turns to African politics, scholars and 
journalists oftentimes use terms such as "tribe" or 
"tribalism" to analyze the issues, but do not do the same 
for other parts of the world. As a matter of fact, the word 
"tribe", when applied to the African people, refers to 
something far different than when it is applied to North 
American Indians, Australian aborigines, or even European 
ethnic groupings.® Additionally, some African tribes are 
described as village states, empires, or in terms of 
language groups.
According to Paul Bohannan and Philip Curtins, the term 
"tribalism" became common in European writing about Africa 
in the 19th century. They argue that, in the era of the 
slave trade, Europeans usually talked about different 
African "nations" or tribal-nations, but under colonial rule 
these "nations" became "tribes". In fact, European 
colonialists often encouraged Africans to band into tribes 
to make it economically less costly to administer and easier 
to divide and rule.®
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Keith Richburg contends that tribalism or ethnic self-
interest remains the defining feature of politics and
political leadership in Africa. Because there is a lack of
a sense of nationalism, i.e., national identity, among
African people that can transcend tribalism, political
leaders— the "Big Men" often play the "tribal card" to come
to power and/or remain in power.® Scholars argue that the
style of political leadership revolves around paternalism—
"Strong Men" and tribalism. This style of leadership is to
most leaders a means to an end. Even among some of Africa's
most charismatic heroes— Lumumba, Kenyatta, Nkrumah, and
Mandela— the manifestation of tribal politics was/is
evident. To understand the role of tribal politics, it is
vital to define tribalism as a concept.
In Webster's dictionary, tribalism is defined as:
An organization, culture, or a belief of a tribe. A 
tribe, on the other hand, is a system of social 
organization comprising several local villages, bands, 
districts, lineages, or other groups that share a 
common ancestry, culture, language, name, and 
territory. Within the tribe, there is solidarity and a 
sense of identity among people.
In Africa, tribalism is as old as Africa and forms the 
primary mode of leadership. Fred Burke asserts that, 
"tribalism or the value and behavior patterns that can be 
attributed to tribal organization and life, is not so much 
disappearing or reappearing as it is changing in form and 
substance".®® In fact, with the partitioning of Africa by
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the Europeans in the late 1800s, tribes were displaced, 
dislocated, and/or forced to live together. Therefore, 
colonialism indeed reinforced tribal conflicts and 
competition for scarce economic resources and political 
power that have enhanced the tribal warfare/conflicts that 
exist to this day in modern Africa.
Regarding ethnic/tribal groups, Nigerian Chief Obafemi
Awolowo once said:
It is a mistake to designate them 'tribes'. Each of 
them is a nation by itself... There is as much 
difference between them as there is between the 
Germans, English, Russians, and Turks....Their cultural 
backgrounds and social outlooks differ widely; and 
their indigenous political institutions have little in 
common. ®®
Due to tribal or ethnic differences among the peoples of 
Africa, it is not surprising to find politics and leadership 
based upon the tribal setting.
No doubt African leaders oftentimes rule as 
kings/chiefs. In fact, in pre-colonial Africa, "larger 
tribes generally possessed more highly developed political 
systems wherein a paramount chief or divine right king ruled 
the tribal nation through the agency of a hierarchy of 
lesser chiefs...."®® In the same way, some modern day African 
leaders rule with absolute power over their people/ 
subjects. As a matter of fact, these leaders make policy 
decisions individually and/or with the assistance of self- 
appointed officials. Therefore, because African leaders
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emerge from traditional settings, they oftentimes adopt and 
rule as elders or chiefs— something that comes to them 
naturally. This is because during their childhood and 
adulthood, they were raised under the leadership of the 
elders or chiefs at the village level. Therefore, when they 
become leaders themselves, they tend to follow the 
traditional (elder/chief) styles of leadership even in 
modern settings.
Some scholars argue that the politics of ethnicity 
take the behavior they do because they are the only forms 
of identity that exist or are presumed to exist in many 
African societies. The fact that leaders rule as elder or 
chiefs and consistently offer favors to their own 
tribes/ethnic groups in terms of jobs, government contracts, 
business licenses, and development grants is to nobody's 
surprise.
The unending competition among other tribes and former 
chiefdoms for these scarce goods and services often leads to 
conflict because of ethnic consciousness. Under such 
circumstances, competition and conflict are bound to occur.®-’ 
This ethnic factor is commonly referred to as "tribalism" 
is so salient that Melson and Wolpe think it instigates 
conflicts that, in turn, produce tribalism and not vice 
versa. ®*
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Tom Mboya probably sums it up best when he writes that 
one of the microcosmic factors for the persistence of ethnic 
sentiment among African leaders is that, "They are still to 
some degree 'communal' because of their background and their 
relatives remaining tribal, and so they themselves cannot 
afford to change at the risk of offending and losing their 
family. "®®
Most significantly, however, is the need for a leader 
to create and maintain a power base. It is Elliot Skinner's 
contention that, during the colonial era, any "African 
leader with universalistic values found that he had to 
appeal to group identity based on descent, if he would 
galvanize his followers to seek political power."®® And after 
independence, as P.H. Gullivers argues, "African politicians 
necessarily require a firm base for their operations in the 
still unstable, inchoate national arena. What better, in the 
short run, to ensure support, electoral and other, and to 
wield a powerful political weapon, than to stand as the 
representative and spokesman of the tribe?"®®
Even those leaders who wished to operate as 
nationalists stood to risk losing tribal support. For 
example, Jomo Kenyatta's dilemma in the 1940s was, as 
William Ochieng contends, a win-lose situation. Ochieng 
states that Kenyatta "wished to operate as a nationalist
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leader of Kenya, but the Kikuyu were planning in tribal 
terms".®® This dilemma can be applied to almost all African 
leaders.
In sum, it is important to cite Colin Legum's theory 
about the importance of a reciprocal relationship between 
the leader and the led: "The elitist political leader in
the modern system needs his 'constituency' invariably a 
tribe or at best a region— on which to rest his power, just 
as the tribal or regional constituency needs its royal 
representatives to defend and promote their interests in the 
modern sector".®® Therefore, the leader's entrapment or 
dilemma to meet his tribesmen's and followers' demands and 
needs is indeed a driving force behind African political 
leadership.
While it is true that tribalism causes political 
corruption, ethnic conflicts, and retards development (the 
"curse" of modern day Africa), political leaders seek to 
secure class position and power by "constructing intra- 
tribal patron-client hierarchies defining social conflicts 
in terms of ethnic relationships...."®® and for the purpose 
of acquiring legitimacy. In fact, African leaders derive 
their power base and legitimacy first and foremost from 
their ethnic groups, and through a patron-client 
relationship. Therefore, tribalism and clientalism should 
not be treated as phenomena peculiar to the so-called
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"primitive world”. According to Deborah Kaspin, "African 
tribalism is, in fact, fairly typical of identity politics 
so richly in evidence in the world at large".®®
African ethnicity is treated differently from European 
ethnicity as reflected in the media coverage of "tribal 
warfare" in Rwanda as opposed to "ethnic violence" in 
Bosnia. Cohen states that, "somehow, ethnicity is more 
primordial in Black-Africa than it is in white Europe.
Social scientists have scrutinized this concept from several 
perspectives and treated it alternatively as a fundamental 
aspect of identity."®® Therefore, ethnic politics and ethnic 
leadership are part and parcel of the African political 
system.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND PATERNALISM 
On the other hand, paternalism— the "father figure" or 
strong man syndrome— is another form/style of leadership in 
Africa. Paternalism derives its meaning and function from 
patriarchical societies whereby a father is regarded as the 
head of the household, the breadwinner, provider, and 
protector of the family. As for the ethnic group or tribe, 
a king/chief is the head, protector, and overseer of the 
needs and demands of a whole ethnic group or tribe. Tribal 
kings/chiefs rule with the help of several self-appointed 
sub-chiefs who are answerable to chief the alone. In fact.
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tribal kings/chiefs possess absolute authority because they 
are regarded by the tribe as "fathers" or "strong men".
In the same way that chiefs once ruled, modern day 
African leaders rule as "father figures" entitled to 
absolute power in decision-making, and oftentimes, of being 
above law. To win trust and support from the general 
public, a leader must prove that his policies provide 
benefits to his people. Cartwright asserts that "trust can 
derive from a number of attributes perceived in the leader 
by his followers: selflessness, age, intellectual ability, 
militance, or even familiarity". Perhaps selflessness, the 
perception that what the leader is doing is for the good of 
all and not particularly for his benefit, comes closest to 
being a necessary ingredient in creating this bond. "In 
Africa, respect for age has given a number of leaders a 
powerful hold over their countrymen. Felix Houphouet-Boigny, 
"Le Vieux" of the Ivory Coast, Jomo Kenyatta, "Mzee" or the 
"wise leader" of Kenya, William Tubman, "the Old Man" of 
Liberia, and Dr. Milton "Pa" Margai of Sierra Leone all 
enjoyed wide respect for the presumed wisdom and detachment 
that age and experience gave them".®* Other rulers built 
their bonds on quite different qualities. For example, 
"Kwame Nkrumah presented himself as militant, and eventually 
took the military title of "Osegeyfo", the warrior redeemer. 
Julius Nyerere has always cast himself a 'Mwalimu' the
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teacher, and appears to maintain respect in the role of the 
thoughtful intellectual".®®
Blaine Harden argues that, in Africa, everything from 
the judiciary, legislature, civil service, parastatals, 
media, and schools are under the Big Men's control. These 
Big Men regard themselves as all-powerful and honorable. In 
fact, most leaders often use heroic titles to make their 
case. Daniel arap Moi, is known as "Baba" (father) of 
Kenya, Mobutu Sese Seko as the "cock" of Zaire, and Nelson 
Mandela as a warrior of south. Some even insist on being 
called "doctors", "teachers", "conquerors", "the big 
elephants/lions", "the number-one peasants", "the wise old 
men", "the national miracles", "the most popular leaders in 
the world", "the immortal beings", or "the gods" In fact, 
the major reason why strong men are corrupt in contemporary 
Africa is purely because they can use their absolute strong
men's power to use their government treasuries as they 
please.
The fact that they are supposedly entitled to a blank 
check as national providers and comptrollers of the state 
resources necessitates political corruption. In fact,
"Strong Men" use the state's resources to feed a personality 
cult that defines them as incorruptible, all-knowing, 
physically strong, courageous in battles, sexually potent.
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and kind to children and the public at large. However, 
these leaders' rules have one overriding goal: to perpetuate 
their reign as Big Men.®®
Therefore, under such circumstances, they create 
patron-client relationships to ensure loyalty and legitimacy 
and thus enhance political corruption.®’ More often than 
not, tribalism and paternalism are the norm among these 
leaders. For example, the eras of Mobutuism and Moiism are 
just two illustrations where both tribalism and paternalism 
played a great role in political leadership. Therefore, 
paternalism and tribalism— kinship ties or parochial tribal 
identity of a leader-led relationship— dictate "who gets 
what, how, and when".®® These two evils are ultimately the 
cause for political corruption.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND CHARISMATIC LEADERS 
According to Richburg, "corruption is the cancer eating 
at the heart of the African state. It is what sustains 
Africa's strong men in power, and the money they pilfer, 
when spread generously throughout the system, is what allows 
them to continue to command allegiance long after their last 
shreds of legitimacy are gone".®® The question whether 
charismatic leaders, e.g., Nkrumah, Lumumba, Kenyatta, and
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Mandela, ruled/rules as tribal chiefs is emphatically "yes". 
In the case of Nelson Mandela, a leader "who proudly 
displays a non-tribal stance, some of his followers 
nevertheless kill each other as Zulus and Xhosas".®° 
Furthermore, Mandela is accused of providing favors to his 
Xhosa tribesmen, especially among the ANC's top executive 
officials.
As for Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Richburg writes that, 
"Kenyatta was a harsh autocrat, a tribal chieftain of the 
first order who believed that it was the Kikuyus's national 
right to rule."®® Kenyatta consistently gave his Kikuyu 
tribesmen favors in terms of business licenses, farms, 
development grants, government contracts, top governmental 
positions, government scholarships, jobs, etc., thus 
enriching the Kikuyus. In the same footsteps that Kenyatta
took, today the Kalenjin, the country's smallest tribe under 
Daniel arap Moi, has done the same thing.
In the case of Kwame Nkrumah and his advocacy of Pan- 
Africanism, the tasks that faced African revolution were 
"the struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism, the 
liquidation of economic and cultural backwardness, the 
overcoming of tribalism."®® He was later, however, accused by 
some African politicians of having "just one goal in mind—  
to establish Ghana's hegemony in Africa and satisfy his
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personal ambitions".^'’ Nonetheless, Nkrumah was truly the 
best example of a dynamic African leader. In his book,
Africa Must Unite. Nkrumah wrote, "Africa needs a new type 
of citizen...a dedicated, modest, honest, informed man. A 
man who submerges self in service to his nation and mankind. 
A man who abhors greed and detests vanity. A new type of man 
whose humanity is his strength and whose integrity is his 
greatness" .
Patrice Lumumba of Congo/Zaire also belonged in the 
company of Nkrumah, Nyerere of Tanzania, Tom Mboya of Kenya, 
and Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea. These leaders believed 
that the only way to build an effective modern state free 
from the shackles of narrow tribal loyalties was to create a 
single, and central government".^® Lumumba, although 
identified with his Beteteta tribe, was also able to attract 
the strongly expressed loyalties of a tribally-heterogeneous 
body of the Congolese. Because of this factor, Lumumba was 
truly the only national political leader. Although he was 
assassinated, Lumumba is still regarded as "a true son of 
Africa, and in his short unhappy lifetime, he was accepted 
as belonging to all of Africa, not just Congo".^ Whatever 
the case, it is truly impossible for a leader to be non- 
tribal in a multi-racial setting. Indeed, Lumumba, Nkrumah, 
Nyerere, and Toure's regimes were not necessarily less 
paternalistic or tribal in nature.
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Tribalism may sound like an old cliche', but it is 
still part and parcel of Africa's body politic. Similarly, 
ethnicity dominates Africans' social and political life. It 
is Richburg's assertion that it is tribalism that prompted 
the Rwandan Hutus to exterminate tens of thousands of the 
Tutsis; that it was tribalism that recently turned Kenya's 
Kalenjins against the Kikuyus in the Rift Valley Province; 
that it is tribalism that turned the Zulus against the 
Xhosas; and that it is tribalism that has caused human 
atrocities throughout Africa— Zaire, Burundi, Somalia, 
Ethiopian, and the Sudan.
Richburg maintains that, political leaders are willing to 
play the tribal card, to unleash tribal passions and 
rivalries for their own sinister motives, and to create the 
kind of violent chaos and atmosphere they need to justify 
their grip on power. Sadly, all too many Samuel Does,
Juvenal Habyarimanas, Siad Barres, Mengistu Haile Mariams, 
Daniel arap Mois, Mobutu Sese Sekos, and Sani Abachas have 
proven to do just that. Wangari Maathai also adds that 
"...many of the current African leaders enjoy immense power 
and control and indeed run states as if they were their 
personal property... invent divisive and manipulative 
tactics, e.g., politically-motivated tribal 
clashes/conflicts among ethnic groups in order to stay in 
p o w e r B e c a u s e  of this factor, most Africans have totally
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lost faith in the political leadership of their countries.
In fact, all throughout African society there is a 
noticeable absence of national pride and patriotism or a 
sense of national identity simply because of tribalism and 
paternalism.
In sum, it is quite in order to argue that, in Africa, 
politics and leadership are significantly influenced by both 
paternal and tribal practices. This style/model of 
leadership varies among different countries and societies 
both in substance and magnitude. But theoretically and 
practically, political leadership in particular revolves 
around tribal politics. Sadly, this trend was/is evident
among some charismatic leaders, e.g., Lumumba, Nkrumah, 
Kenyatta, and Mandela.
Therefore, one can draw a general conclusion that 
political leadership in sub-Saharan Africa has a lot to do 
with paternalism and tribalism/ethnicity and above all 
political corruption. Indeed, one cannot study political 
corruption in sub-Saharan Africa without linking it to 
political leadership. These two concepts have a symbiotic 
relationship and often times they reinforce each other. For 
example, if the leaders are corrupt, paternalistic, and 
tribalistic, surely, one expects bad leadership and vice 
versa. Truly, a good leader such as Nelson Mandela serves
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as a role-model or example to the general public and the 
African continent as a whole as to what good leadership 
entails. To eradicate political corruption and ensure good 
governance in sub-Saharan Africa, leaders such as Mandela 
are essential.
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CHAPTER 5
THE POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC 
IMPACTS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
Political corruption has its roots in ancient times. 
Philosophers, including Aristotle, warned that the states 
that wished to prevent revolutions in their monarchies, 
oligarchies, and democracies ought to guard against 
inequalities that arise out of corrupt practices by those in 
public office or public affairs. He stated that "Every 
state should be so regulated by law that its magistrates 
(read public servants) cannot possibly make money.... People 
do not take great offence at being kept out of 
government;...What irritates them is to think that their 
rulers are stealing the public money".^ For example, in 
Rome, "unscrupulous gain from forbidden sources"^, 
especially the practice of bribe-taking was vehemently 
condemned and punishable by death. This is because bribery 
contributed to political and social decay and thus affecting 
economic growth.^ Clearly, even though political corruption 
has its complex manifestations in polities, it nonetheless 
remains one of the most destructive phenomena in the history 
of mankind and within contemporary societies.
146
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Gregory Jaynes, for example, states that in recent 
years the complex interactions between multinational 
organizations and national governments, the bubba-ocracy in 
America,“ the narcotics undercover agents in Latin and North 
America®, the Gonzalez crisis in Spain, the political 
scandals in Italy® the current crimes and resistance to 
reform in Russia’, are spurned and lubricated by the hydra­
headed phenomenon of corruption. The truth of the matter is 
that, whichever way scholars and people across the globe may 
view political corruption, its consequences are undoubtedly 
damaging and deadly. Countries in Third World nations, 
particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, are the worst 
affected.
From a philosophical point of view Alatas states that:
Corruption promotes nihilism and cynicism.... creates 
the composite problem such as the 'brain drain' of 
educated people from third world societies. In such 
problem corruption is a major contitutent and combines 
with others to form a composite whole. Administrative 
inefficiency and parasitism are other examples of 
composite problem.®
Consequently, the end results grand corruption are
injustice, inequality, and human misery. For example,
during periods of famine, and as recently as 1994, many
Somali children and adults died of malnutrition and other
diseases because Somali warlords and public officials stole
relief supplies, food, and medicine that were meant for
emergency and humanitarian purposes. From 1992 to 1994,
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within Rwanda, Burundi, the former Zaire, and many other 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa, it was reported that 
government officials were stealing relief supplies and 
selling them on the black-market, thus exacerbating the 
suffering of the poor, sick, and powerless.
Syed Hussein Alatas contends that countless episodes 
of injustice are clearly visible to those who wish to see in 
the majority of Third World countries, particularly Africa, 
where total systemic corruption is the order of the day.® In 
the same vein, Stanislav Andreski cites many cases of 
injustice that are generated by corruption in West Africa.
He states that in hospitals, for instance, patients pay 
nurses to bring them bedpans, and doctors too take bribes 
before treating or providing medication to the patients. 
Furthermore, medicinal supplies are stolen from dispensaries 
and public hospitals and sold on the street for profit 
and/or are stocked in doctors' private clinics. In fact, 
this pathological behavior of medical practitioners and 
other government workers applies within almost all of Sub- 
Saharan Africa. Alatas notes that without bribing doctors, 
nurses, or hospital staff, nothing can be obtained.In 
the 1990s, it was found that for years within Kenya's 
Ministry of Health, dead people were on the payroll and were 
still "receiving" monthly paychecks and other bonuses. The 
beneficiaries were top civil servants within the Ministry.
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Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins cite cases in Nigeria 
and elsewhere in West Africa in which outpatients had to 
bribe nurses and doctors in order to be admitted to 
hospitals or clinics and receive treatment. The same thing 
applies to people without jobs. For these unfortunates, the 
only way to acquire job application forms is by giving dash 
or bribes to government officials. In fact, job-seekers 
have to hand out bribes starting from as low as janitors to 
clerks to bosses. To arrange for an interview, it takes a 
series of illicit tolls, "speed money", to become eligible. 
Even after employment has been secured, dash to the bosses 
does not stop. Rather it takes a different shape. Monthly 
"gifts" or "pocket money", lunch, and other entertainment 
items are continually extorted from lower civil servants by 
their seniors. The penalty for not complying can be 
transfer to remote areas and hardship regions or even 
demotion.
This kind of systemic corruption is what Andreski
Stanislav calls "kleptocracy"— a state that steals. Its
results are as follows:
The losses caused by corruption exceed by far the sum 
of individual profits derived from it, because graft 
distorts the whole economy. Important decisions are 
determined by ulterior motives regardless of 
consequences to the wider community. When a useless 
factory is built in an impossible place simply because 
the former owner of the site bribed the official into 
buying it for an exorbitant price, then the cost to the 
community must exceed by far the profit of the
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manipulators. An administrative machine permeated by 
graft does not respond to direction, so that even a 
most enlightened and personally honest leader can 
achieve nothing, his instructions are perverted in 
execution; and the network of collusion is so thick 
that he goes as in a fog. Every bureaucratic machine 
suffers to some extent from aversion to initiative and 
originality, from sycophancy and the preferment of 
intriguers and yes-men. But when graft adjoins these 
normal diseases the administrative services become a 
mere machine of extortion, scarcely able to maintain a 
minimum of public order, let alone to engage in 
successful economic planning.
For a government plagued by systemic corruption such as 
was the case with the former Zaire, neglecting various 
duties and obligations essential to effective administrative 
management and smooth-running of a country is the end 
result. It is Wang An Shih's assertion that a corrupt state 
always neglects its responsibilities and obligations in its 
exclusive attention to political corruption. This neglect 
may reach a point that it becomes callous, disastrous, and 
deadly to the whole society.’® For instance, the deadly 
plague of ebola that killed many Zaireans in recent years 
was a result of the government of Zaire, and in particular 
that of Mobutu, neglecting to provide basic hygiene, 
sanitation, and preventive measures against the disease. 
Consequently, the death toll escalated and caused havoc in 
certain regions of the country. Meanwhile Mobutu and his 
cronies were busy continuing to enrich themselves.
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Additionally, the loss and shortage of the water supply 
in Accra, Ghana, in 1979 was brought about by years of 
neglect in maintaining the Ashiaman reservoir. The effect 
of the lack of water in the capital of Ghana was alarming 
and damaging to the public. Shih goes on to state that, 
"During this period Ghana stood at the brink of a calamitous 
epidemic and consequent national disaster. Children drank 
from filthy pools; water from gutters was collected for 
human consumption; septic tanks remained unflushed for days 
and Accra stood in shame".
THE FUNCTIONAL AND DYSFUNCTIONAL IMPACTS 
OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
The question is : does political corruption have
functional or dysfunctional impacts? While some scholars 
see corruption as dysfunctional others see it as functional. 
According to Charles Schwartz, corruption is on a micro and 
macro-level dysfunctional because it breeds and feeds upon 
economic wastefulness, investment distortions, 
administrative anarchy, political misrule, and social 
disintegration.’® To put this in perspective, in Somalia, 
Ethiopia, Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Zaire, Cameroon, and Kenya, corruption has bred 
disastrous effects such as civil war, ethnic conflict, coup 
d'etat, starvation, poverty, and human suffering.
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Morally, corruption leads to ethical decay and instills 
a negative, widespread belief that state property belongs to 
no one in particular and, therefore, is free for all. On 
the systemic level, due to chronic mismanagement of state 
property, people lose hope in their governments and laws. 
Thus instead of joining hands to clean or fix a corrupt 
state, they spend their energies plundering scarce 
resources. Perhaps there are no other societies that so 
strongly believe that what belongs to one belongs to all 
(free for the taking) than are African societies. Among 
African states, property mali ya serikali is like holy water 
that everyone helps himself to.
Politically, corruption promotes apathy that arises 
because of the pilfering and wasting of state property.
This leads to alienation, cynicism, and a reluctance to 
fight corruption or crimes that are related to bribery, and 
graft.’® It is Schwartz's argument that black, gray, and 
white types of corruption altogether breed specific patterns 
of corruption that contribute to blocking political 
development and economic growth.”
In contrast, other scholars, particularly Stephen 
Morris, contends that the analysis of the consequences or 
functions of corruption hinges on the dialectic between the 
capacity of corruption to serve as a source of spoils among 
the elites on the one hand, and its negation of principles
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of conduct set out by the legitimizing ideology on the 
other. He argues that, from the state perspective, 
corruption can enhance stability of the organizational 
components of the state and formal procedures that reflect 
popular legitimacy. Although corruption may provide a 
pragmatic co-operative device to gain political support 
crucial to the survival of the system, it can also be 
antithetical to legitimacy.’® Because corruption provides an 
avenue for the illegitimate enrichment of a group of elites 
at the expense of the public/majority, legitimacy crises can 
be the ultimate consequence.
Morris asserts that corruption plays a great role in 
integrating and accommodating the different state actors—  
patron clients, political teams, middlemen, politicians, 
policymakers, and their supporters by facilitating 
cooperation and creating a cooperative mechanism for the 
rising middle class by distributing spoils, implementing 
flexible public policy, facilitating social mobility, thus 
crippling mass-based organizations.’®
Political corruption also helps to bolster the feelings 
of legitimacy among political elites by offering material 
benefits to those who play the game according to the rules 
and support the status quo, thus standing to benefit 
financially and politically. James C. Scott states that
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government supporters are handpicked by presidents to occupy 
strategic positions and are endowed with power to distribute 
goods and services as they see fit, and in so doing, they 
help to draw mass support and mobilize public participation 
in order to maintain the status quo.̂ °
Indeed, the use of corruption and bribery to integrate 
an elite and stabilize the system by "buying" with hard 
currency support, especially from those members of the 
opposite political parties (defectors) into the ruling 
party, is rampant and crucial in most African nations. In 
Kenya, for instance, it is known that President Daniel arap 
Moi buys potential opponents with state money by handing out 
hard currency, cars, houses, land, business sites, and 
government loans payable without interest, thus encouraging 
them to defect to his ruling party, Kenya African National 
Union (K.A.N.U.).®’ In Nigeria, the former Zaire, and other 
military-ruled regimes, political or military leaders buy 
off top military officials in return for supporting or 
protecting the state against potential vigilantes or coup 
d'etat from within and without. The truth is, throughout 
Africa the practice of buying top civil servants, military 
officials, politicians, or opponents is part and parcel of 
the African style of leadership.®®
Joseph Nye remarks that corruption allows certain
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political actors a means of escaping the constraints of 
policies that may not be in their best interest.®® Nathaniel 
Leff also notes that by permitting this behind-the-scenes 
influence, corruption also allows non-ideologically 
sanctioned actors an extralegal avenue to influence public 
policy at a more secretive implementation stage.®''
Furthermore, corruption provides a vehicle whereby 
political actors as well as criminals "buy" immunity from 
criminal prosecution or "purchase" well-paying government 
jobs or promotion.®® Indeed, for many people throughout 
Africa, political corruption has at one time or another 
helped solve a serious problem or dilemma, particularly when 
directly dealing with government institutions or 
bureaucrats. In this way, those who benefit from illegal 
connections often support the existing government and thus 
contribute in enhancing political stability.®®
Within the tribal setting, the so-called "divide and 
rule" principle has become a sure tool that African 
presidents use to guard against ethnic unity and revolution. 
This tactic helps leaders maintain their rule and 
legitimacy. Even when their legitimacy is waning, leaders 
often buy off their political opponents, powerful 
politicians, and members of those ethnic groups they see as 
"troublemakers" to secure their rulership. Usually, they 
hand out hard currency, loans, government scholarships.
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contracts, jobs, and promotions and build schools, clinics, 
and roads.®’
For instance, scholars argue that President Daniel arap 
Moi of Kenya sees the Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya, and Kisii tribes 
as "troublemakers" and thus buys them off from time to time. 
He directly appoints or nominates them to powerful and 
crucial government cabinet ministries, to Parastatals as 
executive directors, to top military positions, as 
ambassadors, university chancellors, provincial 
commissioners, and district commissioners. This does not 
mean that Moi cannot demote them if they fail to support his 
government or as Kenyans say, they do not "fuata nyayo" 
follow his foot-steps.®® It is also argued that Moi is one 
of the "worst tribalistic" leaders in Kenya. He has made 
sure that his Kalenjin tribesmen are placed within every 
strategic sector of government, Parastatals, non­
governmental organization, military force, university, 
provincial and district level, national and local levels to 
guarantee his rule.®®
The same can be said of Nigeria's dictator, Sani 
Abacha, who buys off members of the Ogoni and Yoruba tribes. 
The same goes on within his military force. Also the late 
Mobutu Sese Seko used the same strategy and gave favors to 
his cronies and favored tribes. These are only three 
examples, but the same can be said of almost all African
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presidents and countries. Viewed from these presidents' and 
their beneficiaries' perspective, corruption and bribery can 
function because it helps to enhance their rule, prolong 
their leadership, achieve political stability and 
legitimacy, and enforce public participation and support.
It is also James C. Scott's assertion that political 
corruption can be functional at a personal level because it 
contributes to stabilizing the political system by 
discouraging horizontal mobilization of the classes or 
occupational groups.®® What this means is that, while 
corruption benefits the few who support the system, it 
discourages any potential group that may decide to overthrow 
the existing government, because those that benefit from 
corrupt deals or transactions also serve as "watchdogs" 
against any uprising or revolution.
Scott goes on to remark that this occurs in two ways: 
First is that corruption adds to the potential of co-opting 
leaders of potentially powerful and threatening horizontal 
groups, e.g., labor unions, non-governmental organizations, 
and women's organizations, into supporting the system.®’ 
Indeed, this trend is a common practice in Africa because it 
allows powerful labor leaders and top executive officers the 
opportunity to exploit their organizations and to enjoy 
other privileges from the government in return for 
supporting the government of the day and by controlling the
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demands of the labor unions, workers, and women. Simply 
put, they assist in taming workers and women to ensure that 
they support and vote only the rule of the controlling 
political parties.®®
In most African states, women's organizations often 
become the right arm of the ruling parties. Because women 
"hold the sky", that is, they are in the majority, political 
leaders want them on their side for support and votes.
Often, women vote the president's party line or else they 
may encounter roadblocks or risk government subsidies, 
financial support, loans, and business licenses. In Kenya, 
for instance, the Kenya Mandeleo Ya Wanawake Organization 
(M.Y.W.O.) usually takes orders from the presidential level. 
The government is also usually very aware of and behind many 
women's undertakings both on national and local levels. 
Candidates running for MYWO's executive offices are usually 
either handpicked or supported by the government. The 
president makes sure that the chair is a Kenyan African 
National Organization (KANU) supporter and is capable of 
mobilizing women at both national and local levels to 
support and vote in favor of the ruling party's 
initiatives.®®
Secondly, Scott contends that corruption can make it 
relatively easy to channel demands through the system in a 
personal fashion at the implementation stage rather than
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through broad-based pressures at the policy-making level. 
This personal contact with political officials yields more 
superb outcomes than when dealing with a large group of 
people. Stephen Morris concludes that corruption promotes 
political stability especially on the part of the elite 
through its integrative tendencies. It also encourages 
political pragmatism and helps the elite smooth the rough 
edges of public policies by altering their implementation.®® 
Put simply, corruption can facilitate co-optation among 
different groups and enhances political stability.
Charles Schwartz, on the other hand, argues that 
political corruption, particularly the white type, can be 
functional because it serves as an essential lubricant in 
otherwise rigidly regimented political regimes.®® He 
maintains that, within the administration sector, bribes and 
clandestine gift-giving and abuse of power can be functional 
for governmental capacity to the extent that it cuts 
bureaucratic redtape, provides greater managerial 
initiatives and responsibilities, and allows for legitimate 
business expenses to be recovered through 
misappropriations. ®’
Nye also argues that for political corruption to have a 
generally beneficial effect on political development, it 
must meet three cardinal conditions. The first is a 
political culture that is tolerant or corrupt, the second is
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a greater security for political elites, party hierarchy 
members, and politicians close to the president, and the 
third is the existence of adequate societal or institutional 
restraints on corruption through law.®®
Throughout Africa, corruption is tolerated because 
political elites often deviate from morality and the rule of 
law while dealing with administration, governance, and the 
public. Second, all presidential "cliques" have full the 
protection of their presidents or government institutions 
and, thus, they are above the law and hardly ever do they 
get prosecuted or punished (jailed) for being corrupt. 
Because the political elites are protected, this dulls their 
sense of public responsibility; nor are they answerable to 
the public apart from the presidents only. Third, due to 
arbitrary and capricious African laws and their inadequacy 
to define what exactly constitutes corruption, gifts and 
bribes are oftentimes used interchangeably. For those who 
attempt to define corruption, they are either vague, 
ambiguous, or mute. For example, in Kenya there is no law 
that prohibits conflict of interest, thus making it legal 
for politicians and other political elites to engage in 
business when they want— and all of them do.®®
Walter Little and Eduardo Posada-Carbo argue that grand 
corruption can boost the overall growth rate by increasing 
the investment ratio and improving the marginal productivity
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of capital. They state that this "accumulation thesis is
most likely to hold where corrupt rulers feel secure enough
to reinvest the surplus which they illegally extract".'*®
According to these scholars, if corrupt leaders invest their
illegally acquired wealth by creating jobs and building
infrastracture such as roads, bridges, schools, hospitals,
and public airports, this would assist in raising the living
standards of their people and the trickle down effect would
be realized. Dr. Nathan Ozobia also notes that:
If all Africans would plough their ill-gotten money 
back to their countries and communities, the trickle 
down effect can be possible. But the bitter truth is 
that African leaders are not willing to take that 
chance. They are better off stashing their wealth in 
the Swiss banks and other foreign countries because of 
paranoia.'*’
The classic examples of those leaders who keep their 
ill-gotten wealth hidden in foreign countries are from 
Nigeria, the former Zaire, and Kenya. For these leaders, 
corruption provides an avenue to amass wealth and siphon it 
away unnoticed and undeclared. Take for example the case of 
the late Mobutu Sese Seko. All his ill-gotten wealth was 
stashed and scattered throughout the world from Africa 
(Morocco, Gabon, and Comoros) to Europe (France and Belgium) 
to North America (the United States) to South America 
(Brazil) and, of course, other countries where he owned 
villas, hotels, ranches, houses, and businesses.^® The same 
is true with Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Sani Abacha of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
162
Nigeria, and Paul Biya of the Cameroon. This behavior 
clearly damages the economy of Africa and contributes to its 
perpetual underdevelopment and political disintegration.
According to Colin Leys, a society that lacks effective 
public morality cannot develop economically. The fact that 
Africa's development depends upon government action in terms 
of planning and allocation of funds towards development, 
achieving these goals requires single-minded hard work, 
integrity, the rule of law, and moral principle at all 
levels— leaders, office-holders, and businessmen. Without 
this simple rule of thumb, the chances for economic growth 
and social and political development would be minimal.*® 
Unfortunately, the reason why Africa's development has 
stalled is primarily because its elites often consume all 
their energies and time getting rich quickly through illegal 
transactions, corruption, and placing self-interest above 
public interest.
Writing on the issue of morality and economic 
development, Patrick J. Dobel clearly sums it up by stating 
that :
An immoral society is where moral life has, so to 
speak, been privatized. As a result, social relations 
are characterized by complete self-interest and fellow 
citizens are seen as instruments, obstacles, or 
competitors. In the immorally corrupt society, civil 
virtue and social responsibility are abandoned and 
intense competition for spoils become the dominant 
social mode.**
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Other scholars argue that, due to Africa's high level 
of immoral behavior, i.e., corruption, bribery, 
embezzlement, abuse of power, selfishness, and lawlessness, 
economic and socio-political development have been hindered 
or compromised. Undoubtedly, political corruption is the 
most devastating problem second only to tribalism or 
ethnicity in Africa. According to Schwartz, this disease is 
dysfunctional because it leads to policy and investment 
distortions, theft of state property, and wastefulness.*® 
Indeed, in Africa corrupt maniacs loom large like predators 
on the streets of Dakar, Mogadishu, Khartoum, Maseru, 
Timbuktu, Lilongwe, Lagos, Dar es Salaam, Nairobi, and 
Kinshasa. Due to the slow prospect of democracy and reform 
against bribery and corruption, this problem will inevitably 
continue to damage African development. As the era of 
Moiism, Bandaism, and Abachaism, among others, continues to 
ruin development, there is an increasing continent-wide need 
for decentralization, privatization, downsizing of the civil 
service, limitation on executive authority, term limits that 
will force African governments and leaders to become 
accountable, transparent, and democratic. Indeed, the 
Berlin Transparency International Conference has joined 
hands with many Africans to reform and clean up bureaucratic 
corruption by using the power of the purse by denying 
economic aid to corrupt countries.*® However, as Schwartz
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notes, new nation-states, particularly in Africa, cannot 
confidently curtail the dysfunctions of corruption without 
sacrificing the functional utility that in most of Africa is 
badly needed.
THE GRAND POLITICAL CORRUPTION: ECONOMICALLY 
AND POLITICALLY DESTRUCTIVE 
George Moody-Stuart also asserts that grand corruption 
which involves influencing policymakers can be politically 
and economically destructive in Third World nations, 
especially Africa, He states that where high-level 
corruption is rampant, there is no hope of controlling petty 
corruption. Economically, grand corruption increases the 
cost of the transaction. For instance, if a business person 
pays a ten percent bribe to top government officials to 
acquire government contracts or a license to start a company 
in a certain region or area, he will increase the prices of 
his goods to offset the loss (money used to bribe). On the 
other hand, if the sale involves imported goods and 
services, the cost of goods will increase in order to 
balance the transaction. Furthermore, pushing aside cost, 
quality, delivery, and other legitimate considerations in 
the awarding of contracts, the possibility of wrong or 
inefficient suppliers and contractors selected is higher 
because it depends on the highest bidder. In the end, the
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possibility of purchasing the wrong goods, using inefficient
contractors, and building shoddy infrastructure is high.^
Arguing from the same point of view, the former British
Minister for International Development, Linda Chalker,
strongly states that "corruption is a major impediment to
development."** Michael Elliot argues that those who think
that corruption is a way of doing business in Third World
countries and Africa and that bribery is a cultural norm are
dead wrong because bribery and corruption are not part of
everyone's culture. He notes that this excuse is vehemently
and indignantly rejected by honest Africans, Arabs, Asians,
Europeans, and Americans. Chalker, in particular, does not
think that corruption is "a necessary fact of life that
helps the wheels of government and business to turn".*°
Elliot argues that corruption slows economic growth.
He articulates that:
Leaner times have given corruption a nastier taste. It 
was easy to joke about the size of a Rolex watch on the 
wrist of a general in Lagos when Nigeria's oil economy 
was growing. But since 1980 most of sub-Saharan Africa 
has grown poorer, which has made sumptuary excesses of 
the wabenzi that much harder to swallow. It's merely 
unpleasant to have to pay $12 to a junior Zimbabwean 
official for a driver's licence. But even strong 
stomachs turn when— as happened in Angola— a social 
welfare minister imports three hundred Mercedes-Benz 
cars into a country racked by civil war.
Indeed, it is unpleasant for government officers earning 
less than five thousand dollars a year to own a series of
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transportation businesses— "matatus" (mini-buses), big cars, 
houses for rent, land for developing, real estate, import- 
export businesses, and contracting companies, as is the case 
in most African countries. The truth is, most of these 
wealthy men and women have gotten rich through illegal means 
i.e, corruption.
Corruption also affects even the most sophisticated and 
developed nations in the world, especially the United States 
of America. Amitai Etzioni poses the question: "Yes, one
can say there is evidence of corruption, here and there. But 
how encompassing is the effect? Is it eating away at the 
margin, or has it wormed its way into the core?"*^ He 
argues that corruption has spread beyond such low levels 
into systemic or institutionalized corruption. In America, 
he contends campaign contributions are a form of legalized 
corruption." But, one may ask, if campaign contributions 
are legal, "how are they corrupt, and if corrupt, how are 
they legal"?** The answer to this question is that "what is 
ethical is not always legal, and vice versa".**
Additionally, he argues that, in American politics, 
legislators either buy their seats or sell their votes 
illegally for favors and private interests in violation of 
public will, moral principles, and the rule of law. He goes 
on to remark that this legalized form of corruption is the
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most damaging and the most prevalent in contemporary
America. Etzioni state that:
References to corruption in Washington scenes of 
Abscam, of Congressional members calmly stuffing their 
pockets with bribe money, embarrassed only by their 
pockets' not being deep enough to accommodate the day's 
take.
Indeed, one can argue that corrupt transactions not 
only involve members of Congress, but also other political 
elites throughout the United States who often use their 
power and positions for personal gain and to influence 
public policy. To use Representative James A. S. Leach's 
fancier phrase, "A government of the people, by the people, 
and for the people cannot be a government where influence is 
purchased through large, private campaign contributions"." 
Today, in American politics the issue that is hotly-debated 
and investigated by congressional committees deals with what 
influence some businessmen, both foreign and domestic, had 
in the 1992 presidential victory. In short, the issue of 
illegal campaign contributions or "dirty money" that 
implicates the President Bill Clinton and Vice President A1 
Gore is the talk of Capitol Hill.
The issue of "dirty money" not only applies to the 
United States, but also to all of Africa. Indeed, 
politicians and parliamentarians receive or demand big 
contributions or "percentages" from local businessmen and 
foreign investors before casting their votes on certain
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bills or laws. Often, decisions that are made benefit these 
elites personally as well as their "clients". For example, 
the concessions that Mobutu made with some Western investors 
benefitted him and his cronies and not the people of Zaire. 
It is reported that Mobutu stole "diamonds from his country 
to the tune of $15 million a year".*® Similar practices go 
on throughout Africa whereby scarce natural resources are 
used to enrich a few political elites who have power.
Stephen Morris also notes that corruption breeds 
bureaucratic inefficiency and waste and undermines 
legitimate social programs; especially when public funds are 
diverted by government officials to reward only those few 
who support the status quo, legitimate policy objectives are 
undermined. ** In the same vein, Kenneth Johnson states that 
corruption "defeats whatever quest there may be...for 
concrete government reforms".*”
Undoubtedly, the reason why Africa seems to be 
"developing", but somehow never really develops has to do 
with corruption. The truth is that African countries take 
one step forward and two backwards. Instead of spending 
their money on improving their communities by constructing 
roads, schools, water projects and hospitals; by funding the 
agricultural and economic sectors; by revitalizing rural 
areas; and by training workers, thus creating jobs and
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raising living standards, most of their resources go into 
building private airports and palaces, purchasing private 
jets, building churches, and funding private armies.*^
Additionally, scarce resources are squandered through 
the creation of complicated corrupt schemes and procedures. 
For example, the purchase of public lands by government 
officials who later resell them to the government for public 
works, recreational purposes, construction of business and 
office complexes, hospitals, and schools is a common 
practice in Africa. The ongoing land grabbing schemes in 
Kenya by political elites serve as a classic example. 
Politicians and top businessmen buy public lots during 
auctions and resell them for ten times more than the 
purchase price. As reported by the Daily Nation, even plots 
designated for public cemeteries and schools are being 
grabbed by politicians." Kenya is only one example; these 
same practices apply to other African countries as well. 
Therefore, as social projects that benefit the majority are 
continually compromised for personal gain, legitimacy, 
stability, economic growth, and political integration are 
hard to attain.
A CULTURE OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
Perhaps the most pernicious effect of corruption on the 
public at large has been fostered by a generalized "culture
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of corruption". According to Victor Le Vine, "such a
culture exists when politically corrupt transactions become
so pervasive in a political system that they become accepted
norms"." This is a common practice or norm in contemporary
Africa. In fact, if one asked how often Africans pay bribes
when dealing with government bureaucrats or officials, the
answer is not surprising. Bribes are compulsory ingredients
and almost always required before goods and services are
rendered. This also applies to foreign investors.
Corruption also invades virtually all dimensions of
social life, producing what Morris calls a "spillover
effect", or to use Syed Hussein Alatas' term, a "metastatic
effect". Alatas defines metastasis as, "a growth of
pathogenic micro-organisms or of abnormal cells distant from
the site primarily involved by the morbid process".®* It is
a transfer of disease from one organ or part to another not
directly connected to it. Typically, metastasis refers to
the spread of malignant tumors to different parts of the
body. Therefore, the nature of the malignant process is
significant in understanding corruption.
The cancerous or malignant process begins as 
progressive, unrestrained division of abnormal cells. 
Viewed through a microscope, cancer cells may initially 
maintain some degree of differentiation— that is, their 
specialized structure and function— so that they 
resemble those cells from which they arise or some 
developmental stage of the tissue of origin. Some 
cancer cells may perform limited normal functions. As 
the disease progresses, however, the structures usually
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becomes increasingly abnormal in appearance, structure, 
and function until they may not be recognizable as an 
offshoot of the tissue of origin. They may appear in a 
great variety of sizes and shapes. Chromosomes in 
malignant cells undergoing division may appear 
oversized or may have symmetrical spindles or other 
abnormalities. ®*
The analogy of cancer cells to political corruption is 
the fact that corruption can become unrestrained and can 
multiply and spread into other organs and perform 
dysfunctional roles. The same can be said of corrupt men, 
who, if unrestrained, can cause their corrupt actions to 
multiply and spread, thus affecting honest and hardworking 
men and women. This analogy shows us the essence of the 
pathology of corruption.®® Morris argues that the 
"spillover effect" from bureaucratic corruption can extend 
into non-governmental institutions, businesses, private 
schools and universities, and churches." The same is true 
with bribes or "dash", "kitu kidogo", or "speed money". It 
can spread from top public officials to lower civil 
servants, to private employees dealing with government, and 
to the common man, "mwananchi". Corruption can be very 
contagious.
Moreover, in Africa the culture of corruption exhibits 
a sub-cultural acceptance or glorification. This is what 
Alatas refers to as the "demonstration effect". This effect 
is expressed in the lifestyle of corrupt officials and the 
wealth that they display. In fact, this can give the public
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
172
the impression that corruption is indeed productive and 
worthwhile. The advantages of corruption are made visible 
so that others are encouraged to become corrupt— diamonds, 
Rolex watches, palaces, big cars, villas, luxury private jet 
aircraft, houses, etc. This glorification or demonstration 
of ill-gotten wealth can contribute to a variety of 
problems, e.g., divisiveness, cynicism, contempt for honesty 
and, eventually, the rejection of ethical values. It can 
also promote anger, crime, and lawlessness that may lead to 
revolution, a coup d'etat, or civil war.®®
In Africa, the bitterness, anger, and cynicism that 
have emerged due to corrupt government officials and leaders 
have spawned civil wars and competition and conflict among 
ethnic groups, hoping to control the governments and natural 
resources and, thus, acquire power and wealth. No doubt, 
the on-going bloody civil wars, ethnic conflicts, religious 
violence, and the attempted coup d'etats Rwanda, Burundi, 
Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, 
Liberia, Zaire, Uganda, Congo, and Nigeria can be attributed 
to corruption and tribalism that result in inequality in 
sharing the national cake. Put simply, it is about the 
powerful against the weak and all are fighting to control 
the economic sector.
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POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A CANCEROUS DISEASE 
Paul Harrison asserts that corruption is a cancer at 
the heart of most Third World nations, especially Africa.
He writes that, "It eats away at the foundations of trust 
between people and their rulers. It exemplifies the two key 
weaknesses of developing states. The unholy marriage of 
political and economic power, whereby money buys influence, 
and power attracts money; and the 'softness' of state's 
inability to apply and enforce its own laws and regulations, 
so that reform— even if it is legislated— rarely gets put 
into effect".®* He notes that corruption "riddles every 
part of the public edifice like a bad infestation of 
woodworm" .
For example, in 1975 Ghana's official Commission of 
Inquiry into bribery and corruption reported that corrupt 
practices were rife in almost all governmental departments. 
The commission found out that more than one hundred sixty 
cases of corruption practiced ranged from "staff 
appointments, promotions, transfers; clearance of goods from 
customs; allocation of market stalls; leakage of exam 
questions to students,; privileges for prisoners; sale of 
files on criminal investigations to the criminals being 
investigated. Nothing was sacred and secure against graft. 
Mortuary attendants were even demanding payment to release
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dead bodies to relatives. And priests were extracting 
'gifts' in exchange for burying non-churchgoers in 
consecrated grounds".’* Indeed, this pathological behavior 
is practiced on a continent-wide basis.
The most commonly used methods or phrases by Ghanaian 
officials and elsewhere in Africa tend to confuse and 
flatter members of the public on the complexity of 
government procedures and the chains of bureaucratic 
redtapes. Often times, civil servants purposely subject the 
public with intolerable delays in providing them with 
services and thus suggest that a bribe might produce a quick 
solution, or preferential treatment. This method is known 
as "speed money". In indigenous Africa, "gifts" were rarely 
solicited in public or openly. But today, phrases or 
"lingos" are used that have developed into a language of 
fraud. These range from those direct phrases, e.g., loosen 
your hand, bring out a feed for me. let your pocket decide. 
let something talk, to the ambiguous : are you strong?, can I 
see you in the corridor?, can we talk behind the bus/truck?. 
can you strech my neck?, can you see me in the dark?, can 
you meet me in T. G. I. F . ? .  b u y  S O m e - C p ffe S f  t a l k . t O  JUS. 
well, talk like a man, make me laugh, to the most bizarre 
phrases such as clean nana's scandals, utter a hornbill cry, 
let your armpit collect water, to the clue phrases.
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-it is dry, -show me a sign ot rain, the government has not 
paid us. etc.’*
As Neil H. Jacoby et al., argue, payoffs are so much a 
part of nearly every culture that most languages provide 
words for them. In Africa, they range from baksheesh 
(Egypt), dash (Nigeria), tarif de verre (Zaire), kitu kidogo 
or something small (Kenya), and kiinua mgonog (Tanzania).
In Central-South America, it is jeitinho (Brazil), coima 
(Peru), mordida (Mexico), and pajada (Honduras). In Asia, 
it is hatchien (Hong Kong), sin bone (Thailand), makan siap 
(Malaysia), uong sogok (Indonesia), and legay (Philippines). 
In the Middle East, it is roshveh (Iran), roshvat 
(Pakistan) , and "spend money" (India). In Europe, it is 
baksissi (Greece), pot au vin (France), trink geld 
(Germany), bustarella (Italy), vzyathat (Soviet Union), and 
in North America, it is "payoff" in the United States.’*
In sum, political corruption creates a climate of moral 
degeneration and makes a mockery of government. It promotes 
decadence and malaise, makes government incompetent and 
undermines its ability to rule. It creates injustice and 
chaos; it leads to political disintegration and cynicism; it 
promotes immoral behavior and violations of the rule of the 
law; it discourages honesty, hard work, and meritocracy; it 
promotes ethnic conflicts, civil war, crime, and violence; 
it creates economic inequality; it contributes to political
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instability, legitimacy crises, revolutions, coup d'etats; 
and it leads to economic downturns and a lack of democracy 
and development.
POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT
To grasp how political corruption impedes development
and democratic change in contemporary Africa, a definition
of what development and democracy means is pertinent.
According to James H. Mittelman, "development is the
increasing capacity to make rational use of natural and
human resources for social ends".’* Meddy Mugyenyi adds that
development means "to cope with internal and external
demands. It includes increasing the capacity of individuals
and collectivities".’* Therefore, development means
creating abundant goods and services by controlling one's
environment for the sake of improving the socio-economic
conditions of the people as a whole.
In contemporary Africa, development is not only
understood from a communal point of view but also on a
personal level. April Gordon and Donald Gordon write that:
For ordinary Africans, development is seen in personal 
terms. It means additional money for children's school 
books, usable roads to allow the farmers to get their 
products to market, electric lights in the village, 
affordable rice and flour, and a health clinic within a 
walking distance. Development too is measured by access 
to land, jobs, and better housing.’®
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Furthermore, development means better living conditions 
and economic growth, i.e., an increase in per capita income 
and access to basic human goods and services and, of course, 
self-sustainable development which, according to Joe Barkan 
et al., emerges largely from within the country's resources 
and not necessarily one "generated by resources injected 
from the outside"The point these scholars are making is 
that resources or economic aid from outside often open a 
window of opportunity for political corruption, waste, and 
exploitation that leads to lack of development.
The primary question is: How does corruption affect
political and socio-economic development in post-independent 
Africa? Underdevelopment or lack of development can be 
understood from both external and internal perspectives. 
Externally, African economies are unmistakably tied to those 
of Western capitalist countries, especially those in Europe. 
Africa, like many other Third World regions, exports raw 
materials, largely agricultural products, and imports heavy 
industrial materials and finished goods. Within world 
markets, it is argued that there is a huge trade imbalance 
or market price transactions between African and Western 
nations. While Africa's raw materials continue to fetch 
lower prices on world markets, those of capitalist nations 
earn extraordinarily more, even when it is proven some are 
of cheaper or lower qualities.’® Therefore, the fact that
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the world market is stacked against African goods; because 
Africa is exploited on all fronts by the Western capitalist 
countries (a form of corruption), and because the African 
voice is politically impotent or unheard in world trade 
transactions, her development plans, especially at levels of 
economic growth and self-sufficiency are seriously affected.
This condition or predicament is what John Galtung 
refers to as dependency. He asserts that due to external 
exploitation and the unequal relationship between the core 
and periphery countries, the latter heavily depend upon the 
former for their development.’* Other studies also show that 
Africa's economic development is seriously affected by 
economic domination and excessive exploitation by the West. 
Gordon and Gordon contend that "the wealthy, developed 
countries (the 'center') prevent (the 'periphery') from 
developing". Indeed, economic exploitation, neo­
colonialism, or "back-door colonialism" has contributed a 
great deal to Africa's underdevelopment and debt crisis. 
Large-scale borrowing from international financial 
institutions and a tight link to the world economy leads to 
"an extreme dependence on public actors from outside Africa, 
particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank..."®^ to chart Africa's development.
Conversely, lack of development is also brought about 
by internal conditions within African governments. As
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George B. N. Ayittey articulates, "For decades, African 
radicals railed against colonial plunder, American economic 
imperialism, the avaricious propensities of Western banks, 
the predatory practices of multinational corporations, and 
the tight-fisted International Monetary Fund as the causes 
of Africa's economic crisis"." Even though Western 
countries' financial corporations and international markets 
are stacked against African goods, Ayittey still believes 
that Africans, and particularly their leaders, are the 
primary cause for a lack of political and socio-economic 
development. The truth of the matter is that some Third 
World nations, especially many in Asia that experienced 
conditions similar to those in Africa, have achieved great 
heights of economic growth and success at regional, 
continental, and global levels. In fact, some have become 
economic "tigers". Cases in point are Singapore, Hong Kong, 
South Korea, and Taiwan.
Similarly, as reported by the World Press. Review. "One 
cannot gainsay allegations that in the majority of cases the 
continent's leaders have besmirched their character through 
corrupt and dishonest deals".®* Indeed, there are numerous 
cases of government fraud, embezzlement, bribes, kickbacks, 
extortion, and political elites' skimming economic aid 
throughout the continent; yet many people still blame
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Western capitalist countries for Africa's snail's pace of 
development.
To the contrary, Africa must be blamed for its lack of 
development. It is Michael Chege's assertion that African 
governments spend huge sums of borrowed money and scarce 
national resources on their militaries and purchase 
sophisticated weapons and other unnecessary equipment for 
defense purposes rather than wisely investing scarce 
resources to create jobs, better living conditions, and 
infrastructure.
Generally speaking, political corruption leads to 
gigantic diversions of Africa's scarce national resources 
and public funds into private hands, especially within the 
political elites and their cronies and/or ethnic groups." 
Furthermore, even the economic aid that is given under 
strict and exorbitant rates or injected into Africa for 
development purposes ends up in the bottomless pockets of 
political leaders and top civil servants and military 
echelons "who are strategically placed and have access to 
local power and the fruits of public office".®®
In essence, political corruption prevents economic and 
political development rather than promoting it.®’ For 
instance, instead of investing and concentrating in the 
agricultural sector, the backbone of Africa's economy, the 
revitalization of rural areas where the majority of Africans
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live, attempts to provide farmers with adequate 
infrastructure— all-weather roads, a steady water supply for 
irrigation, fertilizers, plans to offer basic needs such as 
immunization clinics and medications, schools, and job 
training— often go nowhere. Instead gigantic presidential 
empires, estates, business complexes, palaces, skyscrapers, 
personal monuments, and airports are constructed in the 
cities. Expensive and unnecessary military weapons are 
purchased, personal police forces (known as the Special 
Branch) are created, and national treasuries are used for 
bribing political opponents and buying ethnic groups— all 
for the sake of seeking legitimacy. These personal 
aggrandizements are made possible by graft, kickbacks, 
corruption, and use of the national treasury as a personal 
f iefdom.
For example, within Nigeria, as in many sub-Saharan 
African countries, the gap between the rich and the poor is 
quite big and evident. Richard Olaniyan claims that 
corruption breeds inequality, unemployment, grinding 
poverty, and anti-social behaviors such as violence, crime, 
cynicism, and ethnic cleansing. He specifically writes 
that, "the unsudden and unmerited affluence corruption 
brings to some people, the scandals of cases of embezzlement 
have created a gap between the government and the masses".®* 
Throughout Africa, the truth is that the rich are getting
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richer while the poor are getting poorer and the gap between 
the two is widening. Also, due to the culture of graft and 
bureaucratic corruption, governments are often seen as the 
major enemy and the cause of inequality and injustice.
Thus, it is no surprise to see civil servants abuse their 
power or use their offices for personal enrichment and/or 
perform their duties only for those who can pay.*”
Another scholar who strongly believes that corruption 
seriously hinders development is Michael Chege who asserts 
that corruption and graft cannot be dismissed in Africa's 
body politic as just another passing cloud; rather it is a 
deadly disease. He argues that political corruption has 
been identified on a continent-wide basis as the "poison" 
that chokes development.** Ben Turok also makes a similar 
claim that corruption hurts political and socio-economic 
development throughout Africa. He articulates that "despite 
a powerful rhetoric in favor of development, the development 
process...in practice is uneven and limited"." Indeed, any 
signs of development can be seen only in urban areas while 
rural areas are compromised and ignored for showcase 
businesses in the urban centers.
Aside from political corruption, the government's 
repressive mechanism that cracks down on anti-corruption 
crusaders and agencies such as the press, political 
opponents, and the public has become a norm, not the
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exception. Scholars argue that without a tradition of 
democratic processes, economic growth and political 
integration will continue to be paralyzed for many years to 
come. Robert Rotberg, in particular, contends that since 
Africa lacks the democratic traditions necessary for 
development, attempts to develop are unlikely to succeed.
He argues that, "corruption and zero-sum government bedevil 
Africa, flourishing as they do in the absence of meaningful 
participatory processes".** Indeed, recent deaths in Kenya 
and the crackdown by the government on political opponents, 
university students, and the public who are demanding 
constitutional reforms for the purpose of fair general 
elections scheduled at the end of this year serve as a 
classic example of how public participation is discouraged.
Thomas Callaghy also argues that the processes of 
democratization have been uneven in contemporary Africa, 
because for years the governments have opposed democratic 
pluralism or multi-party systems that fight against 
political corruption. He therefore thinks that 
"developmental democracies" are unlikely in Africa soon. He 
also asserts that, even with Africa's democratic rhetoric 
and recent transition towards political democracy or 
pluralism, corruption is still more rampant.**
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POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
But what is democratization and how is it perceived in 
Africa? Sarah John Kpundeh states that democratization 
involves public participation, competition, fair elections, 
majority rule, political pluralism, political liberation, 
and freedom of the press and speech, among others." The 
description of this concept is what Mugyenyi refers to as 
"maximalist democracy". According to him, maximalist 
democracy "is more generous. It is phenomenally popular. It 
centers around popular participation in the allocation of 
values. But it also incorporates majority government, rights 
and freedoms related to speech, assembly, dissent, 
intellect, life, property, dignity, liberty, office, 
opposition, opportunity, movement of the press".*®
Furthermore, he argues that maximalist democracy "implies 
certain forms, structures, institutions, and procedure of 
government..."*’which, unfortunately, is lacking in Africa. 
Thus, he concludes that democracy comes to protect the 
accomplishment of development in what he calls "development 
first, democracy second".*® This means that, without 
political, social, and economic development, democracy alone 
is not going to liberate Africa. Even though democracy is 
an important ingredient for good governance, some people 
still argue that Africa does not need democracy per se.
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Instead, it needs economic growth, political integration, 
and basic needs— food, clothing, shelter, better living 
conditions, education, jobs, housing, healthcare, and above 
all, political stability and tranquility that are necessary 
for development and democracy.
To the contrary, some scholars argue that, without 
democratic processes, attempts for development will be 
hindered as it is in Africa today. There is certainly an 
element of truth in this argument that without democratic 
institutions to fight political corruption, the primary 
cause for underdevelopment, economic growth and political 
integration would be remotely out of reach and eventually 
what would result is "dysfunctional development".** 
Undoubtedly, political corruption leads to unstable 
democracies, empathy, alienation, cynicism, and mistrust 
between leaders and the masses. It also threatens attempts 
to establish efficient government, transparency, 
accountability, and finally, it stalls development and 
democracy. *°°
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CHAPTER 6
COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
KENYA
"L'etat, c'est moi" (I am the state)
— President Daniel arap Moi
Kenya, a former British colony, gained independence in
1963 and became a republic in 1964. According to recent
statistics, Kenya's estimated population totals thirty
million people divided among more than thirty ethnic groups.
As many foreign visitors, investors, scholars, and
academicians argue, compared to other countries in East
Africa— Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania—
"Kenya is an island of sanity".̂
To potential investors and businessmen, Kenya was
regarded as capitalism's shining star on the African
continent.̂ For many years, Kenya had been among the few
countries in sub-Saharan Africa that seemed to work both
politically and economically. Indeed, Kenya's once peaceful
environment and economic and political stability played to
its advantage and lured foreign investors. Kenya also
benefitted from economic aid and the tourism industry. In
fact, whenever the President and political leaders,
especially parliamentarians, addressed the public, they
192
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usually took credit for political tranquility and reminded 
Kenyans that the rest of Africa was jealous of Kenya's 
peaceful and prosperous climate.̂
Despite its recent trend of backward political movement 
and economic instability, Kenya has a modern 
telecommunications network, a developing infrastructure, an 
educated workforce, a free market economy, a government 
bureaucracy that functions relatively well, a multi-party 
system, and the rule of law. Because of these factors,
Kenya became the second largest recipient of United States 
economic aid in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s.
However, even with its good reputation, Kenya's 
increasing corrupt practices have severely stained its 
reputation and affected its economic growth. According to a 
survey conducted by Transparency International in 1995-96, 
Kenya ranks as the third most corrupt nation in the world, 
following Nigeria and Pakistan.^ George N. Ayittey also 
contends that, "Corruption emerged in Kenya soon after 
independence and got progressively worse...."® He maintains 
that "the first president of independent Kenya, Jomo 
Kenyatta, and his family amassed a large fortune of land, 
precious gems, ivory and casinos...."^ In short, Kenyatta 
and his Kikuyu ethnic group controlled Kenya's economic and 
political power base from the 1960s and 1970s. When Daniel 
arap Moi took over following Kenyatta's death, corruption
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became institutionalized and grew worse.® This assertion is 
also supported by anonymous Kenya authors and scholars who 
assert that, under Moi, "kickbacks, graft, and conflict of 
interest are evident at all levels of government".̂ It is 
these authors' claim that, under Moi, the entire government 
and society is plagued by large-scale political corruption, 
bribery, extortion, favoritism, ethnicity, and general 
mismanagement of the state bureaucracy and resources.
Due to high-scale corruption among the most high-ranking
political officials, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and many European countries have tremendously cut down
economic aid to Kenya citing large-scale corruption and the
failure of the Kenyan government to prosecute corrupt
officials. For example, comments from the Danish
International Development Agency (DANIDA) state that:
In the past, corruption in Kenya was not widespread, 
and the number of people involved was rather limited. 
However, in recent years the extent seems to pervade 
the whole society. The reason is partly on economic 
development which increasingly puts pressure on the 
individual family's economy, but probably primarily a 
political structure which allows and at times even 
encourages corruption.
Comparing the eras of Kenyatta and Moi in order to trace 
the history of political corruption, Kivutha Kibwana et al., 
state that :
[Up to] 1969, corruption in Kenya was largely under 
control and the country never featured among the 
corrupt countries of Africa. This is attributed to the 
checks and balances that existed, especially in terms
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of a fair Parliament, independent judiciary, effective 
police force and a substantially free press...The 
deliberate weakening and dismantling of political and 
civil society institutions that could act as pressure
groups, during Moi's rule, especially after the
attempted coup d ’etat of 1982, dealt a severe blow to 
the country's ability to control corruption.
The point these scholars are making is that it is during
Moi's nineteen years of rule that Kenya's corruption has
worsened.
Additionally it is argued that corruption is a subject 
that people discuss gingerly if at all because of tremendous
fear of government repression." Therefore, one can argue
that Kenya's pervasive pattern of political corruption has 
worked against its, ruining its once proud reputation, and 
discouraging foreign investors and businesses that are 
critical to Kenya's economic growth. According to most 
foreign investors, it is extremely difficult to start or do 
business in Kenya given the demand of many illicit 
tolls/payoffs and extortions by government officials. As 
reported by the Los Angeles Times. Kenya, a country that 
once was regarded as a place that worked, has lost more than 
other sub-Saharan African countries since acquiring its 
reputation for corruption. This is because Kenya has 
squandered much of its goodwill while surrounded by some of 
the sorriest, war-torn, economically inept, politically
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unstable, and overall desperate countries Africa has to 
offer.
THE KISUMU MOLASSES PLANT
The molasses project was initiated in 1977 under the 
name Kenya Chemical and Food Corporation Ltd. as a joint 
venture between the government, Chemfood Investment 
Corporation of the United States, and Adrait International, 
a subsidiary of Madhvani Group. Madhavani owned 40% of the 
stock in Chemfood. The project was capitalized at 170 
million Kenya Shillings of which the government invested 
Shillings 86.7 million, making it the majority shareholder 
with 51% of the share-holding. Chemfood and Adrait invested 
a total of 83.3 million shillings in equity, taking up 34% 
and 15% share-holding, respectively. The Madhavani Group, 
an influential family of investors, invested 68 million 
shillings. The management of the project was entrusted to 
Eximcorp, a company in which the Madhavani Group 
participated actively.
Once it was completed, the project was expected to 
consume some 110,000 tones of molasses per year to produce 
20 million liters of power alcohol annually and about ten 
other products. These included 3,000 tones of citric acid, 
1,800 tones of fresh baker's and activated dry yeast, and 
2,160 tones of sulphuric acid. The project was also
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designed to produce 6,800 tones of oxygen, 2,000 tones of 
ammonium sulphate fertilizer, 6,000 tones of gypsum, 9,000 
tonnes of carbon dioxide and methane gas, which was expected 
to provide more than 50% of the projects total operating 
requirements of combustible fuels and also create jobs.
After spending more than one billion shillings towards 
constructing the plant, the project soon stalled and finally 
collapsed due to bureaucratic corruption. It was alleged 
that some top government officials were demanding exorbitant 
kickbacks to allocate contracts to businessmen, especially 
foreign investors. Indeed, the Kisumu Molasses Plant became 
Kenya's most celebrated white elephant and cost a foreign 
minister's life. The ghastly murder of Robert Ouko was 
caused by his continuous condemnation of Kenya's political 
corruption, particularly among the top cabinet ministers.
NIGERIA
"Keeping an average Nigerian from being corrupt 
is like keeping a goat from eating yam".
— Chinua Achebe
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with a 
population of more than 120 million, thus accounting for a 
quarter of sub-Saharan Africa's population. Nigeria's 250 
ethnic groups provide an environment of diversity. 
Additionally, over the past few decades Nigeria has been an
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economic powerhouse, i.e., the largest oil-exporting country 
on the continent.
Nigeria was a British colony until its independence in 
1960. Through the years, Nigeria has experienced or 
suffered continuous political tensions based on regional, 
religious, and ethnic lines. For example, the northern 
region of the country is dominated by the Hausa and Fulani 
Muslims, while the south is dominated by the Christian 
Yorubas. The primary factor for these tensions and 
conflicts is the desire to control the economic spoils— oil 
and political leadership.
Larry Diamond asserts that, "Nigeria's ruinous political 
cycles" have rendered its politically and economically 
retarded.Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has seen 
seven successful coups and many aborted ones. The first 
coup d'etat was in 1966 when a small group of army soldiers 
of the Ibo tribe overthrew the government, citing political 
corruption and government mismanagement. The most recent, 
successful coup was in 1983. It was led by General Ibrahim 
Gbandamasi Babangida, who until 1994 controlled the entire 
country politically and economically with an iron fist.
Curiously enough, whenever a coup d'tat takes place, 
rampant political corruption is mentioned to justify the 
overthrow of the existing government. Propaganda
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notwithstanding, political corruption flourishes regardless 
of who is in power or what type of government— civilian or 
military might be in control. Indeed, like Kenya and other 
sub-Saharan African countries, oppression and political 
repression are routinely practiced to discourage public 
uprisings. In addition, there is a lack of existing 
institutions in place to fight corruption. Those few who 
are brave enough to expose and condemn corruption often face 
severe punishment for opposing or criticizing the 
government. Indeed, the 1995 executions of the Nigerian 
anti-corruption activist, environmentalist, and poet Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and hisn nine compatriots serves as a backdrop.
As Robert Williams observes, "When the foreign visitors 
to Nigeria have finished complaining about Lagos and its 
traffic jams.... it is usually time for the travelers' tales 
of voracious and pervasive corruption".^® According to many 
observers, Nigerians are the most corrupt people on the 
continent and perhaps in the world. This is partly due to 
the severe economic imbalance between the many ethnic 
groups. While a few, especially the military, control the 
oil resources and benefit from huge kickbacks and bribes, 
the majority struggle to survive or make ends meet.
As reported in 1989 by the Christian Association of 
Nigeria, more than 3,000 Nigerians held Swiss bank accounts, 
making the Nigerians the majority of Third World patrons of
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Swiss banks.In fact, during the oil boom of the 1980s, 
Nigeria was the only country in sub-Saharan Africa where 
government scandals and political corruption exceeded 
imagination. Government officials were competing for 
private Jaguar aircraft. Unfortunately, since the good old 
days of easy oil money are gone due to world markets, and 
excessive individual greed, and government mismanagement, 
Nigeria has become a den of corrupt officials in search of 
an easy way to make money while the sun shines. Therefore, 
political corruption has flourished no matter what type of 
government or ethnic group is in power. But one can make a 
strong case that generally corruption has not been organized 
or directed by a single individual or family as is the case 
in many other sub-Saharan African countries. This is to 
state that, even though Nigeria is the first or second most 
corrupt nation in the world, it has never produced a 
military predator of the stature of the late president 
Mobutu Sese Seko of the former Zaire.
ZAIRE/CONGO
"If you steal, do not steal too much at a time.
You may be arrested. Steal cleverly (yiba na 
mayale), little by little".
— Mobutu Sese Seko
Perhaps there is no country in sub-Saharan Africa that 
is as systemically corrupt as the former Zaire. According
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to Stanislav Andreski, Zaire was the world Kleptocratic 
state— a country that steals.’® Zaire, a former Belgian 
colony then known as the Belgian Congo gained independence 
in 1961. It is known to possess some of the most fertile 
lands and prodigious mineral deposits and other resources in 
Africa, particularly rubber, copper, diamonds, and iron 
ore. Like Nigeria, Zaire is composed of ethnic groups that 
are constantly at odds with one another.
In fact, in the early 1960s, at one time or another, 
the Congo was at the point of disintegrating because of 
tribal ideological conflict. However, with the 
assassination of Patrice Lumumba and assistance from the 
United States Central Intelligent Agency General Joseph 
Mobutu overthrew the government in 1964, renamed the country 
Zaire, and emerged as a military dictator. Mobutu's 
pervasive corruption cost Zaire's economy dearly, 
contributing to unimaginable poverty and suffering for the 
entire country, while Mobutu remained among the wealthiest 
billionaires in the world.
Scholars argue that in the former Zaire everyone was on 
the take because that was how the system was structured. 
George N. Ayittey asserts that in Zaire, one needed to know 
two things to survive— that is, "whom do I see and how much 
will it cost". Mobutu was known as the cock that left no 
hen untouched and the all-powerful warrior who stole on a
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massive scale.In fact, it was claimed that Mobutu had 
before his death between five to ten billion dollars in the 
Swiss banks and that he "could clear the national debt by 
writing a personal check".In taking from the government, 
Mobutu once advised government officials during a speech 
that if they had to steal they better do it clandestinely, 
intelligently, and systematically or else they risked being 
caught and prosecuted.^® Undoubtedly, Mobutu practiced what 
he preached— a leader who stole cleverly from his own 
country. In fact, often when he was asked about his 
fortune, he would take pride and remind the people that his 
money in Swiss banks did not involve his other wealth— real 
estate, villas, chateaus, castles, building complexes, jets, 
and cattle ranches scattered all over the world.
As Blaine Harden claims, "Of all the countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, Zaire has the ugliest reputation for state-
sponsored corruption. Mobutu has legitimatized and
systematized graft...kleptocracy". Similarly, as noted by
Harden in the The Washington Post:
Zaire is a den of unregenerate thieves. Its president 
and top ministers mouth the free-market lingo that the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the 
Reagan administration like to hear, while continuing to 
fill foreign bank accouhts with loot. No government 
project is begun without payoff. Payoffs are so 
ubiquitous and so exorbitant that many projects are 
never completed. Civil servants regard extortion as 
part of the job description.®^
Therefore, like other countries, corruption ruined the
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former Zaire and instilled a culture whereby the powerful 
exploited the less powerful who in turn exploited the 
powerless. ■’® From top to bottom, bribes and corruption were 
the sure way to do business in Zaire. One Belgian diplomat 
referred to this transaction as follows: "It's like
termites nibbling away at the structure of a society".®'* 
Indeed, looting and stealing from government has become a 
Zairean motto. Thus, even though Zaire is one of the "most 
blessed countries with some of the richest mineral reserves 
in the world, [it] had managed by 1988 to become one of the 
eight poorest countries in the world".®® Undoubtedly, this 
is the position that Zaire or to-day's Democratic Republic 
of Congo holds under its new leader, Laurent Kabila.
Some African scholars think that Kabila is not any 
different from the late Mobutu, because his rule is 
described as dictatorial and his entourage as neo- 
Mobutuists. Secondly, because he comes from Katanga, in a 
Copper-rich region, the desire to fill his pockets is high 
because there is a lack of constitutional or other checks 
and balances to ensure that the corruption endemic to 
Mobutu's Zaire does not become endemic to Kabila's Congo.®® 
Furthermore, for the short period he has been the president, 
he has made many concessions with diamond, copper, and iron 
ore mining businesses from foreign countries and South 
Africa and is believed to be taking kickbacks and
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benefitting from the country's natural resources— more 
political corruption. Additionally, his idea of changing 
the name of the country from Zaire to the Democratic 
Republic of Congo is not a magic bullet for the problems 
that face the country, especially political corruption. 
Indeed, according to one anonymous author, changing the name 
of Zaire was "like swapping a Rolls Royce for a Ford Escort, 
a diamond for a piece of glass, a princess for a whore". 
Similarly, as the Africa proverb says, "You cannot improve 
your child's behavior by changing his name..."38 but rather 
teach him how to behave by example.
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CHAPTER 7
CONTROLLING POLITICAL CORRUPTION 
The literature on political corruption identifies four 
types of strategies important to minimizing or eliminating 
corruption. They are: societal, legal, market, and 
political.® Patrick Dobel, W. Etzioni-Halevy, and M. 
McMullan argue that societal strategies place emphasis on 
the determination of a common standard of morality against 
which politically corrupt behaviors can be measured. 
Vigilance by the members of society and education to make it 
relatively costly for individuals to engage in corruption 
are also emphasized.®
Legally, it is believed that government behavior can be 
constrained effectively by the law. This can be done by 
creating or choosing special commissions of inquiry, special 
courts, or special prosecutors to probe individuals and 
groups accused of political corruption, bribery, or illegal 
transactions. Where evidence gathered points to corruption, 
it is up to the judicial system/courts alone to judge and 
render punishment to offenders based on national laws.®
The market-related strategies to the clean-up of 
corruption emphasize that there is a relationship between 
the structure of the markets, bureaucracy, and the incidents
207
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of corruption. Thus, the prescribed cure is less government 
regulation and bureaucratic redtape, and greater reliance on 
markets for the allocation of resources. It is Bayley, 
Macrae, Rose-Ackerman, and Tilman's assertion that such an 
approach, however, appears to emphasize the manipulation of 
outcomes within existing rules instead of proper reform of 
the rules. The fault is not with the market but with the 
rules that regulate the market. Since rules define market 
outcomes, greater reliance on markets for the allocation of 
resources without reforming existing rules will have little 
effect on outcomes, including government corruption. Unless 
there is effective reform of the socio-political rules 
within which the market functions, incentives for 
opportunism will remain and corruption will continue 
unabated. “
Political strategies for political corruption stress the 
decentralization of the public sector. It is argued that 
corruption arises from the concentration of power in the 
hands of a few political elites— politicians and 
bureaucrats— and that a process which provides citizens with 
greater access to public institutions will significantly 
minimize opportunities for corruption within the country. 
Under this approach, an effective cleanup program is 
expected to emphasize political deregulation and the 
subsequent expansion of opportunities for citizens to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
209
participate in governance. Indeed, social scientists and 
decision-makers who favor this administrative reform as a 
way to minimize the incidence of corruption support 
increasing the legal compensation of bureaucrats in order to 
reduce the chances that civil servants will seek extra-legal 
income.®
Mbaku John Mukum contends that the impetus to clean up 
corruption can be provided primarily by political exigency 
rather than by genuine interest in the efficient functioning 
of the nation's political and economic institutions. In 
several countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, 
post-coup commissions of inquiry are usually designed to 
discredit the ousted government and help incoming elites 
gain recognition and legitimacy. Incumbents also use the 
cleanup programs to help them stay in power and continue to 
monopolize the supply of legislation and the allocation of 
resources. An incumbent leader faced with deteriorating 
economic and social conditions and a challenge from 
opposition parties or groups may initiate a campaign to 
reduce corruption within the administration in an effort to 
direct attention away from existing problems and the 
government's inability or unwillingness to provide effective 
solutions for those problems.® However, as Gillespie and 
Okruhlik state, whether or not corruption cleanups are used 
for political exigency and how often is determined by
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several factors including "the personal values of the head 
of state, challenges from counter elites, and popular 
discontent arising from socio-economic conditionswithin 
a given country.
In several African countries, politicians regularly use 
cleanup campaigns to help them stay in power. Cleanup 
programs can be used to discredit members of a previous 
regime, to destroy the reputations of leaders of the 
opposition, and to improve support among the population for 
the incumbent regime.® For instance, all political 
uprisings/revolutions or coups d'etat in Nigeria, Congo, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, Angola, and elsewhere in 
Africa cite government corruption, mismanagement, 
ineffective bureaucracy, and malaise as the primary reasons 
for a new government and leadership. Additionally, even if 
a government seriously and honestly wishes to clean up 
corruption, existing approaches suffer from at least one 
obstacle : their success depends on the effectiveness of the 
counteracting agencies. In Africa, cleanup programs depend 
upon the judicial system, the police, and the press, and 
assume that those agencies are appropriately constrained by 
the law and are free of corruption and/or are independent 
or free of government manipulation and control. Because the 
judicial systems and the police rank high in corrupt
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behavior themselves, the cleanup programs backed by these 
agencies are likely to be ineffective. Therefore, to ensure 
that the cleanup programs are effective, a selection of 
appropriate new rules must be established to make sure that 
the new social contract is capable of generating the outcome 
desired by the society.®
However, given the fact that political corruption has 
passed the alarming and entered the fatal stage in sub- 
Saharan Africa, only time can tell whether this social ill 
can be cleaned up and cured. According to Joseph N. 
Weatherby et al., "there is no magic bullet for the problems 
that Africa faces". They argue that expecting a total 
eradication of corruption in Africa would be unrealistic 
because in most developing nations corruption still runs 
large. Nonetheless, they argue that political corruption 
can be reduced "down to manageable levels"®® if government 
agencies, political leaders, and the public at large play 
their roles. As for Africa, they state that the solution 
for corruption lies with the Africans themselves. Surely, 
without the African people realizing how vicious and 
damaging corruption can be and what it can do, short-term 
remedies or band-aids and economic aid would be hopeless and 
ineffective in curing this problem in the long term.®®
Wraith and Simpkins suggest some cures for corruption 
in Africa. These remedies are: One, loyalty to the nation-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
212
state rather than family, clan, or tribe. Two, the spread 
of education to enable the public to understand and 
comprehend the effects of corruption. Three, a democratic 
state and environment to allow public freedoms of speech and 
press in order to allow people to criticize the government, 
condemn corrupt officials, and campaign against corruption 
and bribery. Four, to create a climate conducive for 
encouraging commerce, open markets and trade, and a strong 
industrial sector. Five, to create jobs and increase wages 
in the government sector and elsewhere in order to raise the 
living standards and to discourage corruption. Six, to 
inculcate a concept of diffusion of power among ethnic 
groups. Seven, to reduce the civil service and decentralize 
government agencies. Eight, to apply merit rather than 
ascriptive measures when allocating jobs, promotions, 
business licenses, government loans, contracts, 
scholarships, and incentives. Nine, to encourage the growth 
of wealth and status throughout the whole society. And ten, 
to ensure an independent judicial system and vigorous law 
enforcement.
The truth of the matter is that, even with these 
remedies, African people and governments are loath to adopt 
them. For instance, in Africa, parochial loyalty, 
tribalism, and ethnicity predominate. When the issue of 
nationalism comes up, Africans place family, clan, and tribe
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before country. Often, Africans identify themselves not as 
Zaireans, Nigerians, or Kenyans, but rather as Katangans, 
Yorubas, Kalenjins, etc.
Similarly, due to the high rate of illiteracy, the 
majority of Africans, especially those in the rural areas, 
lack an understanding of the workings and effects of 
corruption. Furthermore, many African nation-states have 
autocratic regimes masquerading as democracies. Indeed, 
dictators stalk Africa like wild cats in the night. These 
tyrants run the gamut from Sani Abacha to Omar Bongo, Daniel 
arap Moi to Yoweri Museveni, Robert Mugabe to Laurent 
Kabila, to name a few.
The freedoms of speech, press, and other human rights 
regarded as basic in the West are still non-existent in many 
African nations. Due to this, government critics and anti­
corruption crusaders are severely oppressed, hunted down, 
tortured, detained without trial, imprisoned for life, or 
murdered. Put simply, criticizing the government or the top 
political elites and leaders is a state offense or treason. 
Thus, under these circumstances, political corruption 
continues to flourish because people fear to speak out 
publicly.
In Africa, political power is centered upon a few 
elites or groups based on clan or tribe. In fact, many 
African countries are ruled by a family, clan, or tribe
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because there is a lack of balance of power or wealth among 
ethnic groups. Furthermore, tribalism and nepotism, the two 
factors that encourage corruption, flourish unabated and 
unchecked-
Finally, in Africa, judicial systems still depend upon 
the government of the "Big Men" for orders. Judicial 
supremacy and independent judicial review are non-existent. 
In fact, justice systems in Africa usually serve the needs 
and wishes of the "Strong Men" who consider themselves and 
their cliques above the law. Under this condition, 
political leaders and their cliques go unprosecuted and 
unpunished for crimes of political corruption and this all 
contributes to choking the economies and development of 
their countries.
CONCLUSION
This thesis has unearthed many points that need to be 
reemphasized or highlighted. First, political corruption is 
a universal phenomenon that afflicts every society in both 
developed and developing nations. Second, corruption is far 
from being a novelty. Its practice is as ancient as other 
social phenomena such as violence, crime, or prostitution. 
Third, the meaning of political corruption has changed with 
time, place, and space. Fourth, its definition is elusive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
215
and/or hard to pin down; corruption means different things 
to different people.
In contemporary Africa, political corruption has at 
least some of its roots in the past— the legacy of 
colonialism. In sub-Saharan Africa, political corruption 
cannot be understood outside a framework of the legacy of 
colonialism, neo-colonialism, the "Big Men", tribalism, 
underdevelopment, frustrated economies, and a lack of 
enlightened leadership or techno-politicians. Throughout 
the continent there is a general consensus that corruption 
is morally wrong a economically, politically, and socially 
devastating. However, it is regarded as a way of life and 
of doing business and an outstanding characteristic of 
African public life. For many government workers, 
corruption is an alternative or "extra-legal" means of 
supplementing their wages and/or survival. Political 
corruption permeates the entire societal fabric of the 
African continent and poses serious political, social, and 
economic problems. It exists in both private and public 
sectors with the latter recording the highest incidences of 
corruption that place a heavy burden on the African people. 
Finally, a relatively large number of African people 
recognizes the presence of corruption but lack the power to 
reduce it and fear to speak out due to government 
repression.
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The need to eradicate political corruption in sub- 
Saharan Africa requires a concerted effort of the political 
elites; governmental and non-governmental institutions; 
political parties; intellectuals; independent agencies—  
anti-corruption squads and national inquiry commissions, 
special court and the Prevention of Corruption Acts; 
constitutional reforms; democracy and plurality of political 
parties; the introduction of the bill of rights— freedom of 
speech and the press; transparency and accountability among 
government officials; and the enlightened public at large. 
Above all, to wage a merciless war on political corruption 
an enlightened leadership is needed.
It is the contention of this thesis that, political 
corruption can be defined, contained, reduced, or defeated 
in sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is impossible to prevent 
it completely once it has taken deep roots and manifests 
itself in a large scale (as is the case in many countries). 
Nonetheless, there are some signs of hope that political 
corruption can indeed be contained in sub-Saharan African 
countries as has occurred in South Africa.
But to be successful in controlling political 
corruption, we must treat corruption as a disease such as 
cancer. We must therefore, understand the nature of the 
disease, know its hosts, its distribution, causes and 
conditions, its consequences, and its remedies.
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Unfortunately, some countries have displayed a marked 
propensity to corruption and certain remedial treatments 
have conspicuously failed, especially in Nigeria and 
Zaire/Congo. As the saying goes, however, "where there is a 
will, there is a way".
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
218
REFERENCES
1. K. Gillespie, and Okruhlik G. "The Political Dimensions 
of Corruption Cleanups" A Framework for Analysis", 
Comparative Politics Vol. 24, No. 1, 1991, p. 77.
2. M. McMullan, "A Theory of Corruption", Socioloçi oal 
Review Vol. 9. No. 2, (1961), p. 181.
3. S. Ali, Corruption: A Third World Perspective. (Lahore 
Pakistan: Aziz Publishers, 1985), p. 35.
4. J. Macrae, "Underdevelopment and the Economics of 
Corruption: A Game Theory Approach", World Development Vol. 
10 (August, 1982), p. 677.
5. R. Wade, "The System of Administrative and Political 
Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India", The Journal of 
Developmental Studies Vol. 18, (April, 1982), pp. 287-97.
6. John Mukum Mbaku, "Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa:
The Futility of Cleanups", CATO Journal (Spring/Summer, 
1996), pp. 17-9.
7. Gillespie and Okruhlik, op. cit., p. 82.
8. Mbaku, op. cit., p. 19.
9. Ibid.
10. John Weatherby, et al., THE OTHER WORLD: Issues And 
Politics of the Developing World 2nd, ed.(White Plains NY: 
Longman, 1994), pp. 41-2.
11. Paul Watson, "The Days After Freedom Mandela Waited a 
Life-time for Liberated South Africa: Now Comes the Hard 
Part", The Toronto Star (8 May, 1994), FI.
12. Weatherby et al., op. cit., p. 24 9.
13. Ronald Wraith, and Edgar Simpkins, Corruption In 
Developing Countries (New York: W. W. Norton & Company,
Inc., 1963), p. 208.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
219
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abner, Cohen. 1974. "Introduction: The Lesson of
Ethnicity", in Cohen (ed.). Urban Ethnicity. London.
Abraham, W.E. 1991. The African Mind. Chicago.
Achebe, Chinua. 1983. The Trouble with Nigeria. London: 
Heinemann.
Adams, Herbert and Kogila Moodley. 1982. The Opening of the 
Apartheid Mind: Options for the New South Africa. Los 
Angeles : University of California Press.
"African 'Bib Men' Are Outliving Their Welcome," The 
Washington Post, 9 September 1991, sec. A20.
"Africa on the Precipice: An Ominous But Not Yet Hopeless
Future", Journal of the American Medical Association, 
August, 1993, 70(5): 629.
Alatas, Syed Hussein. 1990. Corruption: Its Nature,
Causes, and Functions. Brookfield USA: Avebury.
Ali, S. 1985. A Third World Perspective. Lahore Pakistan: 
Aziz Publishers.
Andreski, Stanislav. 'Kleptocracy as a System of Government 
in Africa", in Political Corruption: Readings In 
Comparative Analysis, (ed.), Arnold, J, Heidenheimer. 
New Brunswick: Transaction Books. 346-357.
Anonymous Kenyan Authors. 1982. Independent Kenya. London: 
Zed Books.
Antonucci, Emil. 1972. DESIDERATA. Los Angeles, CA: Brook 
House.
Apter, David. 1963. Ghana In Transition. New York: USA.
Aristotle. 1952. The Athenian Constitution. Vol. XXVII,
No.3 &4. (Trans.) Rackman, H. London: Heinemann.
Ayittey, George N.B. 1992. Africa Betrayed. New York: St. 
Martin's Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
220
______ , 1991. Indigenous African Institutions. Dobbs
Ferry, NY: Transactional Publishers.
Barkan, Joel D. et al. 1984. The Legislative Connection:
The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea, and 
Turkey. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Bayley, D.H. 1966. "The Effects of Corruption in a
Developing Nation", The Western Political Science 
Quarterly. 19(4): 719-32.
Benadeo, Alfredo. 1991. Corruption, Conflicts and Power in 
the Works and Times of Niccolo Machiavelli.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Benson, George C.S. et al. 1978. Political Corruption in 
America. Lexington, MS: Lexington Books.
Bladow, Janel. 1994. "Good Guys as Bad Guys: The
Temptations of the Undercover Cop." MIND, May.
Blustein, Paul. "IMF Takes Tough Stance Towards Corrupt 
Regimes, Loan Rules Tightened; Kenya Cut Off". The 
Washington Post. 2 July 1997.
Boetang, E.A. 1978. A Political Geography of Africa. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bohannan, Paul. 1988. Philip Curtin. Africa and Africans. 
Prospect Height, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
_____ , 1964. Africa and Africans. New York: The Natural
History Press.
Bollen, John C. and Henry J. Schmandt. 1979. Political
Corruption: Power, Money and Sex. Pacific Palisades, 
CA: Palisades Publishers.
Brasz, H.A. 1978. "The Sociology of Corruption", in 
Heidenheimer, op. cit., 41-55.
Braudel, Fernand. 1973. The Mediterranean and the
Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. New 
York: Harper and Row.
Brooks, Robert C. 1978. "The Nature of Political
Corruption", in Heidenheimer, op. cit., 56-61.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
221
Burke, Fred G. 1964. Africa's Quest for Order. New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Callaghy, Thomas M. 1994. "Africa: Falling Off the Map?" 
Current History. 93:31-36.
Cartwright, John R. 1983. Political Leadership in Africa. 
New York: St. Martin's Press.
Chege, Michael. 1994. "What's Right With Africa". Current 
History. 93 (583):193-97.
Clapham, Christopher. 1985. Third World Politics: An
Introduction. Madison Wisconsin: The University of 
Wisconsin Press.
Clarke, John Henrick. 1991. Africa at the Crossroads:
Notes for an African World Revolution. New Jersey: 
African World Press Inc.
Colin, Legum. 1970. "Tribal Survival in the Modern African 
Political System". Journal of Asian and African 
Studies. 1 & 2:112.
Dane, Archer, and Rosemary Gartiner. 1984. Violence and
Crime in Cross-National Perspective. New York: Yale 
University Press.
Davidson, Basil. 1992. The Black Man's Burden: Africa and
the Curse of the Nation-State. New York: Random House 
Inc.
DeLeon, Peter. 1993. Thinking About Political Corruption. 
Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Diamond, Larry et al. 1988. Democracy in Developing 
Countries. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Diop, Anita Cheikh. 1987. Pre-Colonial Black Africa. 
Westport, CT: Lawrence Hill.
Dobel, Patrick J. 1978. "The Corruption of A State". The 
American Political Science Review. 72:957-97.
Douglas, Paul H. 1953. Ethic in Governments. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
222
Drew, Elizabeth. 1983. Politics and Money: The New Road To 
Corruption. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company.
Esbstein, William. 1962. The Great Political Thinkers. 3rd 
ed. New York: Holt Rinehart and Wiston.
Ellis, Stephen. 1996. "Africa and International Corruption: 
The Strange Case of South Africa and Seychelles". 
African Affairs. 95(379):165-200.
Elliot, Michael. "Corruption: How Bribes, Payoffs and 
Crooked Officials Are Blocking Economic Growth," 
Newsweek, 14 November 1994.
Elliot, Skinner. 1968. "Group Dynamics in Politics of
Changing Societies: The Problem of 'Tribal' Politics 
in Africa", in Essays on the Problem of Tribe, ed. 
June Helm. Seattle.
Encyclopedia Britannica. 197 6. Art. "Cancer". Encyclopedia 
Britannica. Vol. 30, Chicago.
Etzioni, Amitai. 1988. Capital Corruption: The New Attack 
On American Democracy. New Brunswick: Transactional 
Books.
Etzioni, Halevy W. 1979. Political Manipulation and
Administrative Power. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.
Friedrich, Carl J. 1901. The Pathology of Politics. New 
York: Harper and Row.
Gamesu, Publius. The Legion Observer. 1970. 22 May 1790.
Gardiner, John A. "The Politics of Corruption in an
American City", in Heidenheimer, op. cit.,167-75.
Gillispie, K. and Okrunlik G. "The Political Dimensions of 
Corruption Cleanups: A Framework for Analysis", 
Comparative Politics. 24(l):77-95.
Gould, David J. 1980. Bureaucratic Corruption and
Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case of 
Zaire. New York: USA.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
223
Gordon, April A. and Donald L. Gordon. 1992. Understanding 
Contemporary Africa. London: Lynne Rienner Publisher.
Goldworthy, David. 1982. Ethnicity and Leadership in 
Africa: The 'Untypical' Case of Tom Mboya", The 
Journal of Modern African Studies.
Gulielmo, Ferrero. 1964. The Greatness and Decline
of Rome. Vol. 1, (trans.) A.E. Zimmern, London: 
Heidenmann.
Gulliver, P.H. 1969. Tradition and Transition in East
Africa: Studies of Tribal Elements in the Modern Era. 
London.
Gray, Colin "Combating Terrorism", 1993. Parameters, US 
Army War College Quarterly. XXIII(3): 17-25.
Gross, Martin L. 1996. Political Racket: Deceit, Self- 
Interest and Corruption in American Politics. New 
York: Ballantine.
Halayya, M. 1975. Emergency: A War On Corruption. New 
Delhi India: S. Chand and Co.
Halpern, Manfred. 1963. The Politics of Social Change in 
the Middle East and North Africa. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.
Hancock, Graham. 1989. THE LORDS OF POVERTY: The Power, 
Prestige, And Corruption of the International Aid 
Business. New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press.
Hanelman, Stephen. 1994. "Russian Mafia Politics by Other 
Means", Foreign Affairs. 73(2) :83-110.
Harden, Blaine. "Seeds of Reform Grow Slowly in Zaire:
Corruption Pervades Economy Despite Steps to Please 
Creditors", The Washington Post. 20 November 1987.
_____ , 1990. African Dispatches: From A Fragile
Continent. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Harper, Mary. "Soldier, Statesman, Ladies' Man", BBC Focus 
On Africa. July-September 1997.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
224
Harsch, Ernest. "Accumulation and Democrats: Challenging 
State Corruption in Africa", 1993. The Journal of 
Modern African Studies. 31(1):
Harris, W.V. "Italy Purgatorio", The New York Review. 3 
(March 1994):38-41.
Harrison, Paul. 1993. Inside The Third World: The Anatomy 
of Poverty. London: Penguin Books.
Heidenheimer, Arnold J. 1978. Political Corruption:
Readings In Comparative Analysis. New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books.
Hiltzik, Michael A. "American, Other Foreign Companies
Selling Off Holdings: Kenyan Corruption Overwhelms 
Investors", The Los Angeles Times. 25 June 1989.
Hitchens, Christopher. "Dispatches: African Gothic", Vanity 
Fair. (November 1994):91-117.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing 
Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
_____ , 1978. "Modernization and Corruption", in
Heidenheimer, op. Cit., pp. 492-500.
Jacoby, Neil H. et al. 1977. Bribery And Extortion In 
World Business : A Study of Corporate Political 
Payments Abroad. New York: MacMillan Publishing 
Company Inc.
James, Gibbs L. Jr., 1965. The Peoples Of Africa. Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston.
Jaynes, Gregory. "Bubba-ocracy in America", Esquire. June 
1994.
Jelloun, Tahar Ben. 1990. Corruption. The New Press.
Johansen, Elaine R. 1990. Political Corruption: Scope And 
Resources and Annotated Bibliography. New York: 
Garland Publishing Inc.
John, Dickinson. "Death of a Republic: Politics and
Political Thought in Rome", in Friedrich, op. cit., 
pp. 132-60.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
225
Johnson, Kenneth F. 1984. Mexican Democracy: A Critical 
View. New York.: Praeger.
Johnson, Michael- 1982. Political Corruption and Public 
Policy in America. Monterey California: Cole.
Kaspin, Deborah. 1995. "The Politics of Ethnicity in
Malawi's Democractic Transition", The Journal of 
Modern African Studies. 33(4):595-620.
Key, V.O. Jr., 1978. "Techniques of Political Graft", in 
Heidenheimer, op. cit., pp.46-53,
Klitgaard, Robert. 1988. Controlling Corruption. Los 
Angeles: University of California Press.
Kivutha, Kibwana, et al. 1994. The Anatomy of corruption: 
Legal, Political and Socio-Economic Perspectives. 
Monograph No. 7, Nairobi.
Kpundeh, Sarh John. 1992. Democratization in Africa: 
African Views, African Voices: Summary of Three 
Workshops. Washington D.C.,: National Academy Press.
Knox, R.A. 1949. The Old Testament. Vol. II, Amos, 1:12
(trans.) Burns and Oates and Washburn, London.
Leff, Nathaniel. 1964. "Economic Development Through 
Bureaucratic Corruption", American Behavioral 
Scientist. 8(3):8-14.
"Letter from the President", BBC Focus On Africa. July- 
September 1997.
Leys, Colins. 1965. "What is the Problem About
Corruption?", The Journal of Modern African Studies. 
3(2):228-60.
Lief, Louis, and Douglas Pasternak. "Payback Time: Our Man
in Kinshasa, Zaire gets the bum's rush from
Washington". U.S. Mews and World Report. 2 August 
1993.
Little, Walter, and Eduardo Posada-Carbo. 1996. Political 
Corruption in Europe and Latin America. London: 
MacMillan Press Ltd.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
226
Lowestern, Daniel H. 1985. "Political Bribery and the 
Immediate Theory of Politics", UCLA Law Review. 
3:785-851.
Lowi, Theodore J. 1981. "The Intelligent Person's Guide to 
Political Corruption", Public Affairs. 82:
Macrae, J. 1982. "Underdevelopment and the Economics of 
Corruption: A Game Theory Approach", World 
Development. 10:677-97.
Mauss, Marcel. 1967. The Gift: Forms and Functions
Exchange in Archaic Societies, (trans.) Ian Cunnison 
New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc.
Maren, Michael. "Hear No Evil", African Report. November- 
December 198 6.
Mathaai, Wangari. 1994. "Bottlenecks of Development in 
Africa." Presented at Schumacher Lecture, Bristol 
England.
Mbaku, J.M. 1982. "Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa : The 
Futility of Cleanups", CATO Journal.
_____ , 1994. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Policy
Reform in Africa", Journal of Social, Political and 
Economic Studies. 19 (2):149-75.
McMillan, M. 1961. "A Theory of Corruption", Sociological 
Review. 9(2) : 181-201.
______ , 1978. "Corruption in the Public Service of
British Colonies and Ex-Colonies in West Africa", 
in Heidenheimer, op. cit., pp. 317-30.
Mgyenyi, Meddy.1988. "Development First, Democracy Second", 
Democratic Theory In Africa. London: James Currey.
Miller, David M, and Clark D. Moore. 1970. The Middle
East of Yesterday and Today. New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger.
Miller, Nathan. 1976. The Fondling Finaglers. New York: 
Mackay.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
227
Miller, Rory. 1996. "Foreign Capital, the State and 
Political Corruption in Latin America between 
Independence and Depression" (ed.) Little and 
Posada-Carbo, op. cit., pp. 65-95.
Mittleman, James H. 1988. Out From Underdevelopment: 
Prospects for the Third World. New York: St.
Martin's Press.
Moody-Stuart, George. "The Cost of Grand Corruption", 
Transparency International Press Release. 1996.
Morris, Stephen D. 1991. Corruption and Politics in
Contemporary Mexico. Tuscaloosa : The University of 
Alabama Press.
Mshindi, Tom. "With this Land Mania, it's a grim future for 
All", Daily Nation. 31 May 1996.
Mugoya, Ndungu. "Tribalism and Politics of Patronage in 
Kenya", Finance Magazine. 31 March 1996.
Muthai, Wahome. "Broken Trouser Zip dashes SOS' big dreams 
of a better Payslip", Daily Nation. 2 June 1996.
Nas, T. et al. 1986. "A Policy-Oriented Theory of
Corruption", The American Political Science Review.
8 :116-50.
Nkrumah, Kwame. 1968. Dark Days in Ghana. New York: USA.
Noonan, John Jr., 1984. Bribes. New York: MacMillan 
Publishing Company.
Nye, Joseph S. "Corruption and Political Development: A 
Cost-Benefit Analysis", American Political Science 
Review. 62(2): 417-427.
Oguah, Benjamin Ewuku. 1984. "African and Western
Philosophy: A Study", in African Philosophy: An 
Introduction. Laham, MD: University of American 
Press.
Olaniyan, Richard. 1985. Nigerian History and Culture. 
Longman House: Longman.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
228
Omotoso, Kole. 1994. Seasons of Migration to the South: 
Africa's Crises Reconsidered. Cape Town, South 
Africa: Tafelberg Publisher Limited.
Onuwubu, Chukwuemeka. "Ethnic Identity, Political
Integration, and National Development: The Igbo 
Diaspora in Nigeria", The Journal of Modern Africa 
Studies. 13 (3):399-413.
Ozobia, Nathan. An Interview, October 1996, Las Vegas 
Nevada.
Padhy, Krushna Singh. 1986. Corruption in Politics. New 
Delhi, India : B.R. Publishing Corporation.
Peters, John G., and Susan Welch. 1978. "Political
Corruption in America : A Search for Definitions and 
a Theory, Or If Political Corruption Is in the 
Maintenance of Politics, Why Is It Not in the 
Mainstream of American Political Research?". The 
American Political Science Review. 72(3):974-84.
Plato. 1961. The Laws. (ed.), Edith Hamilton, and 
Huntington Cairns, New York: Patheon.
Ralph, Braibaint. 1962. "Reflections on Bureaucratic 
Corruption", Public Administration. London.
Richburg, Keith B. 1997. Out Of America: A Black Man
Confronts Africa. New York: Harper Collins Publisher 
Inc.
Riordan, William J. 1958. Plunkitt of Tammany Hall. New 
York: USA.
Robert, Melson and Howard Wolpe. "Modernization and the
Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective", 
The Modern Political Science Review. LXIV(4) : 1123- 
60.
Rogow, Arnold A. and H.D. Laswell. 1963. Power Corruption 
and Rectitude. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
"Rogue Gallery", World Press. March 1995.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1978. Corruption : A Study In 
Political Economy. New York: Academic Press.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
229
Rotberg, Robert. 1993. "Clinton Administration and Africa", 
Current History. 92(574): 194-97.
Senturia, Joseph. 1931. "Political Corruption" in
Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. (ed.) R.A. Edwin 
Selingam. et al. London: 3(4):
Schwartz, Charles A. 1970. "Corruption and Political 
Development in the USSR", Comparative Politics.
(4):425-43.
"Scribe-Zaire, Un réussite Privée", Jeune Afrique Economie.
Paris, Vol. 129. November 1989.
Scott, James C. 1972. Comparative Political Corruption.
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.
Shostak, Marjorie. 1983. Misa: The Life and Word of a IKunq 
Woman. New York: Vintage Books.
Smertin, Yuri. 1987. Kwame Nkrumah. New York: International 
Publishers.
Spiro, Herbert. 1996. "Primacy of Political Development", 
Africa: The Primacy of Politics. New York: Random 
House.
"Galtung: Structural Theory of Imperialism", 1981. in
Theories of Comparative Politics : The Search for a 
Paradigm Reconsidered, (ed.) Chilcote Ronald H. 
Boulder: Westview Press.
Tangri, Roger. 1985. Politics in suh-Saharan Africa.
London: James Currey.
Tignor, Robert. 1993. "Political Corruption in Nigeria
Before Independence", The Journal of Modern African 
Studies, pp. 175-202.
Tilman, Robert. 1968. "Emergence of Black-Market
Bureaucracy: Administration, Development and 
Corruption in the New States", Public Administration 
Review. 28:440-62.
Tom, Mboya. 1963. Freedom and After. London
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
230
_____ , 1965. "Is African Culture Blocking Progress?,
East Africa Journal. Nairobi, l(10):26-45.
Theobald, Robin. 1990. Corruption : Causes, Consequence and 
Control. Durham: Duke University Press.
Thompson, Kenneth W. 1985. Essays On Leadership:
Comparative Insight. New York: University Press of 
America.
Turok, Ben. 1987. Africa: What Can Be Done? London:
Institute for African Alternatives: Zed Book Ltd.
Turner, William. 1937. "In Defense of Patronage", The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Sciences, pp. 22-50.
"Uganda International Conference on Empowering Civil 
Society in the Fight Against Corruption",
Transparency International Press Release. 1996.
"United Nations Practical Measures Against Corruption", in 
New York. A Conference Report. 29 May 1990.
Van Klaveren, Jacob. 1978. "The Concept of Corruption", in 
Heidenheimer, op. cit., pp. 38-4 0.
Victor Le Vine. 1975. Political Corruption: The Ghana Case. 
Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Wade, R. "The System of Administrative and Political
Corruption: Canal Irrigation in South India", The 
Journal of Development Studies. Vol. 18 :287-328.
Wallis, William. "Liberators or Oppressors?" BBC Focus On 
Africa. July-September 1997.
Watson, Paul. "The Day After Freedom Mandela Waited a Life­
time for a Liberated South Africa: Now Comes 
the Hard Part", The Toronto Star. 8 May 1994.
Warutere, Peter. "The Problem Is Not the Press", The 
Economic Review. 29 March 1993.
Weatherby, Joseph N. et al. 1994. The Other World: Issues 
And Politics of the Developing World. White Plains,
NY: Longman.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23:
Merlin, Herbert, H. 1972. "The Roots of Corruption-The 
Ghanaian Inquiry", The Journal of Modern African 
Studies. 2(2):
Webster, Third New International Dictionary Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Chicago 1966.
Whitaker, C.S. Jr., 1970. The Politics of Transitional 
Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria-1946- 
1966. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
William, Robert. 1987. Political Corruption in Africa. 
Brookfield: Gower Publishing Company.
Wraith, Ronald, and Edgar Simpkins. 1963 Corruption In 
Developing Countries. New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company Inc.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Graduate College 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Kennedy Geoffrey Ondieki
Local Address :
4421 El Campana Way 
Las Vegas, NV 8 921
Home Address:
P.O. Box 54033 
Nairobi, Kenya
Degrees :
Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, 1995 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Master of Arts, Political Science, 1997 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Special Honors and Awards :
UNLV Department Honors, 1995
The National Political Science Honors Society, 1995
The Professionals of African Heritage Outstanding
Academic Achievement, 1995
CSUN Leadership Award, 1995
Political Science Department Award, 1995
College of Liberal Arts Award, 1994
Thesis Title:
Political Corruption in sub-Saharan Africa:
A Comparative Assessment of Kenya, Nigeria, and 
Zaire/Congo
Thesis Examination Committee:
Chairperson, Dr. Mehran Tamadonfar, Ph.D.
Committee Member, Dr. Michael Bowers, Ph.D.
Committee Member, Dr. Stephen Parker, Pp.D.
Graduate Faculty Representative, Dr. Gary Palmer, Ph.D.
232
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IMAGE EVALUATION 
TEST TARGET (Q A -3 )
1.0
1.1
Üà
\22
L6
1.25 il.4 1.6
150mm
<?> /
W
V
%
/APPLIED ^  IIVMGE. Inc1653 East Main Street Roctiester. NY 14609 USA Phone: 716/482-0300 . ^ ^ ^ 5  Fax: 716/288-5989
0 1993, Applied Image. Inc.. A I FUgMs Reseived
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
